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RESUMEN  
 
En esta tesis, se investiga la relación existente entre la economía informal y el desarrollo de 
un país, centrándose en cómo la economía informal afecta a los ingresos públicos. Junto a la 
delimitación de este concepto, se muestra la relación entre la percepción de la corrupción y 
la carga fiscal y se lleva a cabo una cuantitativa de la evasión fiscal en los países de la Unión 
Europea. Como una dimensión de la economía informal, se analiza la transparencia en la 
normativa tributaria internacional. Así, se estudia la medida en que los nuevos estándares 
internacionales relativos a la documentación sobre precios de transferencia podrían mejorar 
la transparencia en la tributación de empresas multinacionales. Por último, se analiza si las 
fuentes de financiación afectan al pago de impuestos y al margen aplicado por las 
microempresas, y como esto podría generar ineficiencias, que a su vez favorecerían la 
economía informal.  
Con respecto a la carga fiscal, se halla evidencia de una relación positiva entre el Índice de 
percepción de la corrupción y el Índice de pago de los impuestos. Se observa, también, una 
relación negativa entre la economía informal y el tipo impositivo para las empresas. Esto 
implicaría que un tipo de impuestos de sociedades alto es sinónimo de buen gobierno.  
Con respecto a la brecha del IVA o VAT gap, se estudia su evolución en la última década en 
los países europeos. Se aprecia que este diferencial resulta ser más alto, con respecto al PIB, 
en Italia, Grecia  los países del este de Europa. Asimismo, se calcula el peso de la crisis sobre 
la esta brecha del IVA; en este sentido, se encuentra que las economías más afectadas son 
las de Letonia, Rumania, Eslovaquia, Irlanda, Francia y España. Por último, se ofrece una 
estimación del déficit recaudatorio del IVA para el año 2013. La brecha del IVA resulta de 
utilidad a la hora de explicar el volumen de la evasión de impuestos: considerando que parte 
del déficit se refiere a IVA no declarado y que éste expresa ventas no declaradas, se aplica 
sobre estas últimas una tasa de impuesto medio, para sociedades y autónomos, para estimar 
la evasión de impuestos de los países de la Unión Europea. El resultado obtenido indica que 
Grecia, Eslovaquia e Italia son los países con una mayor evasión sobre el total de impuestos. 
Con respecto a la transparencia internacional, se comparan las diferentes propuestas de lo 
que se conoce como “Información país por país” (Country By Country Reporting, CBCR). 
Las propuestas han sido realizadas recientemente por la OCDE, EE.UU., la Comisión 
Europea, el Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) y Canadá. La tesis se centra 
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en la versión de la OCDE, que es la más difundida y la que podría ser adoptada a nivel 
internacional. En este contexto, se propone que sería necesario establecer una información 
país por país específica para grupos de empresas. Éstas deberían ser desagregadas según su 
tamaño, forma jurídica y actividad. Cada grupo debería proporcionar información acerca de 
la actividad y de las empresas que participan en la cadena de producción. Tal información 
podría ser utilizada no sólo para el control de precios de transferencia, sino también para la 
investigación de muchos otros propósitos tales como: los controles de corrupción, el respeto 
de los derechos laborales, el control del impacto ambiental, la prevención del blanqueo de 
capitales y la financiación del terrorismo, la sostenibilidad del comercio y el grado de 
transparencia de las instituciones públicas. Al mismo tiempo, sería útil disponer de más 
información contable y extracontable.  
En la tesis se investiga también la relación entre el acceso al crédito por las empresas y la 
economía informal. El acceso al crédito constituye una parte fundamental en el desarrollo 
de una economía. Por eso, se estudia cómo la crisis financiera afecta al acceso al crédito, 
centrando el análisis sobre España, Francia e Italia. Se propone una comparación de medias, 
donde se observa que la tasa efectiva del Impuesto de sociedades es, en promedio, durante 
ese período, de 24,41% para España, 16,47% para Francia y 55,69% para Italia. Además, se 
calcula que la media de impuestos pagados por cada 1.000 euros de ventas para este período 
es: 6,2 euros para España, 9,3 euros para Francia y 12,9 euros para Italia. La comparación 
de medias de los recargos entre el precio de venta y el coste de adquisición muestra una 
diferencia importante entre países: 81,4% para España, 100,4% para Francia y 70,7% para 
Italia. Tal diferencia se aprecia también desagregando las empresas según la fuente de 
financiación que utilizan. Adicionalmente, se elaboran dos modelos de regresión para 
explicar mejor el efecto de la crisis financiera y de las fuentes de financiación sobre los 
impuestos pagados y en el margen aplicado por las microempresas durante el periodo 2007-
2014, en España, Francia e Italia. En este ámbito, cabe destacar que en España y Francia las 
diferentes fuentes de financiación influyen significativamente en el impuesto pagado, al 
mismo tiempo que el margen aplicado resulta ser dependiente de estas variables, sobre todo 
en Italia. 
Como se muestra en la tesis, los países con mejores instituciones tienen sistemas fiscales 
más eficientes. Los gobiernos y la comunidad internacional han propuesto estándares para 
favorecer la cooperación a nivel internacional en materia transparencia, los cuales tienen un 
alto potencial, pero deben ser consensuados e implementados de la manera más eficiente 
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para crear no sólo un sistema fiscal más equitativo, sino una economía sostenible. 
Finalmente, se ha visto cómo existen situaciones en las que la economía informal y la evasión 
de impuestos pueden relacionarse con otros problemas tales como la disponibilidad de 
financiación para las microempresas cuyo conocimiento puede permitir abordarlos. En estos 
casos, un aumento de recaudación podría derivar de la solución de estos problemas más que 
por una subida de impuestos. Finalmente, se mantiene que la economía informal y la evasión 
de impuestos son, en gran parte, resultado de las políticas fiscales más que una elección 
particular y que reflejan el nivel de desarrollo de un país. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Informal economy is a complex matter that can be seen as the result of the economic status 
of a country and has thus become a modus operandi. Many factors contribute to establishing 
the context of informal behaviours. The State plays a major role contributing to 
strengthening institutions and enforcing legislation. Thus fiscal policy can contribute to 
reducing informal economy. In this thesis the problem of informal economy has been 
reviewed using various approaches.  
 
Informal Economy is defined in the first chapter. Since there is no universal definition of 
informal economy, various perspectives are investigated in the literature. Concurrently it 
may be seen that different approaches to the problem reveal varying causes. The focus of 
this thesis is the effect of informal economy on government revenue. In this regard an 
analysis is provided into the main causes of tax burden, intensity of regulation and 
governance, and their contribution to informal economy. From this prospective, informal 
economy may be seen as a result of the combination of the aforementioned variables and not 
as the cause of them. Thus in order to consider development or revenue mobilization, it is 
first necessary to focus on tax policy, institutions and the like. Moreover, to better evaluate 
the informal economy, it is first necessary to get an estimate of the problem. However, since 
informal economy is essentially unmeasurable, an estimation is given for the retail sector of 
European Countries. At the base of the calculation the VAT gap was used, and an analysis 
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provided of the different methods to calculate VAT gap. In the literature there are two 
approaches, namely the ‘bottom-up’ and the ‘top-down’ methods. The bottom-up method 
calculates the VAT gap starting from the consumption aggregate and applying the right VAT 
rate. The result gives the VTTL which should be collected by the government after 
discounting the loss in VAT due to exemptions, rate reductions and all the other losses 
accepted by the law; the difference between this theoretical value and what it is recollected 
gives the VAT gap. Conversely, using the top-down method, the Full VAT is calculated first, 
that is the VAT the governments could be collecting if they apply the standard rate to all the 
operations. From this value is subtracted the policy gap, which is equal to the VAT loss due 
to rate reductions and exemptions, and the result is equal to VTTL using the bottom-up 
method. Over-riding this, an investigation is made of the impact to VAT of the economy 
down turn during the recession period. Ultimately, due to the VAT gap it is possible to 
calculate (with the right assumptions), the level of tax evasion.  
In the second chapter there is an investigation into how the informal economy could be also 
an expression of international standards in tax matter. For the last decade and especially 
since the financial crisis started, it has been observed that problems concerning tax avoidance 
and tax evasion were getting more attention at an international level. The last important 
project related to this area was the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) carried out by 
OECD. Among multiple topics, specific focus is placed on Country By Country Reporting 
(CBCR). CBCR is a report that large multinational companies will have to submit to improve 
transparency in transfer pricing operation and in tax planning. This proposal by the OECD 
was one of several that was suggested in recent years. Another example, the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) applies its standards in the natural resource sector, 
especially in developing countries. The European Commission, United States and Canada 
have also made their own proposals. These different solutions to improving transparency in 
the operation of multinational companies are compared. A major problem is that many 
countries do not know what multinational companies do at international level; the 
advantages and limitations of each proposal are highlighted and compared.  
The final chapter provides a study into how access to finance changed during the financial 
crisis as this could spread the effect of the it and in this way undermine the margin of the 
companies and the revenue the government could collect. The first part of the chapter gives 
the result of a survey done by European Commission and European Central Bank. The 
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different factors of the shadow bank are assessed as well as the change of success rate in 
obtaining finance in equity, loan and other forms, in order to give a better understanding of 
the effect of the crisis in the financial sector. The next section provides an analysis sample 
of more than 8,000 micro companies of the retail sector of three countries, namely, Spain, 
France and Italy, in three year periods. The years 2008, 2011 and 2014, were selected to 
better illustrate the effect of the crisis. The results highlight the effective corporate tax rate, 
and by means of comparison, changes in taxes paid and margin applied with respect to the 
source of finance which the countries prefer. Although, Spain, France and Italy have similar 
economies they present different results. A regression model was built to investigate a casual 
effect relation in the previous variables. This analysis shows how in the three countries, the 
different source of finance and response to the financial crisis effects the taxes paid and the 
margin that the countries applied. 
The thesis is completed with an overall summary and conclusion of my findings, a 
bibliography and annex are also supplied. 
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1.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1.1 Introduction 
 
In these last years, especially with the economic-financial crisis that has affected many 
countries, states have admitted that tax evasion and tax avoidance have reached a level that 
undermines economic activities and democracies. 
At the international level, major organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation Development (OECD), the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) are searching for strategies to address these problems both in developing and 
developed economies. 
 
1.1.2 Definition of informal economy 
There is no a universal definition of informal economy, authors use what best fits with the 
object of their analysis. 
Joshi for example (Joshi, et al., 2013), discriminates between registered or unregistered 
economic activity1.  
Other authors, like Andrews (Andrews, et al., 2011), first give a general definition of 
informal economy, such as “economic activities and transactions that are sufficiently 
hidden” and then explain the areas and subjects that are most affected. The areas identified 
are social protection, tax evasion and economic growth, while subjects are employees, self-
employed and companies.  
Perry (Perry, et al., 2007), relates informal economy to “bad things”, such as unprotected 
workers, evasion of the rule of law2, and like Andrews, he analyses three groups: workers, 
micro-businesses and companies.  
                                                 
1 “The conception of the informal sector thus moved to a focus on the legal status of the business: whether or 
not it was registered and followed appropriate legislation. It is this legal definition that has widespread use 
today (Gerxhani 2004, Kenyon 2007)” (Joshi, et al., 2013). 
2 “The term informality means different things to different people, but almost always bad things: unprotected 
workers, excessive regulation, low productivity, unfair competition, evasion of the rule of law, underpayment 
or non-payment of taxes, and work “underground” or in the shadows”. (Perry, et al., 2007). 
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Schneider (Schneider & Buehn, 2009) defines informal economy as, ¨all market-based legal 
production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities to 
avoid: payment of income, value added, social security contributions, legal labour market 
standards and administrative procedures¨. All these different definitions highlight the need 
to delineate the concept of informal economy taking into account subjects and areas. 
In this paper, we define the informal economy as what should be formal according to the 
law of a state but it is not. We will limit the analysis to the activities that affect public 
revenue and expenditure and, at the same time, cause a distortion in the market. 
In summary, informality will be defined as that the part of the economy affecting efficiency 
of both public revenue and expenditure, undermining the potential socio-economic 
development of a country or a region. 
With respect to public revenue, the informal economy decreases them and alters the 
distribution of the tax burden. Regarding expenditure, ineffective and/or inefficient 
management policies cause a waste of public resources. 
From this perspective, we can also consider the informal economy when the ratio between 
tax burden and public services established by the State does not match the one desired by its 
citizens. This happens when citizens consider tax burden too high in comparison with the 
level of public service.  
There are several reasons why people choose to stay in a formal or an informal economy. 
For example, someone may consider a formal economy to be too high and an unnecessary 
cost. In contrast, others may prefer a formal economy because they expect to increase their 
activity or not to pay a fine, or simply because it is correct to do so. That is to say, it is 
important that the government should offer concrete advantages to being formal and not only 
justify the tax burden with generic public services. So, if there are not relevant advantages 
to being formal (albeit not paying a fine), then it is more likely that people would prefer to 
be totally or partially informal. In that case, the informal economy is the result of a personal 
cost-benefit analysis in the short to medium term. 
“A study by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE) on strengthening local taxation 
in Africa, based on surveys in Benin, Cameroun, Ghana, Mali and Mauritania, showed that 
people often refused to pay tax because they could see little in return in terms of government 
services or investments. The study showed that this circle of non-compliance is hard to 
break. Lack of resources and a lack of capable local administration staff resulted typically 
1. Definition of Informal Economy and Estimation of Tax Evasion for European Countries 
 
 
8 
 
in low quality goods and services to citizens. […] However, in some cases local authorities 
made efforts to communicate and explain actions they had taken to provide services. […] 
For example to inform citizens of a market renovation which was carried out with public 
funds coming from local taxes. Experience showed that these awareness-raising measures 
only succeed when a link could be established between taxes and a concrete project 
considered useful by citizens”. (OECD, 2008) 
There is also a different approach based on the fact that taxation should be included in the 
social responsibility of a company. In this consideration, taxation should not be considered 
as a cost, but “a distribution out of profits. That puts tax in the same category as a dividend—
are returned to the stakeholders in the enterprise. This reflects the fact that companies do 
not make profit merely by using investors’ capital. They also use the societies´ in which they 
operate, whether that is the physical infrastructure provided by the state, the people the state 
has educated, or the legal infrastructure that allows companies to protect their property 
rights. Tax is the return due on this investment by society from which companies benefit. 
Moreover, tax is properly due to the state in which a company generates its profit, not to 
that state to which it can relocate its profit for taxation purposes”. (Eijsden, 2013) 
Finally, we specify that this concept of informal economy, does not consider illegal activities 
that are naturally part of the informal economy. This could be relevant considering that 
illegal activities affect the formal economy in several ways. 
 
1.1.3 Main causes of the informal economy  
Many factors cause or encourage an informal economy depending on the country and the 
historical period to which we refer. It is important to be aware of the main factors of the 
problem in order to adopt appropriate policies.  
The informal economy also has a historical and cultural nature. There are countries where it 
is widespread and is not perceived as such, but as another way of doing business, often the 
only way. In most cases, when the informal economy has reached a significant size, we have 
a problem of poor public governance (Moore, 2007) (OECD, 2008). 
First, the form of government affects the informal economy. When there is not a strong 
relationship between the state and its citizens, then the latter seek alternative ways to operate 
forming what could be defined as an informal economy (this time with a wider connotation 
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than when it is purely motivated in tax matters). An example of a form of government that 
can counter the rise of the informal economy is a democracy. 
However, for good governance, you also need an appropriate institutional apparatus upon 
which the relationship between citizen and government is founded. In these countries, people 
have a particular interest to operate in the formal economy, as an economic activity, to grow, 
requires public institutions and the informal economy consequently has a reduced 
dimension. 
The literature highlights three main factors that have a strong correlation with the informal 
economy. These are “tax burden”, “intensity of regulations”, “governance structure”. 
(OECD, 2010) (Schneider & Buehn, 2009)  
This vision is not exhaustive, but it gives a better understanding of what we should consider 
when we study how to lower an informal economy. 
Thus we select the following three factors that could have a main correlation in an informal 
economy: fiscal burden, intensity of the law and public services3. (Schneider & Buehn, 2009) 
 
1.1.3.1 Tax burden  
Fiscal burden is a primary factor to incentive people to choose the informal economy. 
Supposing a State gives money instead of demanding it, then people would comply with the 
formal economy. 
“The literature frequently cites tax evasion as a key reason for firms to operate informally. 
Firms evade taxes when they under-report their income or profits in order to evade taxes or 
fail to pay valued added, sales, real estate or other taxes.” (OECD, 2010) 
Schneider (2009) divides between tax and social security contribution burdens. “The bigger 
the difference between the total cost of labour in the official economy and the after-tax 
earnings (from work), the greater is the incentive to avoid this difference and to work in the 
shadow economy. Since this difference depends broadly on the social security 
burden/payments and the overall tax burden, they latter are key features of the existence and 
the increase of the shadow economy” (Schneider & Buehn, 2009) 
                                                 
3 The actors of the informal economies are divided into three groups: black employees; self-employed without 
employees working in the informal way; production of goods and services by formal and informal companies. 
(Andrews, et al., 2011) 
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This is mainly because the labour force has a special connection with the informal economy. 
Moreover, a way to quantify the informal economy is through the number of black workers. 
(Perry, et al., 2007) 
There are three main type of taxes: direct taxes (corporate and personal), indirect tax (mainly 
VAT) and social security contributions. 
In our analysis, like other authors4, we found a positive correlation when we considered 
fiscal burden for the overall 2013 Paying Taxes ranking5 by the World Bank versus the rank 
2013 of Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
 
 
Figure 1–1. Correlation between Corruption Perception Index (CPI) rank 2013 (Transparency International, 2013) and 
Paying Taxes rank 2013 (World Bank, 2013)- Own calculation- 
Therefore, we analysed whether the fiscal corporate burden has a strong correlation with 
ICP, and in more general terms with the informal economy. We compared corporate tax rate 
                                                 
4 “Empirical results of the influence of the tax burden on the shadow economy is provided in the studies of 
Schneider (1994b, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2007) and Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a, 1998b); they 
all found statistically significant evidence for the influence of taxation on the shadow economy”. (Schneider & 
Buehn, 2009). 
5 This rank is a combination of three index: Payments (number per year); Time (hours per year); Total tax rate 
(% of profit). 
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of 108 countries throughout the world. We took the rate from 2006 to 2013 and the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and we did not find any significant linear correlation6.  
Kuehn records the same result “despite a positive relation between tax rates and the informal 
economy, for countries with equally high tax rates, informal economy estimates are 
strikingly different.” (Kuehn, 2007 Version 2009) In the conclusion of his analysis, Kuehn 
reckons that: “differences in tax rates alone do not account for differences in the informal 
economy across high-income countries. […] The quality of governance plays a more 
significant role in accounting for the observed differences in informal economy.” (Kuehn, 
2007 Version 2009) 
Furthermore, when we compare Informal Economy 2012, calculated by Schneider 
(Schneider, 2012), versus the corporate tax rate 2013 (KPMG, 2014) for European countries 
and others7 we found a negative linear correlation. This means that, high tax rates match to 
low informal economies. 
 
 
Figure 1–2. Correlation between Informal economy 2012 (Schneider, 2012) and Corporate tax rate 2013 (KPMG, 2014) 
- Own calculation 
                                                 
6 Change in tax rate 2006-2013 / CPI 2013 Score - Pearson correlation 0,185; Corporate tax rate 2013 / CPI 
2013 Score - Pearson correlation 0,075; Change in tax rate 2006-2013 / Country Rank CPI 2006-2013 - Pearson 
correlation -0,115. We repeat this correlation with 31 Europe countries and we found no correlations. 
7 Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United States (USA). 
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Moreover, there is a positive correlation between high percentage of tax revenue over GDP 
and developed economies where informal economy is lower.8 A high rate of this percentage 
is matched with quite advanced public institution. Except for the Anglo-Saxon countries that 
usually have a lower share, from 1965 to 2012 the fiscal income in percentage of GDP has 
increased. (OECD, 2013) In this way, the real fiscal burden could be symptomatic of the 
robustness of the institutional framework of that country.  
High rate tax could also be a real problem of competitiveness. “Higher tax rates can remove 
the productivity advantage of large formal firms. When the cumulative cost of complying 
with tax and other regulations is high, informal firms will have a substantial competitive 
advantage over formal firms, which may prevent the entry or expansion of formal firms in 
the market.” (OECD, 2010) 
Less competitiveness is correlated with an informal economy: “the negative relation across 
21 high-income OECD countries between the Global Competitiveness Index and estimates 
of the informal economy. This negative relationship is robust to various alternative measures 
of institutional quality by the World Bank such as the Government Effectiveness Index, the 
Rule of Law Index, or the Control of Corruption Index. (Kaufmannet al 2006)” (Kuehn, 2007 
Version 2009) 
The fiscal burden is not a stand-alone problem: it is a political matter. It has a strong impact 
upon the citizens, and it is, quite often, a relevant factor of the political agenda. Changes in 
the fiscal burden could be better way to handle the fiscal function of redistribution of the 
wealth. So for example, there could be a reduction in tax rate for new companies or 
companies with high investment on innovation. 
Talking about informal economy and tax rate, what we are looking for is the equilibrium 
between the level of the tax rate and the income needed by the State. Thus, we do not find a 
strong linear correlation between high tax rate and informal economy, we know that taxes 
are a cost for companies and people, therefore the lower the better. 
With this focus, we could say that the level of tax rate could have a stronger impact on private 
cost than on informal economy and so it could be a tool of economic policy. 
                                                 
8 “At the top level of informality, we find Sub-Saharan Africa, and at the lowest level of informality, we find 
the OECD countries.” (Schneider, et al., 2010) 
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For example, between 2007 and 2012 Germany and Canada lowed their corporate tax rate 
respectively to 9,00% and 10,00% (KPMG, 2014). This reduction, during the economic 
crisis, has given a lower tax cost of compliance for companies.  This is important because 
there is a correlation between tax rate and public revenue. In a curve obtained by Laffer we 
find an inverse u correlation between tax rate and public revenue. Some of the problems of 
this curve are to determine which tax rate maximizes the revenue and the elasticity of the 
two variables.  
We already know that when taxes do not cover all the public expenditure, governments 
usually borrow by issuing government bonds or acquire finance directly from a supranational 
organization (e.g. the World Bank) or international financial institutions. Moreover, the 
margin for a possible increase in the tax rate is also due to the economic trend. So when the 
economy is growing this margin tends to increase too; unlike during a financial-economic 
crisis the fiscal cost is more relevant and thus the margin becomes less. In these cases, a 
State could offset the drop in revenue produced by the crisis with an increase in the tax rate. 
However, if the tax burden was already quite high a further increase could depress economic 
activities and encourage tax evasion; and thereby increase the informal economy. 
Therefore, some countries, especially in Europe, are paying greater attention to public 
finances. In particular, they try to divide the current public spending by the extraordinary, 
and to find the elasticity of revenue with respect to the economic trend.  
In summary, when asking what relation exists between the tax burden and the informal 
economy and in general economic growth, we have found that there is a positive linear 
correlation between paying taxes and the informal economy (or ICP). However, this 
correlation disappears when we take into consideration the corporate tax rate.  
In a period of recession, it could be more difficult to determine a tax compliance behaviour. 
If the State does not have the opportunity to reduce the rate, then it should probably increase 
it in order to avoid a high public deficit. This could result in an excessive cost that could 
increase the informal economy. Therefore, countries with a good public accountability have 
low informal economies  
1.1.3.2 Intensity of the law 
 
Legislation in tax administration is not only necessary but it is important because it 
guarantees the redistribution function of the fiscal system. It could be described as an inverse 
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U curve. Too much legislation increases the fiscal compliance cost and at the same time it 
could be used to legitimate elusion methods9.  
In the converse “specific and targeted rules which link the tax treatment in the country 
concerned to the tax treatment in another country in appropriate situations hold significant 
potential to address certain hybrid mismatch arrangements and have recently been 
introduced by a number of countries.” (OECD, 2012) 
So, if on the one hand, legislation is necessary to better handle tax evasion and manage public 
services, but on the other, an abuse of it provokes, as we have already said, more loopholes. 
“Overly burdensome or inefficient regulation can, in turn, significantly increase the cost of 
both joining the formal economy and operating within it. By reducing these barriers, policy 
makers can increase participation in the formal economy. Furthermore, reducing 
unnecessary restrictions on businesses may increase the intensity of competition in the 
formal economy as more firms may be willing to enter it.” (OECD, 2010) 
 
 
The World Bank quantifies the size of intensity of the legislation around the world in their 
study “Doing Business”, “The DBIs are designed to capture that ease of doing business in 
ten areas, one of which monitors the ease of registering a business.” In measuring the ease 
of starting a business, countries are ranked on:  
 the number of procedures that a company needs to complete before legally starting 
operations; 
 the time (in terms of number of days) necessary to complete each of these procedures;  
 the cost to complete each of these procedures and to start operating the business (as 
a percentage of income per-capita) and  
                                                 
9 This happens because there are political reasons in legislation. Therefore, broadly, there is not poor 
governance at all but political measures defend the interest of the elite instead of all of population. “…the state 
is behaving in a deliberately and coherently exclusionary manner, manifesting an underlying stable political-
economy equilibrium where incumbent business and labour elites defend their rents and will find ways to offset 
and nullify any tinkering” (Perry, et al., 2007) 
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 the minimum capital that must be paid in by firms in order to start a business (as a 
percentage of income per-capita). (OECD, 2010) 
 
Talking about labour regulations cover hiring, firing, severance pay, minimum wage, and 
overtime hours and pay as well as mandatory benefits packages, social security payments, 
rights of association and collective bargaining rights, among others. “They are often enacted 
and designed to protect workers from unfair and discriminatory actions”.  “While 
governments try to find the right balance between protecting workers and ensuring labour 
market flexibility, most developing countries put excessive rigidity to the detriment of 
businesses and workers alike.  Businesses, as a result, are more likely to hire informally 
when regulations are less flexible”. (OECD, 2010)  
Research backs this up and finds an association between intensity of tax and the extent of 
informality within an economy. (World Bank, 2007) 
Also, a competition agency, in addressing market distortion caused by the informal 
economy, has to understand why firms operate in the shadows rather than as part of the 
formal economy. While there are many reasons, one documented cause is that burdensome 
regulations can make it difficult for entrepreneurs to enter the formal market and thus drive 
them underground (OECD, 2010).  
 
Business registration regulations burden. 
 “De Soto (1989), Djankov et al. (2002), Friedman et al. (2000), Loayza, Servén, 
and Oviedo (2005), and Schneider (2005), among many others, have stressed the 
very high registration costs, the regulatory burden to becoming formal, as well as 
the high ongoing costs of fully integrating with the state that drive firms to stay off 
the state’s radar.” (Perry, et al., 2007) 
“Recent studies have conducted extensive empirical testing of this proposition 
using Doing Business and other related indicators. Bruhn (2011, 2013), among the 
leading studies employing natural experiments, use quarterly national employment 
data collected by the Mexican government between 2000 and 2004 and the fact that 
different regions started implementing business registration reform—called 
Systems of Fast Opening of Firms (SARE)´´ (World Bank, 2013) 
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1.1.3.3 Governance and public services 
Another relevant factor when studying the cause of informal economy, is public service and 
the general governance. We do not refer only to the public services to the community, but 
also to the policies to reduce informal economy and, among other things, increase tax 
compliance. 
We analysed the following three dimensions in which a State relates to their economic 
activities: governance in general, public services and community interests. They are not 
fixed areas since governance could also include the other two sections.  
Therefore, our question was how a State through governance, public sector and community 
interests could maximize the formal economy, the social and economic development. We 
started from the concept that in a globalized world, a region is strategic for economic 
activities, basically, for two reasons: it is an important market to sell in and/or it is rich in 
resources (human, capital, naturals…). 
When we talk about governance in general, we refer not only to public institutions but also 
the organization of the government. Some studies show the importance of the State for the 
private sector. The State´s role changes, due to the context, to follow or anticipate the 
evolution of the economy. “Sound public institutions that can adequately secure property 
rights, establish an impartial judiciary and reduce corruption are perhaps the most 
fundamental contributions that public policy can make to promoting participation in the 
formal sector´´ (Loayza, 1996; de Soto, 1989). “Indeed, countries with a strong rule of law 
As Hernando De Soto notes: “As in Peru, for example, it takes a new entrepreneur 
thirteen years to overcome the legal and administrative hurdles required to build 
a retail market for food that would help take vendors off the street; twenty-one 
years to obtain authorisation to construct a legally titled building on wasteland; 
twenty-six months to get authorisation to operate a new bus route; and nearly a 
year, working six hours a day, to gain the legal license to operate a sewing machine 
for commercial purposes” (Soto, 2002) 
 
“Only 3 OECD countries (United States, Australia and Denmark) are listed among 
the top 10 in terms of ease of employment.  High severance costs encourage firms 
to use informal labour as employment decisions do not always work out well and 
economic downturns may lead to costly layoffs.” (OECD, 2010) 
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– proxied by a legal system that protects property rights, have an independent judiciary and 
an impartial court system – tend to have a smaller informal sector.”10 (Andrews, et al., 2011) 
In this context, we could also talk about effectiveness of governance: “…firms may either be 
under reporting revenue or the number of employees in order to hide activities from corrupt 
government officials or because firms simply do not want to pay taxes and finance an 
ineffective government”. (OECD, 2010) 
Kuehn (2007 Version 2009) presents a model where he found correlation between 
governance and informality. Furthermore, when he took into account different levels of tax 
rate the correlation got stronger. 
Next, we will analyse the relationship between public services, informal economy and fiscal 
burden.  
In other words, public services could justify part of the fiscal burden and they have an effect 
on informal economy. Moreover, we postulate the hypothesis that an economy activity needs 
a set of public services to operate, at least at the basic stage. Law, policies, infrastructures 
are some of these services.  
“Disclosure of public expenditure information, and the participation of and supervision by 
citizens—that is, “voice”—in the way taxes will be spent, may also help increase trust in the 
state and may contribute to social norms of compliance. These factors have been credited 
with success in increasing tax compliance (and collections) in Chile and Spain, particularly 
through widespread consensus among political parties about the need for the reform of the 
tax system, improved democratic governance, and highly visible enhancements in social and 
other public services.” (Perry, et al., 2007) Moreover, “this finding indicates that countries 
with better institutional quality (e.g., bureaucracy quality or corruption) can potentially 
raise tax collection without undue extra burden on the economy”. (Minh Le, et al., 2012) 
                                                 
10 Rule of law refers is an index based on seven components: judicial independence, impartial courts, protection 
of property rights, military interference in rule of law and the political process, integrity of the legal system, 
legal enforcement of contracts and regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property. These indicators were 
assembled from three primary sources: the International Country Risk Guide, the Global Competitiveness 
Report, and the World Bank’s Doing Business project.  Source: Euro Barometer 2007 Survey of undeclared 
work in the European Union, OECD STAN Database, and Economic Freedom of the World, Annual Report 
2010 
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Among the services directly connected with tax compliance, we agree with Perry (2007) 
when said: “Promoting taxpayer education and developing taxpayer services in filing 
returns and paying taxes, broadcasting advertisements that link taxes with government 
services, stimulating voluntary compliance by lowering compliance costs, simplifying taxes 
and their payment, and promoting a taxpayer—and a tax administrator—“code of ethics” 
have proved to be useful complementary measures to the punishment paradigm to enhance 
compliance.” (Perry, et al., 2007) 
Keeping tax rate fixed, we could increase tax compliance through the “carrot and stick” 
approach where the “carrot” is the set of policies and public services to promote, directly 
and indirectly, compliance and the “stick” is the tax burden apparatus of resources to audit 
and control the respect of the law. This is just to say that the two thing come together because 
both are services. Likewise, we could also think that the private sector gives “carrots” to the 
government by paying taxes and if it does not receive the right set of services through the 
election’s system the “stick” is used on the government. “Effective government enforcement 
encourages firms to comply with tax and other regulations. When insufficient resources are 
dedicated towards audit and collection programs for example, the incentive of firms to evade 
the rule of law increases, however. Low and inconsistent penalties also encourage such 
behaviour. In particular, perceptions of government ineffectiveness are associated with 
greater informality while corruption is positively related to it”. (OECD, 2010) 
In this area, it is important to tax administrative structure and management. “The use of 
semiautonomous revenue authorities has been shown in several countries to improve tax 
administration with a more service-oriented approach to tax enforcement. The service 
paradigm fits squarely with the perspective that emphasizes the role of social norms in tax 
compliance. Experience from other countries shows that a government’s commitment to even 
handily enforce the tax laws while facilitating taxpayer compliance can have an important 
effect on the pervasive culture of noncompliance found in many countries in the region.” 
(Perry, et al., 2007) So, “… reforms should also emphasize the “service paradigm” with 
policies to enhance the role of the tax administration as a facilitator and a provider of 
services to taxpayer-citizens.” (Perry, et al., 2007)  
Other literature testifies that tax compliance is a corporate responsibility. “Tax is the missing 
element in corporate responsibility debates. Corporate responsibility should start with tax 
compliance. Anti-tax lobbies seek to portray tax as a cost. This is the wrong way to see it. 
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Tax is not a cost, but a distribution out of profits. That puts tax in the same category as a 
dividend—a return to the stakeholders in the enterprise. This reflects the fact that companies 
do not make profit merely by using investors’ capital. They also use the societies in which 
they operate, whether that is the physical infrastructure provided by the state, the people the 
state has educated, or the legal infrastructure that allows companies to protect their 
property rights. Tax is the return due on this investment by society from which companies 
benefit. Moreover, tax is properly due to the state in which a company generates its profit, 
not to that state to which it can relocate its profit for taxation purposes”11. (Eijsden, 2013) 
In addition, the European Commission promotes the three principles of good tax governance 
– namely “transparency”, “exchange of information” and “fair tax competition” – in relations 
between States. Enterprises are encouraged, where appropriate, to also work towards the 
implementation of these principles (EC, 2011). 
Turning to the third point, the State has to defend the interests of the community against a 
particular economic interest. In this area, such as the environment, labour law and so on the 
State limits the economic activities. 
“Citizens are more likely to hold their governments accountable when they have to pay more 
taxes; and as a result, the governments have incentives to design and implement policies that 
improve the welfare of the population. However, in a poverty-ridden country, without prior 
redistribution of a small share to citizens, taxation is likely to remain impossible”. 
(Devarajan , et al., 2010) 
Consequently, the more people interested and involved in the government policies the more 
accountable the government has to be to better answer social needs. 
To sum up, finding the right equilibrium between governance, public services and 
community interests is the way to increase economy activities, tax compliance, and more 
broadly development. Meanwhile we know that all these policies, to be really implemented, 
first have to be found at an international level. At international level, there are more problems 
because it is more complex, and governance could be less transparent and less accountable. 
During the last decade many international organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, 
OECD and others have stressed the need for more transparency and fair competition at the 
international level. At the same time non-governmental organizations such as the Extractive 
                                                 
11 More about the connection between tax and corporate responsibility in Tax Justice and Christian Aid. 
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Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), are trying to do the same. the EU and US have 
tried to go in the same direction, but progress is very slow. 
There are many unanswered questions, such as tax havens, or anonymous companies, 
however the main problem is competition. At the international level, countries compete with 
each other in every sector and in strategic areas like natural resources, and raw materials in 
general, which are extremely important. 
Uncontrolled globalisation tends to uniform standards in transparency, accountability, 
human right, labour right, environment, and so forth. 
 
 
 
1.2 VAT GAP AND TAX EVASION ESTIMATION  
1.2.1 Introduction 
In the first part of this dissertation we focused on how informal economy could be defined. 
It is considered that an activity which is not deemed formal according to the laws of that 
State is therefore informal. At the same time, this activity has to be relevant and should have 
consequences for both public revenue and expenditure. Then, we discussed factors which 
could increase informal economy such as tax burden, intensity of law, governance and public 
services. 
In this section of the paper, we try to quantify the informal economy. To do this we focus on 
informal economy affecting the public revenue. It is impossible to exactly quantify how big 
the informal economy is. The problem is that the informal economy represents missing data 
which can only be estimated. There is not a unique method to measure the informal economy 
because there is not a common definition of it. Also because, it can be seen as the sum of a 
number of factors. Transfer pricing, unreported sales, unregistered activities or illegal 
workers, are each examples of where the informal economy can be found. 
Another problem we face, in measuring the informal economy, is that it may vary depending 
on the region or the State we are referring to. As we have already said, governance, 
institution, legislation and corruption, are some of the indicators which we could defined as 
the "friendly informal economy". When they score badly, they foster an informal economy.  
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So, in the next analysis we estimate informal economy for European countries doing an 
indirect calculation of the tax evasion through the VAT gap. First, we report the estimation 
of VAT gap provided by The European Commission, OECD and other authorities. Secondly, 
we try to calculate the effect of the economy on tax evasion to better focus on tax compliance 
without economic distortion. Finally, using the data available, we estimate the VAT gap and 
the level of tax evasion for 2012. 
 
 
1.2.2 Informal economy VAT gap estimation in the literature 
Due to the difficulty in quantifying the real informal economy, we try to estimate the level 
of tax evasion using data about the VAT gap. To calculate the VAT gap we can choose 
between two methods: the “bottom-up” or the “top-down”. The terms used suggest the 
difference in calculation method, according to whether the data, has components added or 
deducted. 
In the following pages, we present the estimations of VAT gap for the European countries. 
We propose this data as evidence of differing approaches to the matter. For comments 
concerning the difference in the estimation and the result we refer to each study where the 
authors discuss it in detail.  
 
1.2.2.1 The “Bottom-up” method: The European Commission estimation 
A recent study sponsored by The European Commission - Director General TAXUD- 
quantifies the VAT gap for European Countries using a bottom-up method. The VAT gap is 
estimated as the difference between the VAT really received and the VAT which should 
have been received, this is also called VAT Total Tax Liability (VTTL). The VTTL takes 
into account the loss of revenue due to exemption, special regime, reduced rate, etc. 
In the study by the commission, the VTTL is calculated using a bottom-up method by 
summing-up the VAT result related to every national consumption to the correct VAT rate. 
(EC, 2013) (EC, 2014) 
 
The main groups of consumption expenditure are: 
1. Definition of Informal Economy and Estimation of Tax Evasion for European Countries 
 
 
22 
 
 Household Consumption Liability: this is the main factor. The amount of VAT is 
calculated by splitting the consumption between taxable amount and tax received. In 
other words, as the product of the appropriate VAT rates and the amount of 
consumption by individual products or services;  
 Intermediate Consumption on trade: the amount of VAT paid on inputs by 
industries that cannot claim a credit because their sales are exempt from VAT; 
 Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF): VAT paid on inputs to GFCF activities 
of industries that cannot claim a credit because their sales are exempt from VAT.  
 Government Consumption: the amount of VAT on inputs on government 
consumption that cannot be recovered because most government activities are 
exempt from VAT.   
For example, Government consumption in Education is composed of wages and salaries for 
Education workers, plus inputs into the education activities of the government at all levels. 
The VAT paid on such inputs is generally not recoverable, and therefore included into the 
VTTL. 
The difference between the VTTL, so calculated, and the VAT actually received gives us 
what we already termed as the VAT gap. The VAT gap so calculated is usually called 
compliance VAT to distinguish it from the gap related to the policy.  The policy gap is that 
part of the VAT not collected by legislation previsions. This is the case for a reduced rate 
for primary products or exemptions for services like health and education. 
 
VAT gap - Millions 
Euros 
VAT gap - 
Millions 
Euros 2012 
VAT gap on 
VTTL 2011 
Austria € 3.244 12% 
Belgium  € 2.991 10% 
Bulgaria  € 957 20% 
Czech Republic  € 3.267 22% 
Denmark  € 2.141 8% 
Estonia  € 255 14% 
Finland  € 905 5% 
France  € 25.583 15% 
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Germany  € 21.957 10% 
Greece  € 6.651 33% 
Hungary  € 2.971 25% 
Ireland  € 1.262 11% 
Italy  € 46.034 33% 
Latvia  € 818 34% 
Lithuania  € 1.436 36% 
Luxembourg  € 204 6% 
Malta  € 241 31% 
Netherlands  € 1.966 5% 
Poland  € 9.317 25% 
Portugal  € 1.228 8% 
Romania  € 8.841 44% 
Slovakia  € 2.787 39% 
Slovenia  € 270 9% 
Spain  € 12.412 18% 
Sweden  € 2.886 7% 
United Kingdom  € 16.557 10% 
Table 1–1.  (EC, 2014) 
1.2.2.2 The “Top-down” method 
Due to the difficult process of estimating the VAT gap with the “bottom-up” method, some 
authors, like OECD (OECD, 2012), prefer to calculate the VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR), also 
called, c-efficiency. The VRR is the amount of VAT that could be collected not taking into 
consideration the legislation on VAT and applying the standard VAT rate. In other words, 
is it a hypothetically value which combines the compliance gap (what we call simply VAT 
gap) and the policy gap.  
The VRR is the ratio between the actual VAT revenue and a Full VAT revenue, which is 
also called, “Notional Ideal Revenue”. The Full VAT is the theoretical amount of VAT that 
should be collected applying the standard VAT rate with no exemption or reduce rate and 
with a completed tax compliance. In other words, it is a VAT that includes, also, the 
compliance gap (what we simply call VAT gap) and the policy gap, a situation with a zero 
VAT Gap. 
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𝑉𝑅𝑅 =  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑇
 
 
 “It is clear that the VRR is a combination of the “Policy Efficiency Ratio” and the 
“Compliance Efficiency Ratio”. Methods may be developed to produce breakdowns of the 
composition of the VRR. One method may consist in using the tax expenditure (i.e. the 
revenue cost of departure from the application of the standard rate to the “entire” tax base) 
which may allow for calculating the policy efficiency ratio. The remaining difference 
between Policy Efficiency Ratio and the actual VRR would provide the compliance efficiency 
ratio by deduction”. (OECD, 2012) 
 
The estimation of VAT gap with a top-down method follows the calculation developed by 
Richard Murphy. (Murphy, 2014) 
𝑉𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐴𝑃 =  1 −
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑇 
 
 
Thanks to VRR gap calculated by the European Commission (EC) (EC, 2013) it is possible 
to calculate the amount of full VAT.  
 
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑇 =  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
(1 − 𝑉𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐴𝑃 ) 
 
 
This VAT includes the VAT receipt, the compliance gap and the policy gap.12  
In this way, if we can deduct the policy gap from the VRR gap to find a VTTL 
 
𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐿 = 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑇 (1 − 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑝) 
 
The VTTL as we already stated is the VAT that is expected after taking into account a 
reduction due to exemption and the reduced rate in VAT legislation. 
The difference between VTTL and Actual VAT revenues give the VAT gap 
 
                                                 
12 Keen (Keen, 2013) divide the policy gap between VAT exemptions and reduced rate operations.  
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𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = 𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐿 − 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 
 
The VAT gap, calculated in this fashion, is similar to the value calculated with the bottom-
up method. 
 
A. European Commission estimation 
The European Commission -Director General TAXUD- has also commissioned a study of 
VAT gap using a top-down method. The estimation reported below is from the research 
carried out by Reckon LLD to calculate the VAT gap “by identifying and measuring the 
categories of expenditure that give rise to irrecoverable VAT. The main categories of 
relevant expenditures that give rise to irrecoverable VAT are final consumption expenditure 
by households, non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH) and government, 
intermediate consumption expenditure on goods and services used in making exempt 
supplies of goods and services; and gross fixed capital formation on assets and changes in 
the stock of valuables which can be allocated to exempt supplies of goods and services”. 
(Reckon LLP, 2009) 
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VAT gap, 2006 (EUR million) (Reckon LLP, 2009) 
Member 
State 
Theoretical 
VAT 
liability 
VAT receipts VAT gap 
VAT gap 
as a share 
of 
theoretical 
liability 
AT 22.844  19.735  3.108  14% 
BE 25.360  22.569  2.791  11% 
CZ 9.216  7.541  1.675  18% 
DE 164.115  147.150  16.965  10% 
DK 23.611  22.560  1.051  4% 
EE 1.325  1.215  111  8% 
ES 63.013  61.595  1.418  2% 
FI 15.176  14.418  758  5% 
FR 140.817  131.017  9.800  7% 
GR 21.746  15.183  6.563  30% 
HU 8.882  6.813  2.070  23% 
IE 14.043  13.802  241  2% 
IT 119.197  92.860  26.337  22% 
LT 2.335  1.826  510  22% 
LU 1.961  1.941  20  1% 
LV 1.751  1.374  378  22% 
MT 463  410  53  11% 
NL 41.269  39.888  1.381  3% 
PL 23.784  22.127  1.657  7% 
PT 14.371  13.757  614  4% 
SE 29.294  28.487  807  3% 
SI 2.764  2.647  116  4% 
SK 4.632  3.320  1.312  28% 
UK 155.697  128.721  26.976  17% 
EU-25 907.667  800.955  106.712  12% 
Table 1–2. Note: EU-25 excludes Cyprus.  Non-Euro currencies converted to EUR using the average exchange rate in 
2006 
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B. OECD estimation 
The VAT Revenue Ratio provided by the OECD gives the percentage of actual VAT revenue 
on the theoretically VAT. The ratio is usually less than 1; because VAT legislation always 
gives special regime, exemption, reduced rate etc. 
“The aim of the VRR is to provide a comparative measure of a country’s ability to secure 
effectively the potential tax base for VAT. The VRR measures the difference between the VAT 
revenue actually collected and what would theoretically be raised if VAT was applied at the 
standard rate to the entire potential tax base in a “pure” VAT regime and all revenue was 
collected”. (OECD, 2012) 
As reported in the study of The European Commission (EC, 2013) of more interest could be 
the so-called VRR gap. The VRR gap is the ratio between the actual VAT and the theoretical 
VAT minus one. This part represents the lost part of VAT due to policy and compliance gap. 
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VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR) 
  Stand
ard 
VAT 
rate 
2009 
1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Difference 
2000  
2009 
                 
AUSTRALIA 10,0        0,55 0,56 0,55 0,54 0,50 0,52 0,52 
AUSTRIA 20,0 0,65 0,65 0,66 0,61 0,60 0,60 0,62 0,61 0,61 0,59 0,61 0,61 0,61 -0,01 
BELGIUM 21,0 0,57 0,61 0,50 0,53 0,50 0,47 0,51 0,48 0,50 0,52 0,51 0,48 0,47 -0,05 
CANADA 5,0     0,44 0,48 0,51 0,51 0,52 0,48 0,52 0,51 0,49 -0,02 
CHILE 19,0     0,62 0,67 0,64 0,67 0,67 0,64 0,67 0,70 0,59 -0,05 
CZECH REPUBLIC 19,0      0,43 0,43 0,41 0,57 0,53 0,55 0,58 0,56 0,13 
DENMARK 25,0 0,64 0,61 0,60 0,60 0,55 0,58 0,60 0,60 0,62 0,64 0,65 0,62 0,59 -0,02 
ESTONIA 18,0      0,73 0,70 0,69 0,75 0,81 0,80 0,67 0,76 0,05 
FINLAND 22,0      0,54 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,61 0,60 0,58 0,55 -0,05 
FRANCE 19,6 0,65 0,68 0,62 0,61 0,52 0,51 0,50 0,50 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,49 0,46 -0,04 
GERMANY 19,0 0,56 0,57 0,52 0,50 0,62 0,60 0,61 0,56 0,55 0,57 0,55 0,56 0,56 -0,05 
GREECE 19,0    0,46 0,46 0,43 0,50 0,49 0,48 0,47 0,48 0,46 0,39 -0,10 
HUNGARY 20,0     0,30 0,43 0,52 0,46 0,49 0,55 0,59 0,57 0,62 0,10 
ICELAND 24,5     0,56 0,54 0,59 0,54 0,62 0,65 0,60 0,54 0,47 -0,12 
IRELAND 21,5 0,30 0,21 0,44 0,42 0,46 0,52 0,58 0,57 0,65 0,66 0,62 0,54 0,46 -0,12 
ISRAEL 15,5      0,68 0,64 0,63 0,64 0,64 0,69 0,68 0,68 0,04 
ITALY 20,0 0,46 0,43 0,40 0,40 0,39 0,40 0,45 0,41 0,41 0,43 0,43 0,41 0,37 -0,08 
JAPAN 5,0     0,68 0,71 0,68 0,66 0,71 0,70 0,69 0,67 0,67 -0,01 
KOREA 10,0     0,64 0,59 0,61 0,69 0,66 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,67 0,06 
LUXEMBOURG 15,0 0,60 0,56 0,56 0,57 0,47 0,57 0,68 0,75 0,87 0,87 0,91 0,94 0,92 0,24 
MEXICO 15,0  0,33 0,28 0,26 0,32 0,25 0,29 0,30 0,31 0,34 0,34 0,35 0,31 0,02 
NETHERLANDS 19,0 0,49 0,54 0,51 0,56 0,59 0,57 0,60 0,57 0,61 0,60 0,62 0,60 0,55 -0,06 
NEW ZEALAND 12,5    0,89 0,97 0,99 0,98 1,07 1,02 1,03 0,96 0,97 0,99 0,01 
NORWAY 25,0 0,66 0,66 0,63 0,69 0,58 0,60 0,67 0,56 0,57 0,61 0,63 0,57 0,54 -0,13 
POLAND 22,0      0,43 0,42 0,42 0,46 0,50 0,53 0,49 0,46 0,04 
PORTUGAL 20,0    0,45 0,50 0,56 0,60 0,54 0,57 0,53 0,53 0,51 0,44 -0,16 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 19,0      0,48 0,43 0,53 0,61 0,57 0,53 0,54 0,48 0,04 
SLOVENIA 20,0       0,68 0,65 0,66 0,67 0,69 0,67 0,62 -0,06 
SPAIN 16,0    0,59 0,62 0,45 0,53 0,53 0,56 0,57 0,54 0,45 0,34 -0,19 
SWEDEN 25,0 0,45 0,36 0,39 0,42 0,41 0,50 0,52 0,52 0,55 0,56 0,57 0,58 0,57 0,05 
SWITZERLAND 7,6      0,68 0,75 0,73 0,73 0,75 0,74 0,74 0,71 -0,05 
TURKEY 18,0    0,45 0,44 0,43 0,45 0,47 0,38 0,34 0,36 0,35 0,34 -0,11 
UNITED KINGDOM 15,0 0,47 0,45 0,49 0,53 0,48 0,49 0,48 0,49 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,46 0,47 -0,02 
                 
Unweighted average  0,54 0,51 0,51 0,53 0,53 0,55 0,58 0,57 0,59 0,59 0,60 0,58 0,55 -0,02 
Table 1–3. VRR estimation (OECD, 2012) 
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C. The HRMC estimation 
The UK tax administration has actually developed a methodology to estimate the VAT gap 
(HMRC, 2011). It uses national accounts data to calculate the theoretical total VAT liability 
in the UK, which is defined as, “the amount, which would be collected in the absence of any 
fraud, avoidance, debt or other losses”. The difference between actual cash receipts and this 
theoretical amount of VAT is the VAT gap. The gross VAT theoretical tax liability is built 
up from five expenditure components: household consumption; capital expenditure on 
housing; government expenditure; charities expenditure; and expenditure of partially exempt 
businesses. The measure takes into account the applicable VAT rates on that expenditure 
based on commodity breakdowns; the legitimate refunds (deductions) and exemptions 
occurring through schemes and reliefs. The VAT gap measure is close, in terms of 
methodology, to the way the VRR is calculated although the theoretical VAT liability 
reflects actual tax rates, exemptions and thresholds applied to a narrower base than total final 
consumption as in the national accounts. 
 
Estimated VAT gap (£ billion) 1 
  2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 
Net VTTL 92.8 93.0 80.8 95.3 109.8 
Net VAT receipts 2 82.0 79.8 71.4 85.4 98.4 
VAT gap (point estimate) 10.8 13.2 9.4 9.9 11.4 
     of which MTIC fraud 1.0-1.5 1.0-1.5 1.0-1.5 0.5-1.0 0.5-1.0 
     of which debt 0.9 2.4 1.8 0.9 1.8 
VAT gap (per cent) 3 11.7% 14.2% 11.6% 10.4% 10.4% 
Table 1–4. Estimated VAT gap (£ billion) (HMRC, 2013) 
1 The amounts are rounded to the nearest £0.1 billion. 
2 Net VAT receipts are expressed net of payments and repayments. 
3 The VAT gap as a percentage of VTTL has been rounded to the nearest 0,1 per cent. 
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1.2.2.3 Limits of the interpretation of VAT gap 
The compliance gap is the estimation of the degree of compliance by taxpayers that, with 
the correct precautions and small adjustments, could at least be representative of, if not 
exactly similar to, the VAT evasion.  
From this value, we can estimate the amount of tax evasion related to this VAT gap. 
However, it does not cover the definition of tax evasion given in the previous paragraph, but 
only the situation in which the evasion comes from a lower VAT than we had anticipated. 
This definition, does not take into account for example, tax evasion related to transfer 
pricing. The compliance VAT gap could be a consequence of different situations. Below are 
given four different behaviours that generate a VAT gap.  
 
Worked 
example 1: 
Evasion with 
complicity 
Worked 
example 2: 
Evasion without 
complicity 
Worked 
example 3: 
MTIC carousel 
fraud 
Worked 
example 4: 
Fraudulent 
consumer import 
V  
Applicable VAT 
rate  
20% 20% 20% 20% 
A  
VAT receipts  
0 30 –24 0 
B  
Final consumption  
(including VAT)  
120 300 0 120 
C = B*V/(1+V)  
Tax that ought to 
have been remitted  
20 50 0 20 
D = C – A  
Tax not remitted  
20 20 24 20 
Table 1–5. Example of different behaviours that generate a VAT gap (Reckon LLP, 2009) 
As it is possible to see in the table an equal amount of tax evasion could be generated by 
different revenues. 
 
 
1.2.3 The economic impact on the VAT gap 
 
Taking into account the different approach of VAT gap estimation, its limits and 
observations, we report in the table below VAT gap calculated by The European 
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Commission (EC, 2014). For the given period of twelve years (2000-2012) we compare VAT 
gap on VTTL for the four most significant years. 
 
Figure 1–3. . Own calculation based on European Commission VAT gap (CASE, 2014)13 
 
 
Different economy trends are characterized during the period from 2000 to 2011. In 2000, 
there was an energy crisis followed by several years of economic expansion and most of the 
European economy in particular Spain, Ireland and east countries had a flourishing period. 
This situation changed drastically with the crisis of 2007. The GDP of most countries had a 
recession during 2008 and 2009. Post those years, some European countries in particular 
Italy, Spain, Ireland and Greece have suffered more problems to come out of the recession. 
Moreover, in these countries the unemployment rate has been rising ever since then. 
                                                 
13 CASE in the report of 2013 provided data from 2000 to 2011. In the report of 2014, it revised the value of 
VAT gap from 2009 to 2012. To better do a comparison all over the years we recalculate the data from 2000 
to 2008 using the average of variation of the revised data of the next period. 
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As we know, the economy influences VAT and revenue in general. The economic trend 
could also have an effect on tax compliance and on other factors directly correlated with 
VAT gap. 
 
The VAT Gap is defined as the difference between the expected VAT that could be collected 
and the actual VAT receipts by each member states. As we said, the VAT Gap is strictly 
related to the trend of the economy and to the tax compliance of the people. Due to the 2007-
2008 financial crisis we could compare the previous period of the crisis characterized by 
growth with the next one.  
This division is quite important because it shows the weight of the economy on VAT gap. 
During a period of crisis, the fall of tax compliance, the presence of bad debts and other 
factors contribute to increase VAT gap. 
 
In 2007/2008 at the peak of the crisis, most countries recorded a huge hike in the VAT gap 
on VTTL. So, we can see how the crisis affected more the VAT collected than the VAT gap. 
Revenue are more elastic than VAT gap. In other words, a change in the trend of GDP 
affected the revenue more than the gap. So when the economy grows the revenue also grows 
and the gap has a less weight or effect on the economy, because its change is softer. 
Nevertheless, during the crisis starting in 2008/2009 the sharp contraction in the economy 
of many countries and the financial problems of entrepreneurs resulted in a strong increase 
of the gap in both absolute and relative terms. This explains why, that during the crisis, bad 
debts as well as tax evasion increased. 
 
 
Taking this into account, there could be several methods to estimate the weight of the 
economy on VAT gap. Among others, we have divided the countries into three different 
groups depending on how the economy affected their VAT gap. 
In the first group, we selected the countries whose economy has risen again, on average, 
after the crisis. We calculated the average of VAT gap from 2000 to 2007/2008, depending 
upon when the crisis began in that particular country. Then, we compared the result with the 
VAT gap of 2009 and 2010, taking the average of the two differences. This was the amount 
to rest from the 2012 VAT gap. 
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Group 1 
Average 
growth 
of GDP 
2000-
2007 
Growth 
GDP 
2009 
Average 
growth 
of GDP 
2010-
2013 
Year of 
max 
GDP 
(2000-
2012) 
%VAT 
gap on 
VTTL 
Average 
from 
2000-
2007/2008 
Average of 
change of 
%VAT gap on 
VTTL in the 
first two years 
of the crisis 
compare of 
period before 
crisis 
2012 
VAT gap 
without 
economic 
influence 
2012 
VAT 
gap 
Belgium 4,16% -1,65% 2,96% 2012  9% -3,02% 6,98% 10% 
Bulgaria 11,90% -1,40% 3,43% 2012  19% -4,14% 15,86% 20% 
Czech 
Republic 
11,04% -7,83% 1,31% 2011  14% -6,53% 15,47% 22% 
Denmark 3,95% -4,92% 2,74% 2012  8% -0,21% 7,79% 8% 
Estonia 14,72% -13,95% 7,46% 2012  11,42% -1,38% 12,62% 14% 
Finland 4,52% -7,19% 2,95% 2012  6% -0,71% 4,29% 5% 
France 3,94% -2,45% 2,24% 2012  11% -6,21% 8,79% 15% 
Hungary 10,38% -13,38% 1,77% 2008  22% -2,41% 22,59% 25% 
Ireland 8,73% -9,97% 0,29% 2007  7% -6,37% 4,63% 11% 
Italy 3,79% -3,52% 0,67% 2011  30% -2,28% 30,72% 33% 
Latvia 14,34% -19,08% 6,14% 2008  17% -22,33% 11,67% 34% 
Lithuania 12,75% -17,77% 6,80% 2012  36% -5,28% 30,72% 36% 
Luxembourg 7,96% -4,81% 6,37% 2012  2% -1,60% 4,40% 6% 
Netherlands 4,59% -3,57% 1,26% 2012  2% -1,98% 3,02% 5% 
Poland 8,05% -14,45% 5,93% 2012  18% -1,38% 23,62% 25% 
Romania 17,69% -15,43% 4,78% 2008  38% -9,64% 34,36% 44% 
Slovakia 13,99% -2,51% 3,54% 2012  23% -11,80% 27,20% 39% 
United 
Kingdom 
3,74% -13,36% 4,61% 2007  11% -1,71% 8,29% 10% 
Table 1–6. Group 1 – Countries subdivision (Own calculation) 
In the second group, we have the countries with a negative growth of GDP during the period 
after the crisis. For these countries, we calculated the 2012 VAT gap as the average of the 
period before and after the crisis. The periods, with opposite trends give a depurate value of 
gap. 
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Group 2 
Average 
growth of 
GDP 
2000-
2007 
Growth 
GDP 
2009 
Average 
growth of 
GDP 
2010-
2013 
Year of 
max GDP 
(2000-
2012) 
%VAT gap 
on VTTL 
Average 
from 2000-
2008 
%VAT gap on 
VTTL Average 
from 2009-2012 
2012 VAT 
gap 
without 
economic 
influence 
(average) 
2012 VAT 
gap 
Greece 7,13% -0,91% -5,78% 2008  26% 33% 29% 33% 
Portugal 4,16% -2,01% -0,40% 2010  1% 11% 6% 8% 
Slovenia 7,03% -4,90% -0,09% 2008  6% 11% 8% 9% 
Spain 7,62% -3,76% -0,57% 2008  6% 21% 13% 18% 
Table 1–7. Group 2 – Countries subdivision (Own calculation) 
In the third group, we included the countries in which the trend of their economy has had 
no influence on VAT gap. In these countries, the financial crisis gave a contraction of the 
gap; however, we could not deduce whether the crisis had a positive effect on the VAT gap 
of these countries. In these countries there were probably other important factors with a 
stronger influence. 
 
3° Group 
Average 
growth of 
GDP 
2000-2007 
Growth 
GDP 
2009 
Average 
growth of 
GDP 
2010-2013 
Year of 
max 
GDP 
(2000-
2012) 
%VAT gap 
on VTTL 
Average 
from 2000-
2007/2008 
Average of 
change of 
%VAT gap on 
VTTL in the 
first two years 
of the crisis 
compare of 
period before 
crisis 
2012 VAT 
gap without 
economic 
influence 
2012 
Austria 3,99% -2,30% 3,19% 2012  11% 1,41% 13,41% 12% 
Germany  2,48% -4,03% 3,63% 2012  11% 1,36% 11,36% 10% 
Sweden 3,43% -12,24% 9,70% 2012  6% 3,34% 10,34% 7% 
Table 1–8. Group 3 – Countries subdivision (Own calculation) 
The graph below shows, starting from the left, the countries with VAT gap more sensible to 
economic trends. 
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Figure 1–4. % VAT gap on VTTL without economic influence (Own calculation) 
 
As it can be seen, Latvia (-22,33%) and Slovakia (-11,80%) have a high difference between 
2012 VAT gap and the gap estimated. Romania also has a high score (9,64%) but like 
Slovakia maintains a high percentage of VAT gap. Furthermore, it may be seen that Hungary 
and Italy, despite a large gap, do not have a justification in this economic trend. 
 
In terms of ratio of VAT gap to their own VTTL, Romania (34,36%), Lithuania (30.72%) 
Italy (30,72%), Greece (29,00%), Slovakia (27,20%), Poland (23,62%) Hungary (22,59%), 
were the countries with an important VAT Gap without economic distortion during 2012. 
On the other hand, with the same VTTL, in absolute value, the largest European economies 
recorded the highest score. In particular, Italy (€ 33,3 bn), Germany (€ 27.7 bn), France (€ 
25 bn), and the UK (€ 18, 7 bn) contributed over half of the total VAT Gap. 
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Figure 1–5. 2012 VAT gap without economic influence (Millions of Euro) (Own estimation) 
 
 
 
The next graph shows the weight of the estimated VAT gap on GDP. This evaluation adds 
information about the magnitude of the VAT gap in each country. As may be seen, the first 
countries are, in other order, the same countries with higher estimated VAT gap on VTTL.  
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Figure 1–6. 2012 VAT gap without economic influence on GDP (Own estimation) 
 
Observing the three graphs, it mau be seen that Romania has a difference between the VTTL 
and VAT gap out of average. This could be taken as evidence that the country has loopholes 
within the tax system. We recall the attention that VTTL is already depurated from the reduce 
VAT rate and exemption. So we could conclude that after the deduction of economic trends 
this may explain a part of VAT gap, we could associate the estimated VAT gap to undeclared 
sales or in other words, to tax evasion. 
 
 
1.2.4 2013 Vat gap estimation  
In this section, we give an estimation of VAT gap in 2013. For this calculation we adopted 
a top-down method with data taken from The European Commission, OECD and 
EUROSTAT. However, we did not have access to data used by The European Commission 
and OECD. We noticed that in late October 2014, The European Commission released an 
important update of their data on VAT gap, in this publication they did a more accurate 
estimation. Another limitation is that there are few publications concerning this, so this made 
it difficult to compare the data.  
The following is an explanation of the method we used for calculation:  
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First, we took the VTTL divided by "Household Consumption", "Government &  NPISH 
Consumption", "Intermediate Consumption by Industries", "Gross fixed capital formation" 
(EC, 2013). 
Thus: 
 
𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐲 𝐆𝐚𝐩 =
(𝑉𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐴𝑃 − 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝐺𝐴𝑃)
(1 − 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝐺𝐴𝑃)
 
 
We can calculate the "FULL theoretical VAT". With this value of VAT applying the 
standard rate we arrive at the "sales net VAT". At the sales net VAT, we sum up the VAT 
Liability (VTTL) to have the sales with the VTTL. 
Next, we took the weight average of the proportion between sales with VTTL and Final 
consumption during the selected period from 2009 to 2012. We used this average to take the 
right proportion to final consumption of 2013. Thanks to this result and with a weighted 
VTTL rate average we were able to calculate the 2013 VAT gap.  
The following is a simple scheme of the method. 
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VAT GAP ESTIMATION 
PROCESS 
2009-2012 (selected period) 
 2013 
VTTL / (1 - Policy gap)  
% (weigh average 2009-
2012) of Final consumption 
2013 
=  = 
Full VAT 
 
2013 Sales with VTTL 
/   
VAT Standard Rate   
VTTL (2009-2012) / Sales 
Net VAT (2009-2012) 
=  = 
Sales Net VAT  VTTL rate (2009-2012) 
+ VTTL   
= Sales with VTTL 
 
VTTL rate (2009-2012 
weigh average) 
   
Final Consumption 
 
2012 Sales with VTTL * 
VTTL rate (2009-2012 
weigh average) 
 Sales with VTTL / Final 
Consumption 
 
= 
=  2013 VTTL 
% (2009-2012 weigh 
average)  
 
  2013 VAT receipt 
 
 - 2013 VTTL 
  = 2013 VAT gap 
   
Table 1–9. VAT gap estimation process (Own calculation) 
 2013 
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Figure 1–7. % VAT gap/ VTTL Top-down Estimation (Own estimation) 
 
 
VAT gap ESTIMATION 
VAT  2013 2012 
GEO/TIME VTTL VAT 
VAT 
gap 
% VAT 
gap / 
VTTL 
VTTL 
2012 
% VAT 
gap/ 
VTTL 
Inderect 
method 
% VAT 
gap / 
VTTL 
Slovakia 7.290 4.696 2.593 35,58% 5243 39,17% 39,00% 
Greece 18.943 12.593 6.350 33,52% 15450 32,67% 33,00% 
Italy 139.193 93.812 45.381 32,60% 100331 32,04% 33,00% 
Poland 38.230 27.780 10.449 27,33% 25015 25,31% 25,00% 
Hungary 11.676 9.073 2.603 22,29% 8180 24,64% 25,00% 
Table 1–10. VAT gap estimation.  
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In terms of ratio to their own VTTL, Slovakia (35,58%), Greece (33,52%), Italy (32,60%) 
Poland (27,33%), Hungary (22,29%), Spain (23,91%) were the countries with the largest 
percentage of VAT gap on VTTL during 2013. 
 
 
 
Figure 1–8. VAT gap (millions €) (Own estimation) 
 
As in 2012, in the 2013 major European economies have a VAT gap higher than the other 
countries. Among these, Italy is in the first position with aa VAT gap of € 45.381,00 with a 
decrement from the 2012.  
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1.3 TAX EVASION ESTIMATION 2013 
VAT gap can be explained by tax evasion. On this basis, we can calculate tax evasion 
through unrecorded sales. We presume that unreported sales were with the standard VAT 
rate14. The presumption of this estimation is that unreported VAT is on unreported sales. On 
these sales, we calculated the unreported tax due. 
Once we take the amount of unreported sales, we can quantify tax evasion. There are several 
assumptions and hypotheses we should take into account to calculate the right amount of tax 
on these sales. To simplify and to make better comparisons among countries, we took 
average tax rate considering corporate and individual rates.  
As in the VAT gap, the largest economies have a tax evasion larger than the others. 
 
 
Figure 1–9. Tax evasion (Own estimation) 
Italy, amongst the other countries, is in first place, both in the absolute and in the relative 
estimation. Spain and the United Kingdom also have a relevant size of informal economy. 
This means that tax evasion is an important problem for these countries. Conversely, there 
                                                 
14 We use the standard rate because we already taken in account reduce rate and exemption in Policy Gap.  
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are countries such as Slovakia that suffered from a high rate of tax evasion but have small 
economies. In this case, the problem could be dealt with better and handled more easily. 
 
Figure 1–10. Tax evasion on total tax revenue (Own estimation) 
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Figure 1–11. Tax evasion on GDP (Own estimation) 
In conclusion, tax evasion is not a country problem but European ones. Tax evasion is both 
a sign of uneasiness and inefficiency of the system and gives a wrong base for socio-
economic development. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The VAT gap which we estimated without economic influence, give us the real magnitude 
of the problem especially for those countries that had experienced economic growth before 
the crisis. For these countries, the weight of the VAT gap rose sharply during the first years 
of the crisis showing the fragility of the revenue. 
We are aware that in order to estimate VAT gap and tax evasion we have used several 
hypotheses that could limit the interpretation of the data. However, evidence coming from 
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other studies15 show that the margin of error could be in a small percentage. A mayor 
preoccupation is that we do not take into account tax evasion from elusion operation. This 
type of tax evasion is more sophisticated and it could be the real problem of a country. 
However, the unreported sales we estimated, are divided among a multitude of activities, it 
could be representative of the economic composition of a society. 
Another problem is that what it is legal in one country could promote tax evasion in another 
country inside The European Union or the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). In this way, 
countries like Luxemburg or Switzerland could have strong governance, institutions and low 
scores of corruption, but could give a legal base to hide profit. The Financial Secrecy Index 
tries to give a measure of the problem (Tax Justice Network, 2013). 
To sum up, the tax gap calculated gives a glance of the problem of evasion among European 
countries with consequences in competitiveness area (OECD, 2010). As always, tax evasion 
gives a higher tax burden especially for middle lower class of the society that is the most 
vulnerable part of the society that could not evade tax obligations. 
                                                 
15 See (Murphy, 2014) 
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2.1 CBCR COMPARISON 
2.1.1 Background 
During the twentieth century, international taxation and accountability has changed to better 
handle trade between countries and prevent double taxation (Hugh, 2013). 16 
After War World II, in particular, growth in commercial relations produced a proliferation 
in tax treaties between European countries. This matter was important especially for 
multinational companies who faced double taxation. Moreover, tax treaties could integrate 
national tax legislation to build a formal net to better operate. At the same time, the lack of 
legislation both at national and international levels produced the perfect environment for, in 
the first place, the avoidance of double taxation and then the complete avoidance of taxation.  
In 1998 the OECD released a report on the harmful effects of tax competition. This report 
signalled an important change in perspective in international cooperation efforts. The report 
raised three main issues which related to double non-taxation or reduced taxation: 1. tax 
evasion, 2. tax avoidance and 3. harmful tax competition in general (OCDE, 1998). 
                                                 
16 From the very outset, [the drafters of the model convention] realized the necessity of dealing with the 
questions of tax evasion and double taxation in co-ordination with each other. It is highly desirable that States 
should come to an agreement with a view to ensuring that a taxpayer shall not be taxed on the same income by 
a number of different countries, and it seems equally desirable that such international cooperation should 
prevent certain incomes from escaping taxation altogether. The most elementary and undisputed principles of 
fiscal justice, therefore, required that the experts should devise a scheme whereby all incomes would be taxed 
once and only once. (Report prepared by the Committee of Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion -
League of Nations Publications-, 1927, p. 23). 
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At the same time, it was recognised at the international level, that most of the “resource rich” 
countries did not realise any benefit from their natural resources, on the contrary these 
countries were in general associated with corruption, poverty, and conflicts.  
Basically, revenues coming from natural resources required more transparency, better 
accountability and taxation. In this context, standards were set to monitor the revenues 
coming from natural resources. (Principles of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) was first launched in 2003) 
Countries in the West, however, were not really interested in more transparency, or 
international accountability and taxation until the financial crisis started in 2008. At this 
point these countries had a sharp downturn in their revenues which provoked an increment 
in tax burden and thus a cutting in public services. Thus, citizens began to realise that they 
had been paying more taxes than many multinational companies had been. Governments 
began to worry about tax evasion and tax avoidance perpetrated not only by citizens but also 
by MNEs, as a result discussions around this took centre stage at both national and 
international levels.  
From the early 2000s and with an increasing emphasis within the last few years, different 
initiatives have been introduced to improve transparency and accountability at the 
international level. 
 
2.1.2 Introduction to the different CBCR proposals (included EITI) 
 
2.1.2.1 OECD 
Although it has only been in the last few years that the OECD has put more emphasis on 
taxation, it was always at the forefront of their plan to improve international tax co-operation 
between governments, in order to counter international tax avoidance and evasion.  
In one of its most recent studies, the OECD tried to provide an international solution to the 
global problem of “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS). BEPS refers to tax planning 
strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or 
no-tax locations, where there is little or no economic activity, resulting in minimal corporate 
tax being paid. BEPS is of major significance for developing countries due to their heavy 
reliance on corporate income tax, particularly from multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
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In an increasingly interconnected world, national tax laws have not always kept pace with 
global corporations, fluid movement of capital, or the rise of the digital economy, thus 
leaving gaps that can be exploited to generate double non-taxation. This undermines the 
fairness and integrity of tax systems. Fifteen specific actions have been developed in the 
context of the OECD/G20 BEPS project, in order to equip governments with the domestic 
and international instruments needed to address this challenge. The first set of measures and 
reports were released in September 2014. These, along with studies carried out during 2015, 
give countries the tools they need to ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities 
generating profits are performed and where value is created, whilest at the same time, giving 
business greater stability by reducing disputes over the application of international tax rules, 
and standardising requirements. It should be noted that all countries, whether OECD/G20 or 
not, are involved in an equal footing. 
Among the 15 Actions, we will analyse specifically Action 13: “Transfer Pricing 
Documentation” focusing in particular, on Country by Country Reporting. In this regard, the 
OECD provides guidelines to implement exchange of information between countries about 
specific data of MNEs, such as the number of employees, taxes paid and consolidated group 
revenue in the preceding fiscal year of those equal to €750 million or more.   
 
2.1.2.2 USA  
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, known as the ‘Dodd-
Frank Act’, is a United States federal law which places regulations of the financial industry 
in the hands of the government. The legislation, enacted in July 2010, aims to prevent another 
significant financial crisis, by creating new financial regulatory processes that enforce 
transparency and accountability while implementing rules for consumer protection. 
In August 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the amendments 
to its disclosure rules to implement Section 1504 -SEC Rule 13(q)- of the Dodd-Frank Act17. 
This compels every American oil, gas and mining companies, or foreign companies, to 
                                                 
17 (U.S. - Securities and Exchange Commission, 2012) 
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publish their payments to governments, such as taxes, royalties and licence fees, in every 
country they carry out business in. 
The U.S. law requires companies to report any payment of US $100,000 and above, made 
on every individual extraction project they operate. This means that for the first time, people 
living near mines or oil fields will be able to see in detail how much money is being generated 
by local projects, and hold their governments to account if they do not see the benefits. 
On October 25, 2012, the American Petroleum Institute and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
along with two other trade associations, sued the SEC, claiming that it had made a number 
of procedural errors in promulgating the rules. These groups also claimed that Section 1504 
violates oil companies’ First Amendment free speech rights. 
On July 2, 2013, the D.C. District Court ruled that the SEC should have provided 
justifications for the following two requirements of the regulations:  
1) requiring company reports to be made public and  
2) allowing no exemptions to address the oil industry, claiming that some 
countries prohibit disclosure of the information required under this law.  
The SEC is not appealing this decision and is, instead, working on Section 1504 rules that 
will take into consideration the court’s decision. The SEC has not yet issued a new rule. On 
September 18, 2014, Oxfam filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts to force the SEC to issue a new resource extraction disclosure rule.  The SEC 
has said that it cannot achieve Oxfam’s timeframe demands for issuing a new rule.  
At this time, the outcome concerning rules for Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank is unknown. 
 
2.1.2.3 Canada 
As in the US and the EU standards, the Canadian Division 28 -Extractive Sector 
Transparency Measures Act- applies to entities that are directly or indirectly engaged in the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals that are subject to Canadian law.  
Extractive entities are required to report annually on payments made to governments relating 
to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, in Canada and abroad. 
Payments will be broken down in the report on a project by project basis.   
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2.1.2.4 The EITI standards18 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) sets a global standard to promote 
openness and accountable management of natural resources in productive countries, where 
companies operate. The standard is implemented by governments, in collaboration with 
companies and civil society. 
Countries implementing the EITI agree to disclose information on tax payments, licences, 
contracts, production and other key elements around resource extraction. The aim of EITI is 
to make public the data of the payments that a government receives from companies working 
on natural resources within that country. In the EITI, government, companies and civil 
society work together. The government and the companies report the data regarding taxes, 
royalties, bonuses received and paid etc. and the civil society organizations must supply the 
linkage between the information provided and the society. In order to adhere to the EITI 
standard, there are a number of procedures which must be followed. First, the country 
becomes a candidate, and if it upholds the standards and reports the necessary information, 
then it may receive ‘compliant country’ status. Conversely, if the country does not follow 
the standards over a period of years, it is first suspended and then removed entirely from the 
list of compliant countries. 
 
2.1.2.5 EU – European Commission 
In 2010 The European Commission (European Commission, 2010) started talking about 
“Country By Country Reporting”. The first step was a public consultation where the 
Commission considered two types of disclosures: 
a. General country-by-country reporting by multinational companies and 
                                                 
18 Multi-Donor Trust Fund for EITI Invalid source specified. 
In the context of the EITI, the World Bank manages a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) that gives financial 
support to the World Bank’s technical assistance, governments and civil society implementing EITI. 
As of February 2012, the supporting donors that have contributed to the MDTF were as follows: Australia; 
Belgium; Canada; the European Commission; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Japan; the Netherlands; 
Norway; Spain; Switzerland; the United Kingdom, which was the launch donor; and the United States. 
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b. Specific transparency obligations for companies which are active in the extractive 
industry (minerals, oil, and gas) in third countries; 
The first objective of The European Commission, was to increase transparency and 
accountability of multinational companies in general and those involved in the extractive 
sector in particular. The special attention given to natural resources was justified for the 
adoption on July of 2010 by USA of Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires 
all extractive companies listed on the USA stock-exchanges (and among them some EU 
based companies), to publish payments made to governments on a country-by-country basis. 
Moreover, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) was also working on a 
possible country-by-country reporting requirement, which could be incorporated within a 
replacement Standard for IFRS 6 (International Financial Reporting Standard) for the 
extractive sector. Although, it was expected that the CBCR statement would soon become 
mandatory, the IASB has never revised the standard and the requirement has never been 
disclosed for accounting proposes.  
 
The following year, on 25 October 2011, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal19 
requiring the disclosure of payments to governments on a country and project basis by listed 
and large non-listed companies with activities in the extractive industry (oil, gas and mining) 
and loggers of primary forests, the so-called “Country By Country Reporting” (CBCR).  
The proposal established rules ensuring that these companies would disclosed payments to 
governments (e.g. taxes on profits, royalties, and licence fees) on a country basis. Reporting 
would also be carried out on a project basis, where payments have been attributed to specific 
projects.  
This disclosure requirement would have revised the Accounting Directives20 (78/660/EEC 
and 83/349/EEC) and the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC). The Transparency 
Directive was interested by the requirement in order to include all companies which are listed 
on EU regulated markets even if they are not registered in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and incorporated in a third country.  
                                                 
19 see IP/11/1238 and MEMO/11/734 
20 The Accounting Directive regulates the information provided in the financial statements of all limited 
liability companies which are registered in the European Economic Area (EEA). 
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An EU mandatory disclosure requirement would complement the EITI efforts by legally 
requiring companies registered or listed in the EU to disclose payments to governments 
along the same lines as EITI. In doing so, the EU proposal is thus strengthening the EITI 
standards in those countries that have not implemented the EITI yet. 
On 26th June 2013 the European Parliament adopted the proposal21.  
 
In 2013, the European Commission introduced the requirement to disclosure country-by-
country reporting ("CBCR") by banks and investment firms, under Article 89 of Directive 
2013/36/EU (CRD IV).22 After a period of public consultation and a report to investigate 
whether the requirement could have possible negative consequences, it became effective on 
1 January 2015.  
 
On 17 June 2015, the European Commission launched a public consultation on corporate tax 
transparency in the EU. This consultation aims to find out whether requiring companies to 
disclose more information about the taxes they pay could help tackle tax avoidance and 
aggressive tax practices in the EU. For example, companies could be required to disclose the 
taxes they pay, in every country where they operate. This consultation is part of the broader 
Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation. The Action Plan sets out to reform 
the corporate tax framework in the EU, in order to tackle tax abuse, ensure sustainable 
revenues and support a better business environment in the Single Market. 
Below are listed the five key areas identified by the European Commission to improve 
fairness and efficiency in corporate taxation:  
1. Re-launching the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB); 
2. Ensuring fair taxation where profits are generated; 
                                                 
21 Directive 2013/34/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual 
financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC 
22 Directive 2013/36/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. 
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3. Creating a better business environment; 
4. Increasing transparency; 
5. Improving EU coordination. 
As recently as 08 July 2015, the European Parliament voted to insert a requirement for large 
companies to publish information country by country, on profits or losses before tax, taxes 
on profits or losses and public subsidies received. Public interest entities, including listed 
companies and insurance firms, as well as companies designated by member states as public-
interest entities because of their significant public relevance, are also required to adhere to 
these regulations. The amendment is now on the Counsilium.  
Finally, on 28 January 2016 the Commission launched the “Tax Avoidance Package” where 
contains among other things a proposal of amending Directive 2011/16/EU regarding CBCR 
of OECD version (further information in pf. 2.2.4.3) .  
This is a further step in the general country-by-country reporting by multinational companies 
first introduced in 2010. 
 
2.1.3 Comparison between the different proposals of CBCR: Side-by-side 
comparison 
As has been highlighted, fiscal corporate transparency is becoming a relevant matter at 
international level. In the last few years, countries like USA, EU, and institutions such as 
OECD have adopted measures or drawn up proposals to better handle tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. 
Countries accepting the draft proposal of CBCR are concerned with two objectives: firstly, 
they wish multinational enterprises to report the fair amount of taxes, conversely they are 
worried about foreign competitors who are less transparent and who could find out and take 
advantage of their transparency.  
Due to these and other factors, these countries are looking for an international path to develop 
a common CBCR. 
In the following tables, the relevant points of the different standards of transparency for 
multinational companies are compared. A further in-depth analysis can be found in the 
Annex.  
 
The analysis is organised in five different key areas: 
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1. When? - Deadlines; 
2. Who? - Active Actor, Filing obligations subject, Payee; 
3. What? - Payments Categories and main characteristics; 
4. Relevant points. 
 The legislation considered in order to do the comparison: 
 
    Legislation on CBCR   
1 USA 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure of Payments by 
Resource Extraction Issuers. ACTION: Final rule. 17 CFR Parts 240 and 
249 [Release No. 34-67717; File No. S7-42-10] RIN 3235-AK85 
2 CANADA Division 28 -Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act 
3 OECD 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 13: 
Country-by-Country Reporting Implementation Package 
4 EITI The EITI Standard 
5 
EU Extractive 
Industries 
Art. 10 Directive 34 /2013 
EU Bank Art. 89 Directive 36/2013 
Table 2–1. Legislation on CBCR 
2.1.3.1 When: Deadlines; 
WHEN: Time to file the report 
Apply first time to 
the fiscal year 
started on or after 
First deadline 
OECD 
12 months to file the report and 
18 (first year) 15 months to 
exchange the information both 
from the last day of the financial 
years. 
01/01/2016 31/12/2017 
USA 150 days  
No information is 
provided.23 
No information is 
provided. 
                                                 
23 The final rules of 1504 Dodd Frank act was supposed to be implemented from the first time to the fiscal year 
started on or after 30/09/2013, however how the D.C. District Court on July 2, 2013 ruled that the SEC should 
have provided more justifications about the publicity of the report and the no exemption especially in the 
countries where it could be against the law public a report, the application of the final rules is unknowing. 
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Canada 150 days  
No information is 
provided. 
No information is 
provided. 
EITI 
No older than the second year 
(recommended one year) 
No information is 
provided. 
18 months after the 
country is admitted as 
candidate  
EU Extractive Industries Annually 
No information is 
provided. 
No information is 
provided. 
EU Bank Annually 01/01/2015 
No information is 
provided. 
Table 2–2. When: Deadlines (Own elaboration) 
 
2.1.3.2 Who: Active Actor, Filing obligations subject, Payee 
WHO: 
Subjective 
requirement 
Objective requirement Filing Obligation Payee 
OECD 
MNEs with consolidated 
group revenue in the 
preceding fiscal year of 
€750 million or more. 
No sector restriction 
The Reporting Entity 
may be the Ultimate 
Parent Entity, the 
Surrogate Parent Entity, 
or the Constituent Entity 
Country Tax 
Administration 
USA 
All U.S. companies and 
foreign companies 
Engaged in the 
commercial 
development of oil, 
natural gas, or minerals 
(Prevalence of substance 
over form) 
Issuer, a subsidiary of 
the issuer, or an entity 
under the control of the 
issuer  
Federal Government and 
foreign government 
Canada 
Listed, large or any other 
prescribed entities 
Engaged in the 
commercial 
development of oil, gas 
or minerals or control 
(also indirectly) an entity 
engaged in it. 
Parent companies, also 
on behalf of the wholly-
owned  subsidiary and 
reporting entities 
Any government in 
Canada or in a foreign 
state, or a body 
established to exercise 
the power 
EITI 
Companies and 
government entities 
Oil, gas and mining 
companies 
Companies and 
Governments 
Multi-stakeholder group 
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EU Extractive 
Industries 
Large undertakings and 
all public-interest 
entities  
Engaged in the 
exploration, prospection, 
discovery, development, 
and extraction of 
minerals, oil, natural gas 
deposits or other 
materials or in the 
logging of primary 
forests. 
Parent or in alternative 
the subsidiary 
Any national, regional or 
local authority of a 
Member State or of a 
third country. It includes 
a department, agency or 
undertaking controlled 
by that authority. 
EU Bank 
A credit institution or an 
investment firm 
By the nature of the 
institution 
No information is 
provided. 
Member State and by 
third country in which it 
has an establishment 
Table 2–3. Who: Active Actor, Filing obligations subject, Payee (Own elaboration) 
With respect to the entities which must deal with the reports, note the following points: 
a) The OECD does not cover any sector in particular. As with the OECD, the European 
Commission, in its first proposal, did not specify the sector. However, in its 
amendments of the Directives, the OECD has introduced the standards for 
transparency in natural resources and logging, and also for the banking system. 
Logging and banking are innovation in respect of the other provisions. Moreover, the 
EU is working to adopt a new provision in line with the OECD. 
b) The Canadian definition of the subject field engaged in natural resource is broader 
than the others. Indeed, their definition includes not only entities working in or 
control companies working on natural resources, but also “companies controlled or 
deemed to be controlled by an entity deemed to be controlled” (Parliament of 
Canada, 2015). So, all entities should report payments, even if it just has an influence 
on a company that has an influence on another company, whose activity is related to 
natural resources. This open definition gives prominence of substance over form. In 
other words, it includes the real entity that have the control.  
c) In the provision of the OECD, the subject obligated to file the report is the Ultimate 
Parent Entity. However, where there is not an exchange of information agreement 
convention in force, or when the same agreement or convention does not work 
properly, other companies of the same group should file the report with the 
information from the whole group. In this situation, the multinational company 
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provides the same report to various tax administrations. Under this proviso, the duty 
to send the report to other tax administrations shifts form the tax authority to the 
company. Thus, we could illustrate the two possible scenarios.  
 In the first scenario, there is an exchange of information agreement or 
convention in force, the ultimate parent company files the report to the 
tax administration of the country where it resides for tax purposes. In this 
scenario, the tax administration of the other countries where the 
multinational company works, asks this tax administration authority for a 
copy of the report. There are two deadlines to be adhered to:  
o  Up to 12 months from the end of the financial year for the 
multinational companies to file the report,  
o As soon as possible and no later than 18 months (first year) or 15 
months (each subsequent year) from the end of the financial year 
for tax authorities to fulfil its exchange obligations.  
 In the alternative scenario, there is not an exchange of information 
agreement or convention in force, so the multinational companies are 
required to file the same report to the tax administration in each country 
where they work. In this case, in order to save time and cost for the tax 
administration: the procedure is easier and faster, and multinational 
companies have the same workload since the report should be the same 
for each jurisdiction. 
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Figure 2–1. OECD Filing Obligation (Own elaboration) 
The alternative option would also be a way to bypass the tax authorities in those countries 
where tax authorities have organizational problems. If working properly, the multinational 
companies need only file the report once since it should be the same for each jurisdiction. 
 
 
2.1.3.3 What: Payments Categories and main characteristics  
WHAT “Payment” categories 
Type of 
payment 
Limit 
Broke down of the 
payments 
Records 
OECD 
1. revenue,  
2. profit (loss) before income tax, 
3. income tax paid,  
4. income tax accrued,  
5. stated capital,  
6. accumulated earnings,  
7. number of employees, and  
8. tangible assets other than cash or cash 
equivalents with regard to each jurisdiction in 
which the MNE Group operates; 
Material 
payments  
No 
information is 
provided. 
Country level 
No 
information is 
provided. 
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9. An identification of each Constituent Entity 
of the MNE Group setting out the jurisdiction 
and the business activities 
USA 
1. taxes; 
2. royalties; 
3. fees; 
4. production entitlements; 
5. bonuses; 
6. dividends; and 
7. payments for infrastructure improvements 
8. The final rules will require the disclosure 
that are part of a plan or scheme to evade the 
disclosure requirements (no social and 
community payments) 
Material and 
in kind. 
$100,000  
Total amount of 
payments made for 
each project and to 
each government, 
No 
information is 
provided. 
Canada 
(a) taxes; 
(b) royalties; 
(c) fees, including rental fees, entry fees and 
regulatory charges as well as fees or other 
consideration for licences, permits or 
concessions; 
(d) production entitlements; 
(e) bonuses, including signature, discovery 
and production bonuses; 
(f) dividends other than dividends paid as 
ordinary shareholders; 
(g) infrastructure improvement payments; or 
(h) any other prescribed category of payment. 
Whether 
monetary or 
in kind 
the amount 
prescribed by 
regulation for 
the category 
of payment, if 
no $ 100.000 
Country and 
project basis 
Prescribed 
period, or 7 
years 
EITI 
The following revenue streams should be 
included: 
i. the host government’s production 
entitlement (such as profit oil); 
ii. national state-owned company production 
entitlement; 
Cash or in-
kind 
No 
mandatory. 
Countries 
often set 
materiality 
levels based 
The multi-
stakeholder group 
is required to agree 
the level of 
disaggregation for 
the publication of 
No 
information is 
provided. 
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iii. profits taxes; 
iv. royalties; 
v. dividends; 
vi. bonuses; 
vii. licence fees and 
viii. any other significant payments and 
material benefit to government. 
on company 
or payment 
size. 
data (by individual 
company, 
government entity,  
revenue stream and 
at project level) 
EU 
Extractive 
Industries 
(a) production entitlements;  
(b) taxes;  
(c) royalties;  
(d) dividends; 
(e)bonuses;  
(f) licence fees and  
(g) payments for infrastructure improvements. 
Whether in 
money or in 
kind 
€ 100 000  
Government and 
project for each 
category 
No 
information is 
provided. 
EU Bank 
(a) name(s), nature of activities and 
geographical location; 
(b) turnover; 
(c) number of employees on a full time 
equivalent basis; 
(d) profit or loss before tax; 
(e) tax on profit or loss; 
(f) public subsidies received. 
No 
information is 
provided. 
No 
information is 
provided. 
No information is 
provided. 
No 
information is 
provided. 
Table 2–4. What: Payments Categories and main characteristics (own elaboration) 
With respect to payments there are the following differences: 
a) There are two different forms of data requirement. The standard form requires that 
the different types of payments such as taxes, royalties, dividends, licences, etc. be 
displayed. However, the OECD and the EU Bank have provisions that require the 
inclusion of additional information regarding the number of employees, sources of 
revenues, etc. This additional information provides extra data needed to do a tax 
audit. The other type of data places emphasis on the accountability of governments 
towards civil society. The requirements thus shift the focus from how much the 
companies should have paid on taxes to how much the government would have 
earned by using of the natural resources. So, if the MNEs do not pay a fair amount 
on taxes, according to the requirements of the OECD, then the investigation should 
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start looking at the accounts of the MNEs, with a view to combating the “Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting”. In the second case, the small amount of taxes paid by 
MNEs is the government’s responsibility as are its use of natural resources.  
Problems may be generated by both MNEs and by the government, so the focus will 
switch between governments and MNEs depending on the country. 
b) The OECD does not require “Break down of payments” at a project level. The project 
level is however important to identify the data for each project in a country. This is 
especially so for civil society, which should require transparency and accountability 
from governments in every area where the natural resources are utilised. Since the 
OECD does not specify the sector it may be difficult to identify the project each time, 
however in the area of natural resources it may be easier identify the project. USA 
legislation explicitly requires that the payments must be reported for every category 
not just at the project level, but also at each level of government or public agency 
that it is entitled to receive payments. This provides more transparency and also 
tracks where the money goes. 
 
2.1.3.4 Relevant points on CBCR (1/2) 
  
Reports 
accessible to 
the public 
Reports of 
another 
jurisdiction / 
with other 
legislation  
Enforce compliance and fine Audit Exemption 
OECD 
Only for tax 
authorities 
on request 
No applicable 
Purpose to extend their existing 
transfer pricing documentation 
penalty regime. 
No audit requirement No exemption 
USA Accessible  No permitted No specific measures No audit requirement No exemption 
Canada Accessible  
Possible if it 
satisfies the 
reporting 
requirements  
Authorities could inspect 
records relating to payments, 
and other general compliance 
enforcement measures. An 
offence is punishable on 
summary conviction and liable 
Attestation made by a 
director or officer of the 
entity, or an 
independent auditor or 
accountant, that the 
information in the 
No exemption 
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to a fine of not more than 
$250,000 
report is true, accurate 
and complete. 
EITI Accessible  No applicable Suspension and cancellation 
An independent 
auditor, who reconciles 
the information 
provided by the 
companies and the 
government 
No information is 
provided. 
EU 
Extractive 
Industries 
Accessible  
Possible if it 
satisfies the 
reporting 
requirements  
No specific measures No audit requirement 
Companies are exempt 
from reporting 
payments in countries 
where such public 
disclosure is clearly 
prohibited by the 
criminal legislation of 
that country. In such 
cases the company 
should identify in the 
report the government 
concerned 
EU Bank Accessible  No prevision No specific measures 
The information shall 
be audited 
No information is 
provided. 
Table 2–5. 2.1.3.4 Relevant points on CBCR (1/2) (Own elaboration) 
Please Note: 
a) “Report accessible to the public” - only the OECD requires confidentiality of the 
information. In this case, the information is available only to the tax administration 
and it is not open to the public. This is because the OECD provision is included in 
the BEPS guidelines, to fight tax evasion and avoidance, thus the information is 
available only to tax authorities for auditing purposes. One of the weaknesses of 
limiting access to the data could be for the tax administration, which needs to send 
the report to other administrations within 15 months. In other cases, the responsibility 
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of reporting is on companies and there is less time (less than 15 months) and money 
(public officials in the tax administration could be employed to do other tasks). The 
OECD made this limitation to protect the companies from competitors who do not 
have the duty to report the data. Publishing the information could mean more 
accountability and more transparency in managing natural resource. It is expected 
that the companies who do this reporting, could easily sign a contract with the 
government for their standards of transparency and accountability. However, we 
believe that a country takes into consideration many other factors when contracting 
a company or giving it a licence. Thus, a company not publishing their information 
could have an advantage over a company which does. Conversely a company that 
makes the information accessible to the public, permits civil society to be aware of 
how the government is managing the natural resources of the country. This is 
important because in many countries the revenue from natural resources are relevant 
and public accountability on this could improve and strengthen institutions through, 
for example, a democratic process. 
 
Relevant points on CBCR (2/2) 
  
Accrual or 
cash basis 
Formal and active 
participation of the 
civil society 
Formal and 
active 
participation of 
the Government 
or its 
representatives 
Finance 
resource 
Government 
obligation on 
reporting 
Review 
OECD 
No 
information 
is provided. 
No formal 
participation 
No formal and 
active 
participation 
No specify None 
No 
prevision 
USA Cash basis 
No formal 
participation 
No formal and 
active 
participation 
No specify None 
No 
prevision 
Canada 
No 
information 
is provided. 
No formal 
participation 
No formal and 
active 
participation 
No specify None 
No 
prevision 
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EITI Cash basis 
Multi-stakeholder 
group that involves 
the government, 
companies and the 
full, independent, 
active and effective 
participation of civil 
society 
Government are 
part of multi-
stakeholder group 
The Secretariat 
is funded by 
supporting 
governments 
companies. 
Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund to 
support 
implementation. 
Governments 
pay for the 
implementation 
of the standards 
Reporting 
template that 
outlines the 
revenues 
received from 
the extractive 
industry 
No 
prevision 
EU 
Extractive 
Industries 
No 
informatio
n is 
provided. 
No formal 
participation 
No formal and 
active 
participation 
no specify none 
by 21 
July 
2018 
EU Bank 
No 
informatio
n is 
provided. 
No formal 
participation 
No formal and 
active 
participation 
no specify none 
No 
prevision 
Table 2–6. Relevant points on CBCR (2/2) (Own elaboration) 
For the implementation of the report, the EITI engages, in addition to the companies, both 
governments and civil societies. This is quite important because it gives them an active role 
in the process. However, very little participation has been achieved thus far. For example, in 
the EITI standard, the government has to reproduce the data it receives form companies. If 
the government cannot reproduce this, then it is a problem for the tax administration. We 
believe that it could be useful to track the money, not only from the companies to the 
government but also via the government, and from the government to the civil society. With 
no transparency in government, there is a paradox: high standard of transparency for 
companies working in natural resource but high levels of corruption.  
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2.2 CBCR ANALYSIS 
2.2.1 Background 
The objective of “Country by Country Reporting” (CBCR) is to foster sustainable 
development. It was first formulated in the context of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), which was in response to problems with natural resources. It was believed 
that more transparency in natural resources management could translate into a real 
opportunity to boost the development process in natural resource rich countries. This 
measure of transparency consists in the publication of the revenues paid for the use of natural 
resources, from both multinational companies and governments. For civil society, this 
publication has a double function: it is possible to see how much money companies pay in 
taxes, bonuses, licenses, etc. and how the government uses this revenue. 
This happened in the early 2000s, however it was only after the financial crisis, that the 
subject of how much the multinational companies were paying in taxes, reached public 
attention, as well as, the accountability of the governments. During the crisis, rich economies 
experienced a lowering of their revenues. The reaction of the respective governments was to 
put an increase in taxes and public debt and, at the same time introduce heavy austerity 
measures. This situation has raised questions about the fairness of the tax burden: companies 
were paying much less than employee: some multinationals were paying very little in taxes. 
During this period, the European Commission (201024) and United States (201025) began to 
speak about Country By Country Reporting. However, in their proposals, they confined this 
reporting to companies of the extractive sector. Conversely, the OECD (2014) in the 
“Actions of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) provided a draft of CBCR valid for 
all sectors, although applicable only to large corporations (entities with more than € 750m 
on revenue). 
In conclusion, it is likely that in the short term, CBCR could increase tax revenues and make 
a good impression on the electorate, however the real question is whether, in the long term, 
CBCR can promote sustainable development. 
                                                 
24 We refer mainly to: The Commission Communication on Tax and Development (COM(2010)163 final) of 
21 April 2010; Public consultation on Country-By-Country Reporting by multinational companies (Deadline: 
22 December 2010) European Commission - Internal Market and Services DG. 
25 We refer to the Section 1504 of the US Dodd-Frank Act which was adopted on 21 July 2010. 
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2.2.2 Country By Country Reporting: Definition and characteristics 
2.2.2.1  Definition 
What do we mean when we talk about CBCR? Is it just a matter of taxes paid around the 
world by multinational companies?  
In 2010 the European Commission launched a public consultation on CBCR. In that 
consultation, it talked about two types of disclosure: “General CBCR by multinational 
companies” and “Specific transparency obligations for companies which are active in the 
extractive industry (minerals, oil, and gas) in third countries”. The scope of the consultation 
was on how to design CBCR to improve tax governance at a global level. In the consultation 
of 2015, the basic question is whether or not the CBCR option proposed by the OECD is the 
correct one? 
OECD includes the CBCR in the “Action 13 – Transfer Pricing” which is part of the Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) - a study to contrast tax evasion and avoidance. So, in 
this matter, the CBCR is seen as extra documentation which companies have to produce in 
order to justify their inter-group operations. With this extra data, the OECD believes that tax 
authorities can better uncover cases of tax avoidance and evasion. Moreover, the OECD 
maintains that it is not a problem of all multinational companies, but just of very large 
multinational companies (with revenues more than € 750m).  
On this basis, it appears that CBCR is interested in resolving problems related only to 
international taxation. 
However, civil society, through “The Publish What You Pay (PWYP)” and the “Tax 
Justice Network (TJN)” in one of their publications (Murphy, 2009), identifies the 
following ten reasons where CBCR could make a positive contribution: 1. Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR); 2. Accountability; 3. Trade; 4. People; 5. Tax; 6. Corruption; 7. 
Development; 8. Governance; 9. Where you are; 10. Transparency.  
 
In our opinion, CBCR gives information which could be used, not only for taxation purposes, 
but also for many others things such as money laundering, labour rights, etc. This is because 
the CBCR information should not be seen as an easy way to raise extra revenue from those 
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who have earned so much and paid so little in tax; obviously it should integrate their tax 
duty, but CBCR c ould contribute to creating a better business environment to support the 
developing economy of a country.  
Based on this consideration, CBCR should produce accounting and non-accounting 
information which may be used for other related matters, for example to fight tax evasion, 
tax avoidance, money laundering, corruption, etc. and so to contribute, to sustainable 
development.  
This information should be provided: 
 by the EU’s multinational companies for all entities of the group in each country 
where it has a business and 
 by the companies involved in the production chain26 of the product/s or service/s 
sold in the EU and for all their subsidiaries and related entities. 
CBCR should not be a stand-alone initiative. Transparency from multinational companies or 
companies in general, could contribute to the development process, but only if it is backed 
up by the same transparency in public institutions. In other words, non-accountable 
governments generate an opaque business environment and unfair competition. These 
problems may be found whether companies have to use “aggressive policies” in taxation, 
labour rights, environments, etc. to compete at international level, otherwise they could fall 
behind in the market. 
 
2.2.2.2 Information provided 
As stated, CBCR should provide data in order to better supervise or investigate the following 
areas:  
a) Governance of the multinational company; 
b) Corruption; 
c) Labour rights; 
d) Environment impact; 
e) Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing; 
f) Fair trade; 
g) Taxation; 
                                                 
26 For “production chain” we refer to all the activities necessary to product the product or service. 
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h) Public institutions 
Some data should be produced by the companies, others by labour unions. The labour unions 
could provide more reliable information concerning workers´ conditions. Moreover, the data 
should give information about the same company, companies taking part in the production 
chain and about public institutions. Each company within the group or of the production 
chain should provide the following information (a source of data should be provided): 
1. About the subject:  
a. Name of each company of the group and organizational chart of the group; 
b. Nature of business (For example using the Statistical Classification of 
Economic Activities in the European Community, commonly referred to as 
NACE); 
c. Countries where the multinational company has businesses; 
d. Stockholders and ultimate beneficial ownership of the company. 
2. Accounting: 
a. Revenue split between related and unrelated parties; 
b. Revenues from different areas or projects; 
c. Profit or loss before tax; 
d. Stated Capital; 
e. Accumulated earnings; 
f. Turnover. 
3. Tax: 
a. Income tax (paid and accrued); 
b. Payment to governments; 
c. Royalties; 
d. Dividends; 
e. Bonuses; 
f. Licence fees; 
g. Public subsidies received; 
h. Tax rulings; 
i. Pecuniary tax-related penalties; 
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j. List of customer and providers (with the specification of the total amount of 
the transactions of the fiscal year); 
4. Bank accounts: 
a. The bank accounts not only of each member of the group and of each 
company involved in the production chain, but also of the beneficial 
ownership. The specification of all transactions should be available to the 
public authorities. This information is already available for EU tax authorities 
for the EU countries; 
5. Environment: 
a. Information about waste air and water pollution (where applicable sorted by 
type); 
6. Employment: 
a. Number of employees; 
b. Employees working through subcontractors; 
c. Absence from work; 
d. Injured or killed workers; 
e. Security at work; 
f. Leaves (like maternity leave, etc.); 
g. Mobbing; 
h. Whistleblowing: 
7. Money laundering and terrorist financing: 
a. Relation on risk (See European Directive 849/2015) 
8. Tangible assets: 
a. Assets which have a relevant importance; 
b. Assets where a related activity is carried out. 
9. Intangibles assets: 
a. Assets which have a relevant importance;  
b. Intra-group operations involving intangible assets; 
10. Production Chain: 
a. Name of the companies of the production chain and their subsidiaries; 
11. Transparency/corruption  
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a. The scope is to check the problem that the company faces due to bad 
institutions. 
12. Information about public institutions (similar to the “Doing Business” published by 
the World Bank). 
Most of this information is already required in the proposal of CBCR draft by the OECD 
and by the European Commission. We think that all this information should be supplied once 
via the same software for all applicable countries. 
 
2.2.2.3 CBCR’s publication and format 
Multinational companies should submit the information via online software provided by 
governments. It should be the same in each country. In this way, companies would already 
know what information to provide and the public administration would have the information 
in a homogeneous fashion and in a workable format. Governments should decide at 
international level what information to publish and how (as in the USA proposal of CBCR. 
You can find more about this in the Annex). This decision should be based on the different 
needs of the potential recipients of that information. Moreover, countries with poor 
institutions would be easier to involve in the process. They would not need to invest 
resources to ask each multinational for the CBCR, as it is proposed by the requirements 
drafted by the OECD. They could use that resource to facilitate and coordinate controls at 
international level. 
 
2.2.2.4 Subject receiving the information 
Governments and public administration like tax administration: they need to have direct 
access to the information produced by CBCR in order to monitor and prevent tax avoidance 
and tax evasion, money laundering, corruption, unfair competition, etc. 
Investors: they should have access to some information to help lower their risk. Thus, it 
could help companies to have more investors, since more transparency and information 
contributes to lowering the risk and to increasing investments.  
Customers and Civil Society: they could know more about the social responsibility of the 
company and the products or services they are buying. At the same time, they could have an 
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objective opinion about the public institutions, and their policy for sustainable business in 
their country. This could be important for a democratic state in order to better understand 
how institutions are improving. 
 
 
2.2.2.5 Audit and control of the report 
The data should not be subject to any external prior check. However, public administration, 
like tax revenue agencies, should provide an ongoing control, such as a cross check. In the 
case of tax control taken at the international level, countries should reach an agreement to 
give tax authorities, the possibility to accomplish the inspection with the information coming 
from another country. Working together, public administrations, like the tax agencies, could 
fill their gaps in international control measures 
 
 
2.2.3 Consequences: possible scenarios 
2.2.3.1 Adverse scenario  
The CBCR, should influence a positive effect on taxation, worker rights, the environment, 
and public institutions, since the companies need to pay more attention in these areas. For 
example, with the implementation of the CBCR we hope multinational companies will pay 
a fair amount in taxes. In this fashion, they will earn less money, but they will contribute to 
a more stable economy, which ultimately will generate more profit. This could mean that at 
the international level there may be for example two companies doing the same business, 
but the first one (a multinational company) has to follow the CBCR and the other one, (a 
domestic company) operating only in a country which does not apply the CBCR, could cut 
cost for example: avoiding paying tax, exploiting workers, destroying the environment, etc. 
Over the years, the domestic company could buy out the multinational company. In a nut 
shell, if the CBCR will not apply at the international level it could produce a good impact 
on development until a foreign owners taking control over national companies and with 
strong influence in the economy, could press for a change in the legislation to increase profit 
in a speculation way. 
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2.2.3.2 OECD scenario 
The different options of CBCR provided by EU, USA, CANADA and especially by OECD 
focus only on taxation. So, for governments, the problem is whether or not large 
multinational companies are paying a fair amount of taxes. However, what is the fair amount 
of taxes that a multinational company should pay? An initial answer is that multinational 
companies should pay taxes in the country where they sell products and provide the services. 
In addition to that, tax administrations should detect tax avoidance practices. We understand 
that tax administrations will do an ad hoc and ongoing control on the tax policies of large 
multinational companies. So, if all these things work in a proper way, in the future some 
large multinational companies will pay more taxes. The CBCR will provide additional 
information to that. This information is already available to each tax administration, but only 
for the national level and sometimes only at European level. Therefore, it appears to be a 
problem only for exchange of information between tax authorities. For this reason, OECD 
proposal of CBCR is that they summarize some transfer pricing related information in a 
statement, for ease of sharing. 
 
However, we believe there are some unresolved problems: 
a) This version of CBCR does not support a better business environment, because it is 
for ad hoc controls; 
b) A control of a multinational company, based on tax avoidance, always ends in court. 
So, the court decision could take many years and it may differ from country to 
country depending on the legislation and the courts of that country. 
c) CBCR could give governments information to contest others things such as money 
laundering, environmental abuses, etc. but, will it be possible to use that information 
for other related matters? 
 
2.2.3.3 Positive scenario  
The introduction of the CBCR could provide investors the information they need to lower 
volatility; thus, it is likely that the economy could have more stability. A stable economy 
could help the company to better plan their business. In contrast, a transparent production 
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chain would give information about clients and suppliers to the company in order to 
minimize unfair surprises and thus better control the production costs. 
CBCR could contribute to a holistic approach in various matters such as fraud, corruption, 
environment, workers’ conditions, etc. which would contribute to reducing the bureaucracy 
that a company faces and, at the same time, could contribute to the accountability of the 
governments. 
Developing and poor economies could receive help in the implementation of the CBCR. 
This would promote more sustainable development around the world. 
 
2.2.4 Next steps 
2.2.4.1 Implementing CBCR 
CBCR should be introduced gradually, mainly for two reasons: it needs a better coordination 
at the international level and, it should be better understood by the public institutions and 
companies. Steps for implementing the CBCR: 
 Obtain coordination at international level. European Union, United States and 
Canada are each going to implement in a different way to the CBCR. Some countries 
from Africa and South America have been following the EITI standards. The OECD 
has published a proposal of CBCR. It would be useful to find a common process at 
international level in order to implement the same provisions of CBCR and put 
pressure in this regard on other countries such as: Russia, China, India and others. 
We should ensure the introduction of CBCR is a requirement in future trade 
agreement. In order to give stability to the process, undertake the following: 
 Set a minimum level of transparency and accountability for governments and public 
institutions at national and at local level in each country joining the agreement; 
 Divide companies into different areas (large, medium and small multinational 
companies, domestic companies and autonomous). Each area should provide some 
information about the company and about the other companies involved in the 
production chain of a product or of a service.  
 Make sure to have a holistic approach where you specify all the information you 
require from a company. That means that the company should provide all the 
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information once via a single software designed for this purpose. The software will 
reduce bureaucracy and will provide the data in a workable format. 
 Take into account the opinions of: companies, labour unions, shareholders, civil 
society, etc. It is important to specify which information should be provided and 
which should be published; 
 
2.2.4.2 The OECD option 
In the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), the OECD is working on an “Action Plan” 
to provide tax administrations with more transparency and the information to assess high-
level transfer pricing and other related risks. In the “Transfer Pricing-Action 13” the OECD 
gives a proposal of CBCR. It has a provision of three models that could be used to facilitate 
the exchange of CBCR, respectively based on the 1) Multilateral Convention on 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; 2) Bilateral tax conventions; and 3) Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs). 
 This could be a base for international coordination, but we should be aware of its limits: 
 The proposal of the OECD covers all sectors, however it applies only for 
multinational companies having more than € 750m in revenues. This could generate 
unfair competition among large multinational companies. The solution may be to use 
different versions of CBCR for different types of companies, and require some 
information from each of them; 
The ultimate parent company of a group should provide the CBCR of all the companies of 
the group on request to the national tax administration where it has its fiscal residence. Thus, 
if a tax administration of another country wants the CBCR of that multinational company, it 
should request it from the tax administration of that country. However, in cases where 
countries have not adopted the CBCR provided by the OECD, or when countries do not have 
an agreement of automatic exchange of information, or when that agreement does not work, 
the multinational company will provide the CBCR to each tax administration. In summary, 
if a tax administration wants to control a multinational group, in which the parent company 
has the fiscal residence abroad, they should contact the tax administration of that country, 
spending a lot of time and resources. So, if the government is likely to adopt the version of 
the CBCR produced by the OECD, it may be better not to have any agreement of automatic 
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exchange concerning CBCR with other jurisdictions, in order that the multinational 
companies provide directly all the required information. 
 
 
2.2.4.3 The new EU’s proposal of CBCR in the Tax Avoidance Package27 
After the public consultation of September, the European Union took several actions in the 
direction of fight corporate tax avoidance. The project come at the end of January 2016 and 
is composed by 4 action: 
1. Anti-tax avoidance directive: The European commission would like to establish a 
common legal framework among European countries; 
2. Recommendation in tax treaties: In this aspect especial attention is given from 
European Commission to tax treaties due to the fact in the past decade it was an abuse 
as they can modify some aspect of the law.  
3. Revised administrative cooperation Directive: introduction of CBCR 
4. Communication on external strategy: in this area the European Commission should 
continue to promote tax good governance at international level as for example 
supporting EITI project or financing reform in tax administration in developing 
countries. 
So about improving administrative cooperation in taxation, the European Commission had 
made a proposal of introducing the CBCR proposed by the OECD. However, the 
commission is likely not to go behind the limit of OECD’s version except about the 
possibility to make public some information. 
 
 
2.2.4.4 2016 Fiscal reform in Spain 
Spain anticipated the European Commission changing the documentation requirement in its 
last fiscal reform “Real Decreto” n. 634 emanated in July 2015 where at the art. 14 
introduced the CBCR (“Información País por País”) for the fiscal year starting on 2016. The 
                                                 
27 (European Commission, 2016) and (European Commission, 2016) 
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version the Spanish legislation adopted was the one proposed by the OECD concerning only 
the multinational companies with more of € 750 millions of turnover. While the reform 
increases documentation for that companies, reduce it for other companies especially for the 
small one. 
 
 
  
3 ACCESS TO FINANCE 
DURING THE CRISIS AND ITS 
EFFECTS ON THE 
GOVERNMENT’S REVENUE: 
THE CASE OF MICRO-
COMPANIES 
  
3. Access to finance during the crisis and its effects on the government’s revenue: the case of 
Micro-companies 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this section we will analyse how the financial system reacted during the financial crisis 
and what were the consequences for companies. This is divided into two parts, in the first 
part we describe the financial system and how companies perceived it changing during the 
financial crisis. In the second part we analyse a database of microenterprises from Spain, 
France and Italy before and after the financial crisis. 
 
In the first part we investigate firstly how access to finances have changed during the 
financial crisis. This analysis was completed using a questionnaire carried out jointly by the 
European Central Bank and by the European Commission. In addition, we compared the rate 
of start-up or “birth” and termination or “death” of companies before and after the financial 
crisis to better understand the stresses that the real economy received during these years. The 
data was compiled by Eurostat. The “access to finance” questionnaires and the census of 
companies are both analyses for European companies.  
In the second part, we will focus on finance intermediaries. Here we pay attention to shadow 
banking, in order to explore the intermediary institutions outside the regular banking system.  
After exposing the problem of how the access to finance is affecting enterprises and briefly 
considering subjects other than banks, we relook at the questionnaire to observe the recorded 
trend of funds European companies. 
We conclude this descriptive section by giving an introduction to loan sharks. After 
describing problems connected with these illegal practices we will compare the legislation 
of Spain and Italy. These two countries experimented with different legislation and had 
different evidence of loan sharks. Whilst in Spain the problem is connected with individuals 
having difficulties with their mortgage, in Italy the problem is more pertaining to small 
enterprises that cannot get access to the legal finance market.  
 
In the second part of the chapter, we consider how taxes paid and the mark-up applied by 
micro enterprises has changed in three selected years: 2008, 2011 and 2014. For each of 
these years we investigated the differences in taxes and mark-up due to difference sources 
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of finance. Moreover, a regression analysis is calculated to see the strengthens of the 
financial crisis and the sources of finance to influence the taxed paid and the margin applied. 
  
 
 
3.2 HOW THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INFLUENCED THE ACCESS TO FINANCE? 
It is very important for companies access to finance especially during a recession time where 
funding are directing towards less risky activities. Companies that recorded losses could not 
have more funds and could close down producing a downturn in the economy and this could 
become a dangerous spiral. So a financial problem for companies becomes a revenue trouble 
for governments. This is because for each company closing down there is a multiplicative 
contraction in collected taxes. So preserve good enterprises, during financial crisis, could 
limit the effect of it.     
During the past decade the financial system experienced important changes in particular 
during the financial crisis of 2008 - the banks changed their risk approach in lending money. 
At this time the economy had a lack of liquidity, due subprime debts. In some Western 
countries the liquidity for banks was provided by governments, however for citizens and 
companies it was a different matter and the acquirement of loans was more difficult. In that 
context, banks changed their attitude from a quite aggressive policy obtaining new clients to 
a prudent one, where money was lent to more stable activities or only under guarantees to 
lower the risk. The European Commission jointly with the European Central Bank, paid 
attention to that problem and launched a questionnaire about the finance access for small to 
medium entrepreneurs (SMEs).  
As it is shown in the following tables, companies experimented difficulties in obtaining 
finance. Few people had a positive perception of the change in the bank´s attitude. Especially 
in Greece, Spain and Ireland, people had a very negative perception about the banks 
unwillingness to provide finance. 
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Figure 3–1. Willingness of banks to provide finance. (2010) Total NACE_R2: Industry (except construction) 
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Figure 3–2: Increment of Requests of loans refused by the banks between 2007 and 2010. Data source: Eurostat28 
 
In the graph above we can see the increment of loans refused after the financial crisis.  
It is easy to observe how young high-growth and high-growth enterprises were the most 
affected by the crises. For young high growth enterprises, it may be reasonable because they 
could be characterized by higher risk; it is significant that banks preferred to fund a growth 
“normal” company than one with a high-growth historic trend. We could say that those 
companies with good growth profiles may have an intrinsic risk factor, so the bank decided 
not to take any risks. In other words, “good” companies suffered more elasticity in receiving 
a loan.  
It was in this context, that SMEs often found problems in getting a loan and it is likely they 
were also looking outside the formal financial intermediaries at a higher price. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 The questionnaire recollected only the enterprises in the non-financial market sectors that employed between 
10 and 249 persons in the year 2005 and which continued to employ at least 10 persons at the time of the 
survey. 
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3.2.1 A demographic analysis of European enterprises during the crisis  
The number of companies in a country is another index which can give us a view about the 
stability of the economy. With this census we also scrutinised the number of enterprises 
which closed and opened during the same year. During “turbulent times”, a country may 
experience a wide change in these numbers. For this reason, an increase or decrease could 
be a good or bad sign, depending on the country and the background. However, generally 
speaking, in a growing economic period we are expecting an increase in the number of 
companies.  
In this analysis, we would like to identify the height of the financial crisis that started in 
2008. We selected the most significant European countries and, among these, we took only 
the countries for which we have all data available (for Germany the birth number for 2008 
is missing). 
We decided to divide the data into two macro areas: first, we look at the whole population 
of companies (NACE Rev. 2: Industry, construction and services except insurance activities 
of holding companies) and then we focus only on companies with fewer than 10 employees. 
This detail was motivated by the fact that microenterprises may suffer more economic stress 
during the selected period and thus could better present the real economic performance over 
the number of enterprises29 
 
In this first graph we compare the active enterprises over a period of three years (2008, 2010 
and 2012). To better appreciate the variation in the selected years we equated 2008 at 100 
and we calculated the proportions for the following years. The red line is the constant value 
of 100 we have chosen for 2008. 
                                                 
29 A microenterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual 
turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 2 million. (EC, 2003) 
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Figure 3–3: Population of active enterprises. Source data: Eurostat 
In the above graph, it is possible to see different trends. Eastern countries (Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Slovakia) and Central and Northern countries (Austria, Luxemburg, Finland 
and Netherlands), registered a good performance, growing up every other year. Southern 
countries (Spain, Italy and Portugal) and the United Kingdom had a contraction during this 
period. Germany does not have any significant variation.   
In the next figure, we took the same information, but applied it only for microenterprises. 
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Figure 3–4: Population of active enterprises with less than 10 employees. Source data: Eurostat 
Austria, Czech Republic, Luxemburg, the United Kingdom and Germany recorded the same 
trend. Netherlands changed from a positive to a negative value, especially in 2012. Belgium 
reduced to zero from its positive trend. Spain accentuated the decrement. The opposite were 
Italy and Portugal which showed an improvement. In particular, the Italian increment of 
microenterprises was not big enough to contrast the shutting down of larger enterprises. 
 
In the next figure we calculated the rate of birth of companies over death of companies. With 
a value higher than 1 the country registered more companies opening than closing. 
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Figure 3–5: Rate of birth over death enterprises. Source data: Eurostat 
As is possible to see, except for Belgium, Finland and Luxemburg, the other countries 
registered a negative value and/or downturn trend. The explanation of this data can be found 
in the period of time it takes for a company to shut down. It is likely that when the financial 
crisis started in 2008, companies resisted better for the first couple of years and then they 
started to close their activities. 
In the next figure, we present the same information, but this time only for selected enterprises 
employing less than 10 persons. 
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Figure 3–6: Rate of birth over death enterprises with less than 10 employees. Source data: Eurostat. 
At first glance, it may be appreciated that some countries score better, especially Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Only Spain and Portugal registered a worst score, probably 
due to the fact that more microenterprises were affected in these countries.  
Finally, in the next graph, we show the percentage of companies which survived after 2 years 
(2010-2013) and 5 (2008-2013) of their constitution. Also in this case we discriminated 
about the size of the companies showing in the first graph all the companies and in the second 
one only microenterprises.   
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Figure 3–7. Percentage of enterprises newly born in 2008/2010 having survived to 2013. Data source: Eurotat 
The average of survived companies through European countries newly born in 2010 is 60% 
while the percentage low to 49% for the one started on 2008. Microenterprises resist better 
scoring on average 65% for the first two years and 53% for the period long five years. 
 
Figure 3–8. Percentage of enterprises newly born in 2008/2010 having survived to 2013 (with less than 10 employees) 
Data source: Eurostat 
All these figure could give some explication of the stability of the enterprises and especially 
the microenterprises during the last five years. An in depth comparison between countries 
may be misleading due to very different economic history and demographic characteristics 
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of European countries. A longer period could provide a better view of the impact of the crisis 
on the enterprises demographic, however until 2007 the European Commission worked with 
another classification of the companies, so a direct comparison may be ambiguous in this 
case.  
However, the trend and some characteristic of the demographic of the enterprises we 
analysed gives a standalone synopsis of enterprises especially the micro-ones which suffered 
the most consequences of the financial crisis. 
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3.2.2 Shadow bank  
Firstly we analyse how the literature defined it. In a nut shell, our scope is to describe the 
shadow bank as a legitimate alternative both to the traditional bank system and to the so 
called “shark loans”. In the next paraphrase, we will describe how the “shark loans” work.  
 
To be more precise, “shadow banking” should be better called “market-based financing”. 
This is because shadow could evocate something illegal and “market-based” could better 
represent the area of study. As it could be seen in the following table produced by the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund, 2014) there are different definitions of shadow banking. As 
the IMF reported there are definitions focus more on the type of entities or activities or both. 
  
DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF SHADOW BANKING 
Activities Entities Activities and Entities 
Claessens and Ratnovski (2014): All 
financial activities, except traditional 
banking, requiring private or public 
backstop to operate 
McCulley (2007): Levered-up 
financial intermediaries with 
liabilities perceived akin to bank 
deposits (“the whole alphabet 
soup”) 
FSB (2013): Credit 
intermediation involving entities 
and activities outside the regular 
banking system 
FCIC (2010): Unregulated or lightly 
regulated bank-like intermediation 
Ricks (2010): Maturity 
transformation outside banking 
social contract 
Schwarcz (2012): Provision of 
financial products and services by 
shadow entities and financial 
markets 
Mehrling and others (2013): Money 
market funding of capital market 
lending 
Acharya, Khandwala, and Öncü 
(2013): Nonbank financial 
institutions that behave like banks, 
borrow short, leverage, and lend and 
invest long in illiquid assets, but less 
regulated 
Gorton and Metrick (2012): 
Institutions, old contracts (repo), 
and more esoteric instruments 
(ABCP, ABS, CDO, and the 
like30) 
Deloitte (2012): Market funded, 
credit intermediation system 
involving maturity or liquidity 
Pozsar and others (2013): Entities 
that conduct maturity, credit, and 
liquidity transformation without 
Kane (2014): Entities with 
liabilities supposedly redeemable 
at par but without a government 
guarantee, and instruments that 
                                                 
30 ABCP = asset-backed commercial paper; ABS = asset-backed security; CDO = collateralized debt 
obligation; repo = repurchase agreement. 
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transformation through securitization 
and secured-funding mechanisms 
government guarantee or access to 
central bank liquidity 
trade as if they have a zero 
performance risk 
Harutyunyan and others 
(forthcoming): Noncore liabilities 
capturing non-traditional funding 
.   
Table 3–1. Source (International Monetary Fund, 2014, p. 91) 
To better analyses what the shadow bank is about we will focus on the definition given by 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) “Credit intermediation involving entities and activities 
outside of the regular banking system” (Financial Stability Board, 2015). 
This definition is important to monitoring the trend of non-bank financial intermediation; 
however the subjects acting outside the banking sector are very different.  
 
So the FSB goes a step forward and classifies the subjects of the shadow bank by the 
activities they offer:   
Classification by Economic Functions 
Economic 
Function 
Definition Typical entity types 
EF1 
Management of collective investment vehicles 
with features that make them susceptible to runs 
Fixed income funds, mixed funds, credit hedge 
funds, real estate funds 
EF2 
Loan Provision that is dependent on short-term 
funding 
Finance companies, leasing companies, 
factoring companies, consumer credit 
companies 
EF3 
Intermediation of market activities that is 
dependent on short-term funding or on secured 
funding of client assets 
broker-dealers 
EF4 facilitation of credit creation 
Credit insurance companies, financial 
guarantors, mono-lines 
EF5 
Securitisation-based credit intermediation and 
funding of financial entities 
Securitisation vehicles 
Table 3–2. The FSB identifies 6  different financing services provided form different actors in the shadow economy for a 
sample of 26 countries that represent the majority actors of the financial market. 
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For these reasons the FSB narrows down the definition, removing the financial institutions 
which have good regulations or who depend mainly on banks and focusing more on those 
that do not have clear regulations or regulations equivalent to bank regulation. In this 
situation the risk of credit intermediation may arise.  
With respect to the narrow definition of the shadow bank we reproduced a specification 
directly from the FSB report (see the annex). 
 
To better clarify the subject of the shadow economy, we will look at the different types of 
institutions in the financial market. Since the focus of this thesis is on how financial sources 
have been changed due the financial crisis and how this could have some relation to paying 
taxes, it will not be an exhaustive classification of this financial subject. We propose a 
possible division of types of intermediaries into four main groups: 1) Deposit-type 
institutions; 2) Contractual Savings Institutions; 3) Investment Funds; 4) Other Types of 
Financial Intermediaries (more specification in the annex). 
 
 
3.2.3 Lending composition 
In the first part, we saw how the financial crisis has changed the trend of lending money. 
Banks perceived an increase in the risk of lending money and entrepreneurs had to find 
alternative ways to obtain credit. 
Eurostat collated these changes in finance composition through their analysis of “proposed 
of finance”, “accepted”, “partially accepted” and “refused” for equity, loan, or other types 
of finance source such as leasing, factoring, and advanced payments. 
Below we present comparability tables of five selected European countries: Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom.  
 
3.2.3.1 Success rate in obtaining equity finance in 2007 and 2010 
According to the following tables, it is possible to see how the request for equity changed 
before and after the financial crisis. For equity finance we refer to the process of raising 
capital through the sale of shares of an enterprise. In the first table, Spain, France and the 
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United Kingdom reduced the percentage of requests accepted. On the other hand, the 
requests of German and Italian companies that were not an option before the crisis, have 
been widely accepted by the banks after the crisis. 
 
 Banks Existing shareholders Business angels 
% 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 8.8 35 91.2 65 90.2 94 9.8 6 0.9 0 99.1 100 
Spain 98.5 75.4 1.5 24.6 88.6 72.5 11.4 27.5 2.3 0.5 97.7 99.5 
France 74.7 46.2 25.3 53.8 98.2 94.8 1.7 5.3 29.4 50 70.6 50 
Italy 0 49.1 100 51 65.1 83.1 34.9 16.9 0 0 100 100 
UK 93.7 79.8 6.3 20.2 100 93.7 0 6.4 43.6 21.9 56.4 78.1 
Table 3–3. Success rate in obtaining equity finance, by sources 1/2 (Eurostat source) 
Analysing the increase of equity through existing shareholders it is possible to see how there 
has been a high degree of requests accepted or partially accepted in both years.  
 
Business angels, sometimes used for new small enterprises, is a marginal way of finance but 
it is used in the United Kingdom and, especially, in France where they have recorded quite 
good scores of requests accepted.  
 
As it is showed in the next table, family, friends, or other individual may be a way to raise 
finance in small contests. Excluding France, the other countries have a major increment in 
the requests refused, especially Italy that went from 14,5% to 97,8%.  
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Family, friends or other 
individuals, not any of the 
above 
Initial public offering or other 
stock market offerings 
Other financial institutions Other businesses 
% 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 100 58 0 42 66.7 26.5 33.3 73.5 0 93.6 100 6.4 86.5 33.9 13.5 66.1 
Spain 68.2 44.5 31.8 55.5 46.9 0 53.1 100 74.3 45.6 25.7 54.4 78.4 33.3 21.6 66.7 
France 41.7 69.6 58.3 30.5 37 23.2 63 76.8 45.3 51.2 54.8 48.7 73.5 58.3 26.5 41.7 
Italy 85.5 2.2 14.5 97.8 26.9 82.3 73.1 17.7 0 58.9 100 41.1 28.2 8.4 71.8 91.6 
UK 84.3 54 15.7 46 23.1 0 76.9 100 80.2 95.3 19.8 4.7 42.6 38.5 57.4 61.5 
Table 3–4. Success rate in obtaining equity finance, by sources 2/2 (Eurostat source) 
The Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the way for fast expanding good companies to raise quite 
large quantities of money. IPOs may be issued by smaller, younger companies seeking 
capital for growth, but it is also done by large companies looking to become publicly traded. 
Except for Italy, the other countries reduced this means of finance.  
Financing the equity through other financial institution recorded different trends among the 
countries. The most impressive is the change of Germany moving from 0% in 2007 to 93,6% 
in 2010. 
Rising capital selling shares to other business have found low success during and after the 
financial crisis among the selected countries, probably due to the high risk involved. 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Success rate in obtaining loan finance in 2007 and 2010  
Loans are money supplied to use for all types of corporate activities. Banks play an important 
role in this field, accounting for approximately half among the subjects providing them 
(Financial Stability Board, 2015). However, a company may borrow money from other 
sources such as, the owner, employees, family, friends, other business and so on. Unlike 
equity a loan does not give any rights over the company. Due to the financial crisis banks 
decreased lending money to companies. In this area, in the UK and in Spain the rate fell 
respectively by 15% and 10%. The request for loans to owner and directors remained stable 
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and positive as we expected; whilst requests to other employees remained stable except in 
Italy where it collapsed from 91,9% to 8,1%.  
 
  Banks 
Owner(s)/director(s) of the 
business 
Other employees of the business 
% 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 93.3 91.8 6.7 8.2 98.6 97.8 1.4 2.2 17.7 36.6 82.3 63.4 
Spain 97 86.9 3 13.2 85.4 71.8 14.6 28.2 47.7 39 52.2 61 
France 98.1 93 2 7 90.1 84.6 9.9 15.4 52.6 49.6 47.4 50.5 
Italy 98.8 95.1 1.2 4.9 96.5 91.6 3.5 8.4 91.9 4.5 8.1 95.5 
UK 94.5 79.3 5.6 20.8 98.4 91.6 1.6 8.4 37.4 55.1 62.6 44.9 
Table 3–5. Success rate in obtaining loan finance, by sources 1/2 (Eurostat source) 
Family, friends and other individuals remain another source of loans. They increased by 10% 
in the UK and in Germany and lowered by a 5% in Spain and France. In Italy, it sank from 
93,9% to 73,4%. With respect to the loans lent by other businesses, the contractions were 
bigger in countries like Italy and Spain were the crisis hit harder. Finally, other sources of 
loans dropped in Spain. 
  
Family, friends or 
other individuals 
outside the business 
Other businesses Other loan sources 
% 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 53.2 67.6 46.8 32.5 33.5 23.3 66.5 76.7 58.2 38.1 41.8 62 
Spain 52.4 41.8 47.6 58.2 70 53.8 30.1 46.2 80.7 42.3 19.3 57.7 
France 67.9 62.8 32.1 37.2 67.3 50.2 32.7 49.8 84.1 74.3 15.8 25.7 
Italy 93.9 73.4 6.1 26.6 95 62.8 5 37.2 73.5 81.4 26.6 18.6 
UK 78.8 90.2 21.2 9.8 46.8 61 53.2 39 96.8 87.8 3.1 12.2 
Table 3–6. Success rate in obtaining loan finance, by sources 2/2 (Eurostat source) 
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3.2.3.3 Success rate in obtaining other source of finance in 2007 and 2010  
Finally, we report other ways of financing, including leasing, factoring, bank overdrafts and 
so on. With respect to leasing, almost all the requests were accepted amongst the countries 
in both the selected years, only Italy and Spain recorded an inflection of the rate. Factoring 
is another source of finance widely used when the time for payment are long. It is quite 
expensive in relation to the other ways of financing but assures the income of credit, which 
become important especially during a financial crisis. Its rate is quite stable among countries. 
Bank overdrafts or credit lines is another expensive way of financing especially for short 
periods, however for this this type of source the rate is quite stable.  
We report other sources of finance in the annex. 
 Leasing Factoring Bank overdraft or credit line 
% 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
Requests 
accepted / 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 97.7 99.9 2.3 0.1 51.5 60.5 48.5 39.5 95.6 97.8 4.4 2.2 
Spain 95.1 83.8 0.4 6.5 95.1 83.8 4.5 9.7 95.1 83.8 4.5 9.7 
France 96.6 92.2 1.1 2.6 96.6 92.2 2.3 5.2 96.6 92.2 2.3 5.2 
Italy 84.4 78.4 1.2 6.7 84.4 78.4 14.4 14.9 84.4 78.4 14.4 14.9 
UK 99.7 92.7 0.1 5.3 99.7 92.7 0.1 1.9 99.7 92.7 0.1 1.9 
Table 3–7. Success rate in obtaining other source of finance, by sources (Eurostat source) 
In the following graph it is possible to see the level of loans that financial institutions have. 
It represents the loans that financial institutions have given in the last ten years in Spain, 
France, Italy and Greece. France is the country with a more loans given due probably to its 
economy. The economy of Spain before the crisis was growing and so its debts; however 
with after the crisis it is possible to see the fall in loans. Italy has a trend similar to Italy but 
with a light fall after the crisis. And finally Greece, where the level of loans remain very low 
over all the period.    
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3.2.4 Shark loan: a risk based approach 
Usury was condemned over the past centuries in different cultures and especially in the main 
religions because of its nature. Whilst usury has always been condemned, its concept  has 
changed over the centuries. Nowadays, the debate about usury, today under the name of 
shark loans, shifted the focus from the vulnerability of the borrower to the regulation or not 
of the market of loan.  
The question is how to increase both the offer of different types of loan and the protection 
of customers. To answer this question, it is found whether the governments should regulate 
the market like imposing a rate cap or they should leave the market works by itself. 
In a perfect, unregulated market, the supply matches the demand in an equilibrium situation, 
so we could hypothetically suggest that shark loans could not exist because the interest rate 
(or in general the cost of the credit) is commensurate to the risk.  
Moreover, a higher interest rate could be justified for a higher risk of insolvency of 
borrowers. In this situation, the higher interest rate could even generate low profits for 
lenders. That could happen in a perfect market with no distortion. For example, a borrower 
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should choose the lender among others offering the lowest interest rate. Speaking more in 
general, the customers should buy the better deal between quality/quantity and price.  
Another point in favour to a non-regulated market could be the fact that, lenders could prefer 
to remain in the formal market rather than in the informal one. This could facilitate the 
control by the governments and prevent the cases where the lenders use violence or 
extortionate methods to have the loan or the interest paid (Baker & Breitenstein, 2010). For 
the authors, the use of restrictions, for example an interest rate cap, are likely to produce an 
increase of shark lenders. 
On the contrary, Mayer (Mayer, 2012) found there are not significant differences between a 
country with no interest cap rate and another applying it, when the interest is not too low. 
Many other factors influence the loan’s market. An important role plays the borrowers’ 
profile. In this view, loans with a high interest rate apply especially to a specific target of 
customer. The borrower could have difficulties to find a loan with a low interest rate and 
probably have financial problems or they have bad historic record. Moreover, they could be 
under pressure because of the critical economic outline and with no enough time to compare 
and evaluate the lender: in summary, they could be in a vulnerable situation.  
On the side of the lender, we will not focus in primary financial intermediary like banks but 
in those who operate with the client we describe before. 
The lender will include in the price of the loan not only the risk of the client but also their 
vulnerability. This vulnerability could be used by lenders in case the borrowers could have 
problem in pay the loan back. This could determinate a big different in the profit of the 
lender. There are different techniques to make pressure legally and illegally. For lenders the 
profit could depend more on the vulnerability than on the interest, the more pressure the 
lenders could exercise the more profit could generate. 
In this context, we find also microcredit. It could be seen as a revolutionary practice of high 
interest rate loan to support informal business not receiving other form of credit. Poor people 
could improve their business to have a more stable and better income. We recalled it to better 
explain the narrow line that could divide good practices of loans with a high interest rate to 
what we could define as “shark loan”. 
Microcredit works lowering the risk to pay back because it is guaranteed by a peer group 
instead of collateral. Also, it is characterized to be a small amount of money. If one person 
defaults, no one in his/her lending circle will receive another loan. 
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However, the microcredit that brought with no doubt benefit to many people was more than 
once accuse of extortion, threating the client to have the loans pay back. That come not only 
because of bad practices of the lenders but also because the microcredit often finances an 
informal business, even with the presence of a contract, that could facilitate the attempt for 
the borrower not to pay back the loan and for the lender to extort to obtain more and 
punctually what it was agreed. 
More generally speaking, in the shark loan we are analysing whether there is another factor 
to add to the vulnerability of the borrower and to the intrinsic risk of the business. This loan 
could be characterised by an informal factor from the borrower, as we have seen in the 
microcredit or from the lender or both.  
Lenders, we are talking about, stay at the margin of the legal market and in some case in the 
informal one. However, these lenders could represent a last hope for a person or company to 
receive a loan, and thus to same economic activities. 
In these situations, the lender has to discover ways to minimize the lost and maximize the 
profit. In some cases that could bring the lender to use the loan as an excuse to reach other 
objectives like not to the end of lending money but with another purposes like to launder 
money or to offer an unpayable loan to take the goods or asset granted or endless loan to 
charge interests as long as they can. 
To sum up, this type of loans are high risk, the borrower is in pressure vulnerability situation, 
the lender could be “aggressive” and be looking only for “one shoot” profit not daring 
customer loyalty, like in a scam situation. 
On the contrary, it could be the lender the illegal one. They work only with a trust client and 
they lend small amount of money at a normal interest rate, in some cases lower than bank 
overdraft interest. The scope of the lender is to clean dirty money, so it could support even 
lost, but instead to declare it they could declare a profit or a higher profit.  
 
3.2.4.1 Legislation in Italy  
 
    Deccreto Legge (DL)300-2006 - Riapertura Termini Mutui Antiusura 
    Decreto Ministeriale (DM) 132-2010 - Regolamento Attuazione Fondo Solidarietà 
Mutui Prima Casa 
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    DM 220-2007 - Iscrizione Fondazioni Elenco Provinciale UTG 
    DM 239-2002 - Finanziamento Fondo Solidarieta' vittime usura e racket 
    DM Tesoro 6 agosto 1996 - Requisiti patrimoniali fondazioni - onorabilita' e 
professionalita' esponenti 
    Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica (DPR) 287-2000 - Regolamento di attuazione 
art. 16 L. 108-96 (mediazione creditizia) 
    DPR 315-1997 - Regolamento di attuazione art. 15 L. 108-1996 (Fondo di prevenzione) 
    DPR 455-1999 - Regolamento Fondo di solidarieta' vittime racket e usura art. 21 L. 44-
1999 
    Legge 44-1999 - Fondo di solidarieta' vittime racket e usura 
    Legge 108-1996 - Disposizioni in materia di usura 
    Legge 244-2007 (Finanziaria 2008) art. 2 commi 475-480 - Fondo Solidarieta' Mutui 
Prima Casa 
    Legge 266-2005 (Finanziaria 2006) - Finanziamento Fondo Prevenzione 
    Legge 448-2001 (Finanziaria 2002) - Unificazione Fondo Solidarieta' vittime racket art. 
18 L. 44-99 al Fondo Solidarieta' vittime usura art. 14 L. 108-96 
    Legge Regione Puglia n. 7-2006 
 
 
The first mention of usury in the legislation of Italy appeared in 1930 in the art. 644 of the 
Penal Code. This article punished those who generically apply too high an interest in lending 
money. However, the law was quite generic and indefinite, so it was only with the reform of 
1996 Law 108 that usury was better defined. Moreover, at the art. 2 of law 108/1996 it was 
defined as the limit of the interest rate which lenders could apply. In particularly, it was the 
average interest rate plus the 50% of the same. 
In 2011, the calculation was modified: at the average interest rate is added a quarter and then 
a 4% and the difference between the interest rate and the limit rate cannot be more than 8%. 
This calculation should include not only the interest rate but all the costs the borrower has 
to pay relating to the loan excluding taxes and fines.  
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The advantages of this law is that it is based upon an objective calculation and does not take 
into account the nature of the lenders, so it may happen that a bank could, at some level, 
apply an interest rate higher than the limit.  
Moreover, the Italian legislation makes a provision regarding the institution of a special fund 
to lend money without interest to victims of usury. In addition to this, it is permitted that 
formally recognized foundations and ONGs could represent the victims during the process. 
 
Although there are numerous benefits to this legislation, the reality is quite different from 
the legislation. The judicial times are very long because the calculation is a bit too 
complicated (the Bank of Italy published a “circular” with a mistaken formula) and the 
borrower who is in a critical financial necessity could be expected to pay more for the process 
and may be waiting months or even years before the sentence and the repayment is complete. 
 
3.2.4.2 Legislation in Spain 
Legislation: 
 Law 16/2011 of 24 June on consumer credit contracts. 
 Law 22/2007, of 11 July, on the distance marketing of financial services. 
 Royal Decree 1/2007 of 16 November, approving the revised text of the General 
Law for the Protection of Consumers and Users and other complementary laws. 
 Law 34/2002, of 11 July, services of the information society and electronic 
commerce. 
 Law 15/1999 of 13 December on the Protection of Personal Data Order EHA / 
1718/2010, of June 11, regulation and control of advertising of banking services 
and products. 
 Circular 6/2010 of 28 September, the Bank of Spain, credit institutions and 
payment institutions on advertising of banking services and products. (Dictates the 
precise rules for the development and implementation of the provisions of the 
Order) 
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 Law 2/2009 of 31 March, by which regulates the contracting with consumers of 
loans or mortgages and brokerage services for the conclusion of contracts of loan 
or credit.  
 
The law about usury in Spain, called “Ley Azcárate”, dates back to 1908. That law, reformed 
several times, states that a contract of lending will be null on three occasions: 
1) if the interest rate is evidently too high; 
2) if there was a “leonine” contract, when all benefits are for the lenders; 
3) when the amount of money lent is lower than the one written in the contract. 
As it is possible to appreciate, in Spanish legislation the judge has the power to declare a 
contract null for usury. The rate taken in some process as an average was the limit for 
overdraft that is 2,5 times the legal interest rate31. However, judges could base their findings 
on the evidence of a specific case and evaluate whether or not to declare the contract null. 
If in one hand this legislation gives a degree of flexibility for the judge, on the other hand, it 
does not proportionate any protection to the borrower. With this scenario, the borrower will 
go to the court just in limited cases, due to the uncertainty of the law and the associated costs. 
Furthermore, as is reported in the “Reclamation Report of 2014” published by the Bank of 
Spain32 the cases arisen was for more than 95% from citizens, with respect to mortgages 
(Banco de España, 2015); It is possible to say that in Spain there is not a formal register of 
cases of usury for self-employed and SMEs. In addition to this, the application of a very high 
interest rate is not prosecutable33., when the Bank of Spain reckons that the financial 
institution is charging an interest rate which is too high, its recommendation is not binding. 
In this case, if the borrower wants the execution of the recommendation, they should go to a 
trial.  
                                                 
31 According to art. 19.4 of the Law on consumer credit. 
32 The report does not take into account the Azcarate law or anything about usury instead it talk about customer 
protection.  
33 In Spain usury was decriminalized by the Penal Code of 1995, breaking the penalty criterion set by the 
Criminal Code of 1928. 
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Special attention should be taken of the analysis carried out by ADICAE34 on micro-lending 
and payday lenders (ADICAE, 2014). ADICAE analysed some of the online companies 
offering short-term loans or microcredits. In their report, the association verified whether the 
companies were respecting the standards of transparency and details of the information to 
the public established by the law.  
The conclusion of the study shows how the companies lack transparency and try to speed up 
the finalization of the contract. It highlights the fast way in which the company could lend 
the money, which may be seen as a “quality indicator”, when actually the customer does not 
have enough time to read and evaluate the real cost of borrowing. Spanish legislation (art. 8 
L. 16/2011) states that the possibility for the customer to ask the pre-contractual information 
is valid for 15 days. Moreover, all companies lack in some measure to explicitly 
communicate the real conditions of the costs. In some cases, the companies have the right to 
change the conditions in a unilateral form. This behaviour goes against the disposition of the 
art 16.1 L. 16/2011 which states that the conditions of the contract should be provided in 
written form. Another unjustified penalty charged to clients is for exceeding the limit. This 
penalty has been already eliminated by the Bank of Spain. Furthermore, the ADICAE 
declares that these companies are not subjected to any control. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
34 ADICAE (Asociación de usuarios de bancos, cajas y seguros de España) is an association for customers’ 
protection in the financial sector.  
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3.3 DIFFERENCES IN TAXES PAID AND MARK-UP APPLY BY SPANISH, FRENCH 
AND ITALIAN MICRO ENTERPRISES IN THREE SELECTED YEARS: 2008, 2011 
AND 2014.  
3.3.1 Introduction  
In this part we analyse the impact of the economic downturn in three selected countries: 
Spain, France and Italy. Thanks to our data we were able to compare companies before and 
after the financial crisis. To better see what changes the financial crisis has produced we 
selected three years: 2008, 2011 and 2014. 2008 offers a view of the companies’ performance 
before the crisis; 2011 gives us information about the impact of the crisis in the short term 
and 2014 provides evidence of the consequences of the crisis in the medium term and, at the 
same time, gives us information about where we are currently. 
The companies selected for this analysis are the so-called “micro companies”, which, 
according to the European Union definition, are characterized by a turnover of less than 2 
million euros, and employ fewer than 10 people. We preferred to focus on the sector of 
“Wholesale and retail trade”35, in order to develop a deeper analysis. Finally, we only 
selected companies that were active in the selected period. 
3.3.2 A first analysis 
3.3.2.1 Background data 
Firstly, we need to consider the economic and legislative context of each country. To 
summarize the variables that could affect the performance of companies we have 
extrapolated information from the “Doing Business” study (World Bank, 2016), from 
national records and from the European Commission. 
The first of these indicators is the corporate tax rate. It is important information mainly 
because it generates a cost for the companies that, depending on the rate, could encourage 
or discourage economic activity. In the following table, the corresponding corporate tax rates 
for the selected countries are shown. 
                                                 
35 NACE classification. 
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Corporate Tax Rate 
  Spain France Italy 
  2008 2011 2014 2008 2011 2014 2008 2011 2014 
Nominal corporate income 
tax rate 
30% 30% 30% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 31,40% 31,40% 31,40% 
Special tax rate for SMEs 
(Small-medium enterprises) 
25% 25% 25% 15% 15% 15%       
ESD (Enterprises of Small 
Dimension) 
  20% 20%             
Table 3–8. Corporate tax rate national government source 
With reference to Spain, as it is possible to see in the table, from 2011 there are three different 
types of rate. The nominal tax rate is 30%, which applies to all companies. In 2008, small-
medium incorporated businesses adopted a reduced rate of 25% up to a taxable income of € 
120.202,41. From 2011, to benefit from the reduced rate, companies needed to meet two 
requirements: have a turnover not exceeding € 10 million and a taxable income of € 
300.000,00 or less. Furthermore, an additional reduced rate of 20% was applied to the 
companies with a turnover of less than € 5 million and with no more than 25 employees. In 
our study, as mentioned previously, we were working with microenterprises so the minimum 
rate, eligible for each year, is used.  
Regarding France, we found the standard tax rate to be 33,33%, with a special corporate tax 
rate of 15% on the first taxable income of € 38.120,00 for the entire selected period. 
Finally, Italy does not have any reduction in corporate tax rate. The standard tax rate is 27,5% 
to which a 3,9% Regional value added tax is added. Although, the taxable income is not the 
same we have added it to the standard rate taking it as a unique corporate tax rate of 31,40% 
(OECD, 2014). 
In the following table, we report the “Paying tax” indicators from “Doing business” edited 
by the World Bank for the respective years. 
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   France Italy Spain 
   2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
P
a
y
in
g
 t
a
x
es
 
Payments (number 
per year) 
8 8 8 14 14 13 9 9 9 
Time (hours per 
year) 
132 132 137 314 285 269 234 187 167 
Total tax rate (% of 
profit) 
66,1 65,7 68,9 72,5 67,6 65,2 58,8 37,9 58,2 
Table 3–9. Paying taxes (Doing Business – World Bank, source) 
As can be seen, France has a better and more stable score for the number of payments; with 
just 8 payments against the 14 of Italy and the 9 of Spain, and fewer hours each year 
dedicated to filing the tax statement. In this, Italy recorded a very large number of hours, 
while Spain decisively improved over the period concerned, going from 234 to 167 hours 
per year. Making the business of paying taxes easier is a factor that could have affected 
compliance. In short, more complicated procedures for paying tax could cause more cost and 
difficulty in both paying taxes, and paying the right amount. 
 
In the following tables we report the reforms in relevant aspects for business. We have 
reproduced the summary of reforms reported by the World Bank in the “Doing Business” 
project. 
In the case of Spain, we can see how important changes have been applied in the area of 
“Paying tax”. Over the last decade tax reforms have been addressed in two directions. On 
one side, the government lowered both the nominal standard rate and the reduced corporate 
tax rate, as stated previously, and at the same time the administration of tax switched to an 
online system. Other reforms streamlined the process of starting a business and reorganised 
the process for resolving insolvency. Finally, the labour market was made more flexible – or 
fragile, depending on your point of view – incentivizing fixed term contracts for employees 
over permanent ones. 
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Spain36 
Protecting Minority 
Investors 
2016 
Spain strengthened minority investor protections by requiring that major sales 
of company assets be subject to shareholder approval. 
Paying Taxes 
2008 
Spain made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing the corporate 
income tax rate. 
2010 
Spain made paying taxes easier and less costly for companies by improving 
efficiency in the electronic filing and payment system and reducing the 
corporate income tax rate. 
2015 
Spain made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing the statutory 
corporate income tax rate. 
2016 
Spain made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing rates for 
corporate income, capital gains and environment taxes—and made it easier by 
introducing the online Cl@ve system for filing VAT returns. At the same time, 
Spain reduced the amount allowable for depreciation of fixed assets and raised 
the ceiling for social security contributions. 
Starting a Business 
2012 
Spain eased the process of starting a business by reducing the cost to start a 
business and decreasing the minimum capital requirement. 
2014 
Spain made starting a business easier by eliminating the requirement to obtain a 
municipal license before starting operations and by improving the efficiency of 
the commercial registry. 
2015 
Spain made starting a business easier by introducing an electronic system 
linking several public agencies and thereby simplifying business registration. 
Registering Property 2015 
Spain made transferring property easier by reducing the property transfer tax 
rate. 
Resolving Insolvency 
2011 
Spain amended its regulations governing insolvency proceedings with the aim 
of reducing the cost and time. The new regulations also introduced out-of-court 
workouts. 
2013 
Spain strengthened its insolvency process by making workouts easier, offering 
more protections for refinancing agreements, allowing conversion from 
reorganization into liquidation at any time, allowing reliefs of the stay under 
certain circumstances and permitting the judge to determine whether an asset of 
the insolvent company is necessary for its continued operation. 
                                                 
36 The following table reproduce the information provided by the World Bank in the following web page: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms (World Bank, 2016). 
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2015 
Spain made resolving insolvency easier by introducing new rules for out-of-
court restructuring, introducing provisions applicable to pre-packaged 
reorganizations and making insolvency proceedings more public. 
Trading Across 
Borders 
2011 
Spain streamlined the documentation for imports by including tax-related 
information on its single administrative document. 
2013 
Spain reduced the time to import by further expanding the use of electronic 
submission of customs declarations and improving the sharing of information 
among customs and other agencies. 
Labor Market 
Regulation 
2011 Spain reduced the notice period applicable in case of redundancy dismissals. 
2013 Spain temporarily allowed unlimited duration of fixed-term contracts. 
2014 
Spain reduced the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts and 
increased the minimum wage. 
Table 3–10. Reform in Spain (2008-2014) (World Bank, 2016) 
In France, as in Spain, most reforms saw the introduction new electronic systems designed 
to facilitate compliance. At the same time, important improvements were made in the area 
of “Getting credit” by centralizing collateral registries and eliminating the public estimation 
of the debtor’s assets. 
France37 
Paying Taxes 
2009 
France made paying taxes easier for companies by changing the effective rates 
for Social Security and payroll taxes and by making electronic filing mandatory 
for Social Security contributions by companies liable for more than €800,000 in 
such contributions. 
2016 
France made paying taxes less costly for companies by introducing a credit 
against corporate income tax and reducing labor tax rates paid by employers. 
Starting a Business 2015 
France made starting a business easier by reducing the time it takes to register a 
company at the one-stop shop (Centre de Formalités des Entreprises). 
Labor Market 
Regulation 
2015 
France substantially amended its labor market regulations, including the 
provisions dealing with large-scale collective redundancy processes. 
Registering Property 2008 
France reduced the time required to register property by implementing a new 
system (Télé@ctes) allowing notaries to access the land registry electronically. 
                                                 
37 The following table reproduce the information provided by the World Bank in the following web page: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms (World Bank, 2016). 
3. Access to finance during the crisis and its effects on the government’s revenue: the case of 
Micro-companies 
 
 
110 
 
2010 
France made transferring property easier and less time consuming by more fully 
implementing an online system that enables notaries to obtain encumbrance and 
ownership documents from the land registry electronically. 
2014 
France made transferring property easier by speeding up the registration of the 
deed of sale at the land registry. 
Trading across 
borders 
2009 
France speeded up and simplified customs clearance procedures by introducing 
an electronic customs declaration and eliminating the need to submit certain 
documents. 
Getting Credits 
2008 
France strengthened its secured transactions system by launching a unified and 
geographically centralized collateral registry. 
2010 
France enhanced its insolvency process by encouraging preinsolvency workouts 
and eliminating the requirement that a public auctioneer provide the estimation 
of the debtor’s assets. 
Resolving Insolvency 2012 
France passed a law that enables debtors to implement a restructuring plan with 
financial creditors only, without affecting trade creditors. 
Table 3–11. Reform in France (2008-2014) (World Bank, 2016) 
Like the other two countries, Italy has also reduced red tape by introducing obligatory 
electronic filing and by consolidating procedures. As in Spain, labour regulation has 
facilitated fixed term contracts and the corporate tax rate has been reduced. The reduction of 
the corporate tax rate could be seen as a means of lightening the tax burden on corporations 
in the middle of the financial crisis. 
Italy38 
Labour Market Regulation 
2009 Italy increased the notice period for redundancy dismissals. 
2010 Italy allowed the use of fixed-term contracts for permanent tasks. 
2015 
Italy relaxed the conditions for using fixed-term contracts but 
reduced their maximum duration to 36 months. 
2016 
Italy adopted the Jobs Act, which simplifies redundancy rules and 
encourages out-of-court reconciliation, reducing the time and cost 
for resolving labor disputes. The new legislation also broadens the 
coverage of unemployment insurance. 
Enforcing Contracts 2014 
Italy made enforcing contracts easier by regulating attorneys’ fees 
and streamlining some court proceedings. 
                                                 
38 The following table reproduce the information provided by the World Bank in the following web page: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms (World Bank, 2016). 
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2016 
Italy made enforcing contracts easier by introducing a mandatory 
electronic filing system for court users, simplifying the rules for 
electronic service of process and automating the enforcement 
process. 
Starting a Business 
2009 
Italy made starting a business easier by making it possible to carry 
out all required procedures through a single notice. 
2011 
Italy made starting a business easier by enhancing an online 
registration system. 
2015 
Italy made starting a business easier by reducing both the minimum 
capital requirement and the paid-in minimum capital requirement 
and by streamlining registration procedures. 
Registering Property 
2013 
Italy made transferring property easier by digitizing cadastral maps 
of properties and making the maps available to notaries online. 
2014 
Italy made transferring property easier by eliminating the 
requirement for an energy performance certificate for commercial 
buildings with no heating system. 
Resolving Insolvency 
2008 
Italy enhanced its insolvency process through new legislation that 
gives trustees greater discretion in liquidating assets and grants 
creditors the right to propose arrangements for other creditors to 
take over distressed assets, which may shorten the liquidation 
procedure. 
2012 
Italy introduced debt restructuring and reorganization procedures 
as alternatives to bankruptcy proceedings and extended further 
rights to secured creditors during insolvency proceedings. 
2014 
Italy made resolving insolvency easier through an amendment to 
its bankruptcy code that introduces a stay period for enforcement 
actions while the debtor is preparing a restructuring plan, makes it 
easier to convert from one type of restructuring proceeding to 
another, facilitates continued operation by the debtor during 
restructuring and imposes stricter requirements on auditors 
evaluating a restructuring plan. 
Getting Electricity 2013 
Italy made getting electricity easier and less costly by improving 
the efficiency of the utility Acea Distribuzione and reducing 
connection fees. 
Paying Taxes 2009 
Italy made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing the 
corporate income tax (IRES) rate and the regional tax on productive 
activities (IRAP) rate. 
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Table 3–12. Reform in Italy (2008-2014) (World Bank, 2016) 
The reform aspect is an essential part in our analysis because it gives us an idea of direction 
the country is going in. 
 
3.3.2.2 The effective corporate tax rate for micro-enterprises 
In our investigation we focused on two different indicators: first of all, how the performance 
of companies has changed since the crisis and how this has affected the revenue of the 
government; and secondly, how companies’ mark-ups and costs have changed as a result of 
the financial crisis. The aim of the analysis is to identify different behaviour in paying tax 
between homogeneous companies. In other words, how similar companies have reacted to 
the crisis in these three different countries and how the countries themselves have played a 
crucial role in the matter.  
Our database is composed of the balance sheets of a sample of 8928 companies from Spain 
and Italy and 8377 from France. 
Firstly, in our investigation, we calculated the effective corporate tax rate. We calculated the 
tax rate starting with the tax paid and divided the profit before taxation. On this occasion we 
only selected the companies that reported a profit in the chosen year. The following tables, 
divided by countries, give us the average corporate tax rate and its distribution among 
companies39.  
As stated above, the companies’ statements come from the same standardized database 
(ORBIS), so all the data is treatment in the same way. The tax invoices include all taxes 
related to the accounting period (paid, accrued or deferred).  
 
                                                 
39 The name of variable is TR_INDIRECT_TAX_RATE where TR is for Trimmed 5% mean. 
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Figure 3–9. Spain corporate tax rate (Own calculation) 
 
As it is possible to see, in Spain and France the effective corporate tax rate matches the 
nominal tax rate. In Spain, in particular, the variance is minimum, showing that most of the 
companies classified in this segment – the micro ones – are exposed to an equal rate of 25% 
(the mean is 24,79%). In France, on the other hand, as the reduced rate works just for the 
first € 38.120,00 of taxable income and additional income is taxed at the standard rate of 
33,33%, the variance is somewhat larger, and the mean is 17,59% as a result. However, from 
the graph it is clear that the median is 15%, which is the reduced rate, meaning that most 
companies are taxed at that rate. 
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Figure 3–10. France corporate tax rate (Own calculation) 
 
Finally, the Italian micro companies are subjected to a standard rate equal to 31,40%. The 
peculiarity of the Italian case is that the mean is quite high (54,86%) and for some companies 
the rate exceeds 100%, most likely due to the fact that the tax includes other types of tax, 
including fixed rates applied to companies that do not relate to their profit or loss for the 
year. In this last case, the variance is larger than in Spain and France, meaning that taxes are 
influenced by other components that are not present in the other countries. 
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Figure 3–11. Italy corporate tax rate (Own calculation) 
In the table below it is possible to see how the effective tax rate changed during the selected 
years. As we observed before, these figures represent the actual tax paid. It is possible to see 
how in Spain during 2011 the rate decreased slightly, probably due to a combination of the 
financial crisis and a reduced tax rate. France shows contraction in 2014, meaning that the 
crisis could have caused more problems in that year. Finally, stated above, Italy has a high 
tax rate with a no clear trend. 
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 Effective tax rate40 
Country 2008 2011 2014 
ES 24.79% 23.95% 24.49% 
FR 17.60% 17.08% 14.75% 
IT 54.86% 58.44% 53.78% 
Table 3–13. Effective tax rate (Own calculation)   
 
3.3.2.3 Tax paid for € 1.000,00 of sales  
In the next graph we will see the amount of taxes paid for every € 1.000,00 of sales, 
excluding the companies in the top 5%. In this case we selected only the companies paying 
taxes and with a range of sales from € 1.000,00 to 2 million.  
Our hypothesis is that a higher corporate tax rate corresponds to more taxes collected. 
However, we would like to find out the optimum balance, where the tax rate maximizes 
revenue. We recalled the concept of Laffer’s curve; so we assume that Spain, France and 
Italy have similar institutions and economies. Furthermore, we assume that the companies 
are comparable, as we selected only “wholesale and retail trade” companies. Therefore, the 
differences will be found in the tax law and in particular in the tax rate. 
At a glance, it is possible to see in the graph below, that the amount of tax paid on every € 
1.000,00 of sales is higher in Italy (€ 13,86) than in Spain (€ 6,72) and France (€ 9,42). 
However, to better appreciate the differences, we have to compare the tax paid with the tax 
rate. In other words, we will see how the level of the tax rate can generate different amounts 
of revenue. For this analysis we have chosen the effective tax rate rather than the nominal 
one. So, speaking for 2008, Spain has a rate of 24,79%, France of 17,59% and Italy of 
54,86%. 
Firstly, we could argue that between Spain and Italy the difference in the amount of tax paid 
is due to the difference in the tax rate, as they are in the same ratio (more or less 1 : 2; Spain 
24,79%/€ 6,72; Italy 54,86%/€ 13,86). However, if we compare Spain or Italy with France 
we have to look for a different conclusion. French companies pay € 9,42 on every € 1.000 
of sales with an effective tax rate of 17,59%. So, with the lowest tax rate companies are 
                                                 
40 The corresponding graph with the distribution are showed in the annex. 
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paying more than Spain and in proportion more than Italy. That result is closer to the Italian 
one, because more companies contribute tax at the official rate. It means that the “Profit 
before tax” invoice is higher in France than in the other two countries. 
 
 
 
Figure 3–12. Own source (ORBIS database) 
 
As it is possible see in the graph, the countries do not converge to the same value, though 
Spain does better in 2014 compared to French and Italy, which see a reduction in the amount 
of tax paid. 
 
So, the logical question is: why do French companies declare more than their Spanish and 
Italian counterparts? Or, in other words, why do they earn more? And widening the analysis, 
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the questions we ask ourselves are: is the level of GDP influencing that result? Is tax evasion 
distorting our value? Or are different sources of finance affecting the company’s 
performance? And finally, how do the different combinations of these factors react to the 
financial crisis? 
 
With regard to GDP, we asked whether different levels could influence the willingness of 
people to declare more or less income. 
The fact that enterprises in equal conditions declare more profit in a wealthier region could 
be due to the fact that their profits contributes to the GDP of that region. Another reason 
could be that wealthier regions are also more expensive, so a company may need to make 
higher margins in order to operate. Below is the same graph shown before, but weighted 
according to the GDP of each country. The result represents an amount of tax taking into 
consideration the GDP of the region. For this, we are not able to compare the value of the 
preceding graph, but we can see how the countries compare to each other. 
 
Country 
Number of companies for 
corresponding years 
2008 2011 2014 
ES 5165 4071 3955 
FR 4916 4592 3872 
IT 7520 7301 6986 
Table 3–14. Number of companies for the corresponding years divided by countries (own source, ORBIS database) 
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Figure 3–13. Taxes paid for € 1.000,00 Sales GDP's weighted (Own source, ORBIS database) 
 
3.3.2.4 Tax paid and tax evasion 
As we said before, difference in tax paid in different countries could be produced by the 
amount of tax evasion calculated in the first chapter.  
The tax evasion was calculated from the VAT gap. From this we calculated the value of 
undeclared sales. Than we applied the average tax rate for households and corporations, and 
finally we estimated the value of tax evasion and its bearing on total tax revenues and GDP.  
Here we have collated the percentage of tax evasion on total tax for the countries we are 
working with. We are aware that it is an approximation, but we would like to find a possible 
explanation for the gap in taxes paid by the companies in Spain, France and Italy. That 
difference should be proportionate to the corporate tax rate applied in these countries. 
However, the three economies recorded different levels of efficiency so we would like to 
know if that gap could be accounted for by tax evasion. 
 
.0200
.0250
.0300
.0350
.0400
.0450
.0500
.0550
ES FR IT
TAXES PAID for € 1.000,00 Sales GDP's weighted
2008
2011
2014
3. Access to finance during the crisis and its effects on the government’s revenue: the case of 
Micro-companies 
 
 
120 
 
 
TAX PAID for €1,000.00 
SALES 
TAXES PAID for € 
1.000,00 Sales GDP's 
weighted 
Tax Evasion 
Country 
Mean 
2008 
Mean 
2011 
Mean 
2014 
Mean 
2008 
Mean 
2011 
Mean 
2014 
2012 2013 average 
ES 6.71 5.48 6.48 .0290 .0253 .0305 13% 15% 14.21% 
FR 9.42 9.64 8.73 .0317 .0318 .0285 10% 10% 9.91% 
IT 13.86 13.25 11.75 .0522 .0512 .0462 24% 25% 24.45% 
Table 3–15. Tax paid and tax evasion data (Own calculation) 
 
Country 
TAX PAID (included 
taxes evaded) for 
€1,000.00 SALES 
TAXES PAID 
(included taxes 
evaded) for € 1.000,00 
Sales GDP's weighted 
Effective tax rate 
 2011 2014 2011 2014 2011 2014 
ES 6.26 7.40 0.0289 0.0349 23.95% 24.49% 
FR 10.59 9.60 0.0350 0.0313 17.08% 14.75% 
IT 16.50 14.62 0.0637 0.0575 58.44% 53.78% 
Table 3–16. Tax paid included tax evaded and effective tax rate 
 
2011 
differences 
in tax rate 
no tax evasion adjustment  with tax evasion adjustment 
Country 
differences in 
tax paid  
differences in 
tax paid (GDP 
weight) 
differences in 
tax paid  
differences in 
tax paid (GDP 
weight) 
ES/IT 144% 142% 102% 164% 121% 
ES/FR -29% 76% 26% 69% 21% 
FR/IT 242% 38% 61% 56% 82% 
      
2014 
differences 
in tax rate 
no tax evasion adjustment  with tax evasion adjustment 
Country 
differences in 
tax paid  
differences in 
tax paid (GDP 
weight) 
differences in 
tax paid  
differences in 
tax paid (GDP 
weight) 
ES/IT 120% 81% 102% 98% 65% 
ES/FR -40% 35% 26% 30% -10% 
FR/IT 265% 35% 61% 52% 84% 
3. Access to finance during the crisis and its effects on the government’s revenue: the case of 
Micro-companies 
 
 
121 
Table 3–17. Difference in taxation. (own calculation) 
 
 
 
3.3.2.5 Correlation between tax paid and source of finance 
In this section we analyse how different sources of finance could affect the payment of taxes. 
To do this, we divided the companies into six different groups depending on the type of 
funding they used. So, we assigned the number 1 to companies predominantly financed by 
commercial credit; 10 for companies using their own financial resources like the previous 
year’s profit or their own capital; 20 for using outsource lending; 11 and 21 to companies 
using a combination of the above, and 100 to companies not adopting any source of finance 
in particular. 
 
Group Classification of source of finance 
1 
= Commercial credit - commercial debts       IF > 
45 days 
Commercial credit as a way of  finance 
10 
= Gearing = ((Non-current liabilities + Loans) / 
Shareholders funds) * 100.  IF < 50 
Own financial resources 
11 = 10 + 1 
Combining both own financial resource 
and commercial credit 
20 = Gearing  IF> 200 Outsource lending 
21 = 20 + 1 
Combining both outsource lending and 
commercial credit 
100 = All others companies Residual group 
Table 3–18. Classification of source of finance (Own classification) 
As, it is possible to see in the graph below, for 2008, each country presents the same trend. 
Companies whose commercial credit terms are more than 45 days longer than the terms on 
their commercial debts are paying on average less tax than companies using their own 
resources. The trend comes down when the companies use a combination their own 
resources and commercial credit, except in Italy where it remains at the same level as the 
companies using only their own resources. Companies using loans or a combination of loans 
and commercial credit score quite low, as do companies in the residual group.  
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The explanation for this could be that companies paying more taxes are both those reporting 
profits instead of losses and those using a percentage of the remaining profit as a financial 
resource41.  
 
Figure 3–14. Tax Paid for € 1,000.00 of turnover in 2008 (Own calculation, ORBIS database) 
The following graph shows the same variables, but for the year 2011. This year is important 
as it can give us relevant information about the impact of the financial crisis on companies 
a few years after it started. 
                                                 
41 We reported in the Annex the table of descriptive statistic of companies divided by Countries, Type of 
Finance and Performance; however, we did not do any calculations on it because the such subdivision produces 
unbalanced and too small sample (the performance is calculated as “1” if reported a profit for, at least, 2 fiscal 
periods in the last three years including the object of analysis; in the other cases “-1”).  
2008 
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Figure 3–15. Tax Paid for € 1,000.00 of turnover in 2011 (Own calculation, ORBIS database) 
 
As the graph shows, generally speaking the countries maintain the same trend, however Italy 
and Spain register a lower score in each group. While Italy has a slight decrease, Spain shows 
a strong one, meaning that the first years of the crisis were more difficult for Spanish 
companies. Another explanation could be the fact that in 2011 Spain adopted a fiscal reform. 
As we saw before, in 2011 an additional reduced rate was applied to the companies we 
selected for our study, so the effective rate could have lowered the level of taxes collected. 
 
 
 
2011 
3. Access to finance during the crisis and its effects on the government’s revenue: the case of 
Micro-companies 
 
 
124 
 
  Taxes paid every € 1.000,00 of turnover 
TR_ TURNOVER (as a 
turnover mean of the 
two groups) 
Difference in 
taxation 
 
1 = 
Commercial 
finance 
10 = Own 
Finance 
Difference 
ES 3.26 € 6.66 € 3.39 € 454,081.75 € 1,541.51 € 
FR 3.16 € 7.06 € 3.90 € 468,385.50 € 1,828.56 € 
IT 10.20 € 14.27 € 4.07 € 487,394.35 € 1,982.70 € 
Table 3–19. Difference in taxation (Own calculation) 
 
2014, as shown in the next graph, shows the same trend for Italy, especially where companies 
using their own resources score better than the others. However, this time, Frnce and Italy 
appear to have been feeling the effects of the crisis more than Spain. As it is possible to see 
in the graph, while France and Italy registered a decrease in each group, Spain was able to 
gain some points. This could be explained in different way: after the first years of the crisis 
and after having reduced its tax rate, Spain could have been experiencing a more stable 
economy. Italy and France, in contrast, show a downward trend, at least relating to micro-
enterprises in the retail sector. There could be several reasons for this, one of which is that 
consumption in these two countries was still going down, something that could be indicative 
of an unstable economy.  
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Figure 3–16. Tax Paid for € 1,000.00 of turnover in 2014 (Own calculation, ORBIS database) 
 
  
2014 
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3.3.3 A studio of mark-up 
3.3.3.1 Methodology 
In this section we analyse mark-ups, dividing the companies by their fiscal residency and 
the different ways in which they finance their activity, and looking at the mark-up between 
the material cost and the turnover42. As we are analysing only one sector, “wholesale and 
retail trade”, the material cost is a good indicator of the mark-up that companies apply. 
Furthermore, for a better comparison, we excluded both the top and bottom 5% of both 
material cost and turnover43.  
We carried out our analysis with a two-way ANOVA. We used factorial ANOVA with two 
independent variables and one dependent variable. Our dependent variable is the mark-up 
between material cost and turnover. The independent variables are the countries: Spain, 
France and Italy, and the main source of finance the companies used: commercial credit, 
their own resources, external resources, a combination of the three, or no source in particular. 
As we did our analysis for the years 2008, 2011 and 2014, we will begin with our hypothesis 
and then display the data for each year. 
 
 
Independent variable 1: Countries 
 Group 1: Spain 
 Group 2: France 
 Group 3: Italy 
 
Independent variable 2: Source of Finance 
 Group 1: 1 = Commercial credit - commercial debts IF > 45 days; 
 Group 10 = Gearing = ((Non-current liabilities + Loans) / Shareholders funds) * 100 IF < 50; 
                                                 
42 Total operating revenues (Net sales + Other operating revenues+ Stock variations). 
43 The alternative would be calculating the mark-up with the all data and then proceeding to exclude that 5%. 
We preferred the first method because we believe that it provided better comparable data. However it brings a 
problem of variance that we better analyse in the section “Limitations of the study”. 
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 Group 20 = 10 + 1; 
 Group 11 = Gearing  IF> 200; 
 Group 21 = 20 + 1; 
 Group 100 = All others companies 
 
Dependent variable: Mark-up (trimmed 5% turnover over trimmed 5% material cost) = (tr. Turnover – tr. 
Material cost) / tr. Material cost 
 
We will use the Two –way ANOVA (Factorial ANOVA) to determine if there are significant differences or 
interactions between the means of our groups. 
 
There are three Null hypotheses and there are three Alternative hypotheses: 
 Ho1: there is no difference in the mean mark-up between the three countries; 
 Ho2: there is no difference in the mean mark-up between the six source of finance groups; 
 Ho3: there is no interaction between the two independent variable of countries and source of 
finance. 
 
 Ha1: there is a difference in mean mark-up between the countries; 
 Ha2: there is a difference in mean mark-up between the source of finance; 
 Ha3: there is an interaction between the two independent variable of countries and source of 
finance. 
Table 3–20. ANOVA Hypotheses (Own elaboration) 
3.3.3.2 Analysis of the mark-up for 2008 
By calculating the mark-up between material cost and turnover we are able to have a better 
view of the different pricing policies that companies used, depending on their location and 
source of finance. 
At the end of 2008 the global economy suffered a shock. The crisis, first concentrated only 
in the financial sector, quickly spread in the real economy, bringing all the problems that we 
all know about. So, this year should reflect the stability that the economy had been 
experiencing up to that point. We know that the three countries we are focusing on, despite 
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having similar economies, were growing at different speeds. Spain was the one with a better 
GDP performance, while France had a higher GDP value. 
First we will show the statistical results of our test and then we will use the graphs to analyse 
each of our hypotheses.  
The critical value is 95%; meaning that the comparison with the mean should be true for 
95% of the sample compared. As can be seen in the table below, the significant value of our 
three hypotheses is less than 5%, meaning our null hypotheses must be rejected in favour 
our alternative hypothesis. Thus we can conclude that there is a significant difference of less 
than 5% in the mark-up that micro-companies apply to material costs between the countries, 
the type of finance and the interaction of these two variables. 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects                                                                                             2008 
Dependent Variable: MARKUP_trTURNOVER_trMATCOST 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 5410390.615a 17 318258.271 64.347 .000 
Intercept 60098354.382 1 60098354.382 12150.912 .000 
CountryISOCode 1666519.023 2 833259.511 168.472 .000 
FINANCE6 677728.630 5 135545.726 27.405 .000 
CountryISOCode * 
FINANCE6 
196727.799 10 19672.780 3.978 .000 
Error 108307403.757 21898 4945.995   
Total 247738004.979 21916    
Corrected Total 113717794.372 21915    
a. R Squared = .048 (Adjusted R Squared = .047) 
Table 3–21. Test of two-way ANOVA of mark-up for 2008 
 
As the P-value is less than 5% we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative ones for each of 
three hypotheses. Our alternative hypotheses are:  
 Ha1: There is a difference in mean mark-up between the countries; 
 Ha2: There is a difference in mean mark-up between the source of finance; 
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 Ha3: There is an interaction between the two independent variable of countries and source of 
finance. 
 
We must now examine each of the hypotheses. In the first comparison we divide the 
companies according to their nationality and display the mean mark-up value. As it is 
possible to see in the annex, large samples are used for each country: 7290 companies for 
Spain, 6943 for France and 7583 for Italy. This, and the fact that we took just one sector, 
makes the result more reliable. 
 
 
Figure 3–17. Mark-up means comparison between countries 2008 (Own calculation, ORBIS database) 
 
According to the graph, Spain and Italy have a similar mean, although Spain (72,64%) 
somewhat higher than Italy (64,98%), whereas France recorded a very high score (98,56%). 
This result is impressive because material costs for companies in all three countries are 
thought to have been quite similar. In simple terms, not taking into account other costs, it 
2008 
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effectively says that what would have been sold for € 100,00 in France would have been sold 
for € 74,00 in Spain, and for € 66,00 in Italy. On the other hand, comparing the result with 
our previous analysis of how much tax companies were paying, this result is not surprising, 
considering that in 2008 France was the country that had the highest corporate tax rate, and 
collected the most tax. So, we can conclude that during the 2008 location was an influencing 
factor on the level of mark-up micro-companies applied44. 
 
The next null hypothesis to be rejected concerned whether the source of finance influenced 
the mark-up the companies applied. As it possible to see in the following graph the difference 
is still significant, but it is lower than the previous one. 
 
                                                 
44 We controlled our analysis by also taking in account the GDP in the different regions across the countries. 
The result was that regions with equal GDP but of different nationality score differently. In other words, if in 
one area inside a country more GDP is associated to a higher turnover (also because a higher turnover generates 
a higher GDP) the comparison of only the GDP irrespective of nationality does not give an explanation of the 
mark-up. 
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Figure 3–18. Mark-up means comparison between sources of finance 2008 (Own calculation, ORBIS database) 
 
The next graph, in contrast, shows how different combinations of location and source of 
financing affect the mark-up applied by companies. 
2008 
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Figure 3–19. Mark-up means comparison between sources of finance divided by countries 2008 (Own calculation, ORBIS 
database) 
 
As the above graph demonstrates, companies that finance their activity predominantly by 
commercial credit (group 1) apply a lower mark-up than companies using other sources of 
finance. However, Italy and Spain a low score is also registered when different combinations 
of commercial credit apply.  For example, the group “11” (companies using commercial 
credit and their own resources) have a very low mark-up, as do companies in the “21” group 
(the use of commercial credit with external sources). On the other side, a higher mark-up 
2008 
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used by companies in group “10” (companies financing with their own resources). Apart 
from in this case, France does not have such a wide difference between the groups. Spain 
and Italy, though, show a larger variation between groups. Hence, we can conclude that the 
level of mark-up applied is influenced both by country and source of finance, so we must 
reject the null hypothesis of equal mean. 
 
In the previous table we analysed the comparison of mean by different sources of finance in 
each country. Unlike the previous analysis, this time the countries are not included with the 
source of finance, but the data has been split by country. On this occasion the hypothesis is 
an equal mark-up according to source of finance. As the P-value is less than 5% in each 
country, we can conclude that source of finance could have an association with the mark-up 
applied. The graphic representation is the same as before, but this time, countries are listed 
separately. 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects                                                                                             2008  
Dependent Variable: MARKUP_trTURNOVER_trMATCOST 
Country 
ISO 
Code 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
ES 
Corrected Model 441274.771a 5 88254.954 16.668 .000 
Intercept 15593812.843 1 15593812.843 2945.050 .000 
FINANCE6 441274.771 5 88254.954 16.668 .000 
Error 39097715.719 7384 5294.924   
Total 78528285.706 7390    
Corrected Total 39538990.490 7389    
FR 
Corrected Model 270167.760b 5 54033.552 10.220 .000 
Intercept 22083917.270 1 22083917.270 4176.972 .000 
FINANCE6 270167.760 5 54033.552 10.220 .000 
Error 36676358.502 6937 5287.063   
Total 104385355.025 6943    
Corrected Total 36946526.262 6942    
IT 
Corrected Model 268802.927c 5 53760.585 12.521 .000 
Intercept 26615451.914 1 26615451.914 6198.729 .000 
FINANCE6 268802.927 5 53760.585 12.521 .000 
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Error 32533329.537 7577 4293.695   
Total 64824364.248 7583    
Corrected Total 32802132.463 7582    
a. R Squared = .011 (Adjusted R Squared = .010) 
b. R Squared = .007 (Adjusted R Squared = .007) 
c. R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = .008) 
Table 3–22. 2008 - Test one-way ANOVA. Mark-up divided by source of finance in each country taken disjointedly. 
 
3.3.3.3 Analysis of the mark-up for 2011 
The same analysis was carried out for 2011. For this reason, we will show only the results 
relating to the variables and hypotheses outlined previously. 
As it is possible to see in the table, we reject the null hypothesis of equal mean among 
countries as well as according to source of finance. Moreover, we see that there are not 
significant differences in means, nor in relation to the interaction of the two variables. 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects                                                                      2011  
Dependent Variable: MARKUP_trTURNOVER_trMATCOST 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 5812117.025a 17 341889.237 44.631 .000 
Intercept 53314866.392 1 53314866.392 6959.839 .000 
CountryISOCode 1197692.881 2 598846.441 78.175 .000 
FINANCE6 920207.218 5 184041.444 24.025 .000 
CountryISOCode * FINANCE6 196786.550 10 19678.655 2.569 .004 
Error 168949224.318 22055 7660.359   
Total 341287107.139 22073    
Corrected Total 174761341.344 22072    
Table 3–23. Test of two-way ANOVA of mark-up for 2011 
 
As the P-value is less than 5% we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative ones for each of 
three hypotheses. Our alternative hypotheses are:  
 Ha1: There is a difference in mean mark-up between the countries; 
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 Ha2: There is a difference in mean mark-up between the source of finance; 
 Ha3: There is an interaction between the two independent variable of countries and source of 
finance. 
 
As it is possible to see in the next graph, there is an increase the mean in each country when 
compared to 2008. The companies in the sample are mostly the same in each of the years 
compared45. This has both a positive and a negative aspect. The advantage is that 
comparisons are more reliable; the disadvantage is that we lose some information about 
companies that went out of business in the intervening years. This type of sample was chosen 
for two main reasons: the first being that a company in its last year of existence would record 
abnormal data that would be more suited to a case study. The second reason is that the sample 
better characterizes how businesses reacted in order to survive to the crisis. 
 
 
                                                 
45 The turnover and the material cost are filtered for each year excluding the top and bttom 5% so a small 
number of different companies could be in this exclusion as we did the operation for each year separately.  
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Figure 3–20. Mark-up means comparison between countries 2011 (Own calculation, ORBIS database) 
The increased mark-ups across the countries could be explained by differing variations in 
material cost and turnover. As shown in the table below, the financial crisis lowered material 
costs more than turnover.  
 
Variation 
 
Material 
cost 
Turnover 
 2008-2011 2008-2011 
ES -24.19% -21.28% 
FR 0.33% 2.20% 
IT -7.12% -5.00% 
 
In the next graph, it can be seen how the mark-up applied varies according to source of 
finance. In this case, the figures are not broken down by country. We can conclude that 
2011 
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during 2011 different sources of finance influenced the level of mark-up companies applied. 
Comparing this year to 2008, we see how the range is wider and the mean is higher for each 
source of finance. In the corresponding graph for 2008, the minimum mark-up mean was 
about 70% and the highest was 85%. In the 2011, the minimum is  75% and the highest level 
is applied by companies mostly funded by external sources of finance (group 20), at 95%, a 
difference of 20 percentage points. That difference is important and it could be explained in 
several ways. However, for this study we are simply interested in identifying that a 
difference exists and that it is connected with the source of finance. 
 
Figure 3–21. Mark-up means comparison between sources of finance 2011 (Own calculation, ORBIS database) 
An in-depth view of what could be affecting the mean mark-up, can be found in the next 
graph, where the figures are now broken down by country. The result gives us more 
information about the differing performance of companies in the three countries depending 
on their finance model.  
2011 
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Figure 3–22. Mark-up means comparison between sources of finance divided by countries 2011 (Own calculation, 
ORBIS database) 
Generally speaking, and similarly to previous graphs, lower scores are associated with the 
groups primarily financed by commercial credit (group 1) or a mixture (groups 11 and 21). 
Moreover, some differences can be seen when looking at each country individually. Spain, 
for example, is the one that has a wide variation between the different types of finance, in 
particular between companies mostly funded by external financial resources (group 20) and 
those funded by both external and commercial credit (group 21). France and Italy also follow 
the same trend, however with a narrower difference between groups. One of the conclusions 
that can be drawn from comparing this graph with the previous about paying taxes, is that 
companies asking for external lending (group 20) generally apply higher mark-ups, but then 
have a lower score in paying taxes, meaning that they need a high mark-up to pay their debts. 
Companies in group 1 have low scores both in paying taxes and in mark-up. Finally, the 
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companies with a better performance are those ones using their own resources (group 10), 
which is a logical assumption. As their own financial resources are composed of the capital 
given by the stakeholders and the profit of the previous years, this is the likely reason for 
their good performance. In other words, most of these companies are consistently profitable, 
meaning that they do not need external finance or commercial credit, as they produce enough 
profit to pay their stakeholders and finance their activities.  
As for 2008, we calculated the comparison of mean mark-ups according to source of finance 
for each country. Our null hypothesis this time is that the mean mark-up is equal in each 
group of companies divided by source of finance. As before, the analysis is broken down by 
country. This graph shows the distribution of means in each country. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects                                                                                                         2011 
Dependent Variable: MARKUP_trTURNOVER_trMATCOST 
Country 
ISO 
Code 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
ES 
Corrected Model 703191.555a 5 140638.311 14.216 .000 
Intercept 21973376.036 1 21973376.036 2221.039 .000 
FINANCE6 703191.555 5 140638.311 14.216 .000 
Error 73883054.905 7468 9893.285   
Total 129477771.120 7474    
Corrected Total 74586246.460 7473    
FR 
Corrected Model 274800.613b 5 54960.123 7.485 .000 
Intercept 13785069.164 1 13785069.164 1877.485 .000 
FINANCE6 274800.613 5 54960.123 7.485 .000 
Error 50816096.128 6921 7342.305   
Total 128750038.116 6927    
Corrected Total 51090896.741 6926    
IT 
Corrected Model 341221.103c 5 68244.221 11.823 .000 
Intercept 33003916.723 1 33003916.723 5717.686 .000 
FINANCE6 341221.103 5 68244.221 11.823 .000 
Error 44250073.285 7666 5772.251   
Total 83059297.903 7672    
Corrected Total 44591294.389 7671    
a. R Squared = .009 (Adjusted R Squared = .009) b. R Squared = .005 (Adjusted R Squared = .005) 
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c. R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = .007) 
Table 3–24. 2011 - Test one-way ANOVA. Mark-up divided by source of finance in each country taken disjointedly. 
 
 
3.3.3.4 Analysis of the mark-up for 2014 
2014 was analysed in the same way as the previous years. As before, we studied whether the 
nationality of companies, their source of finance, or the interaction of both factors influenced 
the mark-up the companies applied. As before, the mark-up is calculated from turnover and 
material cost. In the table below, we can appreciate how the difference is significant when 
we focus only on countries or on the source of finance. However taking the two variables 
together the mean result in mark-up policies shows little change.   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects                                                                            2014 
Dependent Variable: MARKUP_trTURNOVER_trMATCOST 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 6125943.198 17 360349.60 36.95 .000 
Intercept 24130847.54 1 24130847.54 2474.57 .000 
CountryISOCode 355296.01 2 177648.00 18.22 .000 
FINANCE6 1166622.63 5 233324.53 23.93 .000 
CountryISOCode * FINANCE6 172745.31 10 17274.53 1.77 .060 
Error 220833173.55 22646 9751.53   
Total 411767731.24 22664    
Corrected Total 226959116.75 22663    
Table 3–25. Test of two-way ANOVA of mark-up for 2014 
 
As the P-value is less than 5% we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
ones for each of three hypotheses. Our alternative hypotheses are:  
 Ha1: There is a difference in mean mark-up between the countries; 
 Ha2: There is a difference in mean mark-up between the source of finance; 
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 Ho3: There is no interaction between the two independent variable of countries 
and source of finance. 
 
Looking at all the graphs, we can deduce that companies have to apply a different mark-up 
depending on where they are situated or depending how they finance their activity. That said, 
for 2014, when we compare both variables jointly, the result is that the mean mark-ups are 
not very different. 
 
As can be seen in the graph below, the difference in mean between countries stays constant 
compared to 2011. However, the three countries experience a slight increase due to a  
 
significant decrease in costs compared to turnover.   
 
 
Figure 3–23. Mark-up means comparison between countries 2014 (Own calculation, ORBIS database) 
 
2014 
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Variation 
Country Material cost Turnover 
  2011-2014 2011-2014 
ES -11.76% -12.51% 
FR -2.68% -1.94% 
IT -14.81% -13.22% 
Table 3–26. Variation of material cost and Turnover (Own calculation) 
As in the previous years, the trend in mark-up across the different sources of finance shows 
a high degree of variation. Companies funded mainly by commercial credit (group 1) were 
able to apply a lower mark-up, as were companies using this method of finance combined 
with others. Additionally, companies using their own resources (group 10) scored better, as 
did companies borrowing money (group 20).  
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Figure 3–24. Mark-up means comparison between sources of finance 2014 (Own calculation, ORBIS database) 
 
In this last graph, we can see some differences with respect to the previous years. As the 
statistical results suggest, there are no significant differences between means when taking 
into account location and source of finance jointly. However, it is possible to see that the 
significant difference of 6% is near to 5%, so it is possible to say that we should reject our 
null hypothesis. With a level of 10%, which can be seen in the graph, the levels of mark-up 
in France and Spain come closer, especially among the companies using a combination of 
external finance resources and commercial credit (Group 21). In this group, Spanish 
companies apply a higher mark-up than their French counterparts. Another improved trend 
in Spain during 2014 is regarding the amount of tax paid. During this year Spain registered 
a higher score. 
2014 
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For 2014 we also compared the different means of mark-up depending on different source 
of finance in each country. As before our null hypothesis is equal mean between groups, but 
due to the fact that P-value is less than 5% we reject the null hypothesis and we can say that 
source of finance is a relevant variable when dividing the companies by their mark-up. 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects46                                                                          2014 
Dependent Variable: MARKUP_trTURNOVER_trMATCOST 
Country 
ISO 
Code 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
ES 
Corrected Model 837179.899a 5 167435.980 15.347 .000 
Intercept 18704485.088 1 18704485.088 1714.392 .000 
FINANCE6 837179.899 5 167435.980 15.347 .000 
                                                 
46 France is omitted due to poor sample size in the group 20 and 21 (see the descriptive table in the annex) 
2014 
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Error 84358228.760 7732 10910.273   
Total 142037621.810 7738    
Corrected Total 85195408.659 7737    
IT 
Corrected Model 305162.149c 5 61032.430 7.132 .000 
Intercept 34821066.020 1 34821066.020 4069.028 .000 
FINANCE6 305162.149 5 61032.430 7.132 .000 
Error 66175830.254 7733 8557.588   
Total 111620592.389 7739    
Corrected Total 66480992.403 7738    
 
 
a. R Squared = .010 (Adjusted R Squared = .009) 
b. R Squared = .007 (Adjusted R Squared = .006) 
c. R Squared = .005 (Adjusted R Squared = .004) 
Table 3–27. 2014 - Test one-way ANOVA. Mark-up divided by source of finance in each country taken disjointedly. 
 
3.3.3.5 Limitations of the study  
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the data is limited to companies conforming to the 
definition of “micro-enterprises” – less than 10 employees and a turnover lower than € 
2.000.000,00 for each of the three selected years. On one hand, comparison across the three 
years is more reliable. On the other hand, we lose some information that could inform us 
about trends in the years after the crisis in particular, as during the crisis a lot of businesses 
closed. A different sample could show the different stages of companies’ lifecycles. 
However, the financial accounts of the surviving enterprises give us an idea of the stresses 
they encountered during and after the crisis. 
Another limitation is the number of countries we analysed. This is because we preferred to 
work with a small sample of countries but a large sample of businesses, rather than more 
countries but fewer companies from each. 
With regard to the data, the analysis of the mark-up has two limitations. The first one is that 
when we divided the sample by country and then by source of finance, the distribution of 
companies in each group changed each time, and on three occasion the sample result came 
out to be less than 100 – France in 2011: group 21 (57 companies), and in 2014: group 20 
(58) and 21 (17). 
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We experienced another problem with variance. A better mean comparison is the result of 
group of individuals with small amount of variance, so that one group does not invade the 
sphere of distribution of another. In other words, the perfect situation happens when the 
highest value in one group is lower than the lowest value in the next group. A high level of 
variance could mean that some individuals in two or more groups occupy the same area.  
The problem of the variance, as we had already anticipated in the analysis, comes from data 
we opted to use: we excluded the top and bottom 5% of companies for both turnover and 
material cost. The mark-up resulting from those two variables could have had a distribution 
with some values that were either too high or too low. We preferred to do this this because 
we believed it would give a higher figure for mark-up. The alternative would have been 
excluding the top and bottom 5% or 10% of the mark-up figures to cut out the data that 
increased the variance. The result of this process is that the means are rounded down. This 
is not surprising because the nature of mark-up is that it has a lower limit of profitability and 
an upper limit established by the market. So, if we redo the previous analysis lowering the 
variance, the result is that there is no difference in the mark-up when location and source of 
finance are considered at the same time. 
Although the data might have a problem with variance, it is limited by the fact that when 
variance is high the sample is large, meaning that means are not affected by one anomalous 
value, as a subgroup can take the high values. 
 
3.3.3.6 Behind the limitation 
As stated in the previous section, we cleaned our data – in particular the mark-up to lower 
the variance of the groups resulting from dividing the sample by country and then by source 
of finance. The result is that the groups with higher values lower the mean until it meets the 
others. In other words, the best companies score far more than the average ones.  
So, regarding the question of whether the top 5% or top 10% companies with the highest 
mark-ups are associated with a particular source of finance, the answer is that companies 
with no commercial credit and, in particular, using their own resources, or in some cases 
borrowing money, are the companies that not only survived to the crisis, but also applied 
very high mark-ups.  
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3.3.3.7 Conclusion 
In this section we have compared Spain, France and Italy at different times before, during 
and after the financial crisis. First we calculated the corporate tax rate. Thanks to that 
measure we have been able to see the effective fiscal policy in each year for the selected 
countries. We then analysed the tax paid in each country by companies. Here we saw that 
France was the country with a more efficient system. Finally, we saw how different sources 
of finance could have been related to the amount of mark-up that companies applied. In this 
section we saw that in France higher mark-ups were often applied. The companies that 
applied the lowest mark-ups were those that primarily funded by commercial credit. 
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3.4 REGRESSION MODEL ON TAXATION AND MARK-UP 
3.4.1 Introduction 
In this section we would like to investigate the causal connection between taxation, mark-
up, and source of finance over the last 9 years (2006-2014) in Spain, France and Italy. In the 
previous analysis, differences in means due to different sources of finance and nationality of 
micro-enterprises were shown. Although the information was valuable because it showed 
different levels of means for different groups of companies, that analysis does not give 
explain the effect of one variable over another. Because of this, it is also necessary to see if 
the variable considered in the previous analysis can explain the level of tax paid by the 
companies and the mark-up they apply. 
 
3.4.2 Methodology 
For this analysis the data of 1.000 of micro-companies from Spain, France and Italy from 
2006 to 2014 has been used. We used panel data, and built a regression analysis to understand 
how variables such as regional GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and the source of finance 
could influence the taxed paid by a company and the margin it applied.  
After the test of Hausman fixed model is chosen47.  
 
The regression model for taxation is: 
TAXATION = C(1) + C(2)*GDP(-1) + C(3)*INTERESTPAID + C(4)*MCREDITORS + 
C(5)*MNONCURRENT + C(6)*MSHAREHOLDER + C(7)*D2008 + C(8)*D2009 + C(9)*D2010 + 
C(10)*D2011 + C(11)*D2012 + C(12)*D2013 + C(13)*D2014 
 
The regression model for margin is: 
MARGIN = C(1) + C(2)*GDP(-1) + C(3)*INTERESTPAID + C(4)*MCREDITORS + 
C(5)*MNONCURRENT + C(6)*MSHAREHOLDER + C(7)*D2008 + C(8)*D2009 + C(9)*D2010 + 
C(10)*D2011 + C(11)*D2012 + C(12)*D2013 + C(13)*D2014 
                                                 
47 More on fixed effect could be found in (Arellano, 2003), ( Mátyás & Sevestre, 2008) and (Pesaran, 2015) 
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The dependent variables are taxation and margin, where margin results from operating 
revenue and material costs. 
 
The independent variables are: 
a) Regional GDP; 
b) Interest paid48; 
c) Mcreditors: the mean between the balance of commercial credits and debts at the 
beginning and at the end of each year. Credits are the commercial credits companies 
have to pay and debts are the credits that the customers have to pay to the company; 
d) Mnoncurrent: the mean of sum of the external source of finance at the beginning and 
at the end of the fiscal year. 
e) Mshareholder: the mean between equity at the beginning and the end of the fiscal 
year; 
f) D2008 D2009 D2010 D2011 D2012 D2013 D2014 are dummy variables measuring 
the effect of each year on taxation or margin taking 2007 as a base 
The tests of the model are reported in the annex. 
 
 
3.4.3 Regression model 
 
3.4.3.1 Spain 
We will start our regression analysis with Spain. The Hausman test informs us that a fixed 
effects model was the most appropriate one49.  
 
  
 
                                                 
48 The variable was introduced into the database with a positive sign, thought it represents a cost for the 
company.  
49 The test is reported in the annex. 
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Test outcome (fixed effect) 
Dependent Variable: TAXATION   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/02/16   Time: 15:03   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=1  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 842   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4555  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 26629.91 12727.36 2.092337 0.0365 
GDP(-1) -1.027862 0.582330 -1.765085 0.0776 
INTERESTPAID -0.424011 0.092655 -4.576228 0.0000 
MCREDITORS -0.016140 0.004527 -3.564990 0.0004 
MNONCURRENT -0.013767 0.004866 -2.829267 0.0047 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.034036 0.011851 2.872053 0.0041 
D2008 1177.004 888.3957 1.324864 0.1853 
D2009 -588.2063 1328.046 -0.442911 0.6579 
D2010 -3344.690 906.8448 -3.688272 0.0002 
D2011 -3301.046 964.6617 -3.421973 0.0006 
D2012 -5193.859 867.8983 -5.984410 0.0000 
D2013 -5661.204 724.6961 -7.811832 0.0000 
D2014 -4576.742 453.2982 -10.09654 0.0000 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.531492    Mean dependent var 1446.419 
Adjusted R-squared 0.423511    S.D. dependent var 18894.22 
S.E. of regression 14345.79    Akaike info criterion 22.14765 
Sum squared resid 7.62E+11    Schwarz criterion 23.35206 
Log likelihood -49587.28    Hannan-Quinn criter. 22.57178 
F-statistic 4.922085    Durbin-Watson stat 2.063895 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Table 3–28. Spain: Regression model of taxation (Own Calculation) 
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Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
TAXATION = C(1) + C(2)*GDP(-1) + C(3)*INTERESTPAID + C(4)*MCREDITORS + 
C(5)*MNONCURRENT + C(6)*MSHAREHOLDER + C(7)*D2008 + C(8)*D2009 + C(9)*D2010 + 
C(10)*D2011 + C(11)*D2012 + C(12)*D2013 + C(13)*D2014 + [CX=F,ESTSMPL="2006 2014 IF 
COUNTRYISOCODE_A=1"] 
 
 
Firstly, we focused on R-squared, which is 53,15%, meaning that the independent variables, 
when considered jointly, could explain more than half of the tax amount. Moreover, the GDP 
of the previous year is not significant at 5%, but it is at 10%, meaning the difference in GDP 
when it is significant influences the taxed paid in a negative way. The variable concerning 
interest paid is significant in a negative way. It means that for an increase of passive financial 
interest there is a decrease in taxation of 0,42. An explanation could be that part of the margin 
is used to pay the interest on loans. Talking about the different sources of finance, we can 
see that each one is significant and negative, meaning that the source of finance influences 
the taxes paid by a company. The creditors/debtors variable is negative and significant, 
indicating that the balance between the debts the companies have with providers lower the 
payment of taxes when their amount is larger than the credit the company has with the client. 
The explanation for this could be that the companies are having problems with sales. Non-
current liabilities indicate that long term debts are inversely correlated to taxed paid. This 
could be explained by the fact that a company exposed to external sources of finance would 
record a worse performance. Shareholder funds mainly contain two types of invoice: the first 
one is a stock-one and is given by capital and by the capital reserve, and the second one is a 
flow-one that has both the profit and loss of the current and the previous period. In the 
analysis we are aware that social capital should be positive and quite constant; capital 
reserves change over time but not always with a positive correlation with the recorded profit. 
Finally, the previous and current profit or loss has a direct impact on the payment of taxes. 
For this variable we expect a significant and positive correlation between shareholder funds 
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and taxation, however in a period of crisis the correlation could be inverse because 
companies could have recorded a profit one year and a loss the next. 
Regarding the dummy variables that represent financial crisis, we chose to measure the effect 
of each year on taxation. It is possible to see that the 2008 and 2009 are not significant in the 
taxation model, but from 2010 each year has a strong negative impact.   
 
The following table shows the regression analysis for the other dependent variable: margin. 
In this case we selected the margin as the result between turnover (operating revenue) and 
material cost.  
 
Test outcome (fixed effect) 
Dependent Variable: MARGIN   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/02/16   Time: 15:57   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=1  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 940   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 5630  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 34179.17 45392.15 0.752975 0.4515 
GDP(-1) 4.925628 1.985012 2.481410 0.0131 
INTERESTPAID 0.714855 0.609965 1.171961 0.2413 
MCREDITORS 0.027087 0.029564 0.916209 0.3596 
MNONCURRENT -0.064336 0.017256 -3.728366 0.0002 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.073844 0.031879 2.316391 0.0206 
D2008 314.2142 4199.875 0.074815 0.9404 
D2009 -6516.272 4386.667 -1.485472 0.1375 
D2010 -3542.757 2879.097 -1.230510 0.2186 
D2011 -9451.083 2843.245 -3.324048 0.0009 
D2012 -19111.32 2581.966 -7.401851 0.0000 
D2013 -25184.08 2710.071 -9.292774 0.0000 
D2014 -22324.16 3144.789 -7.098778 0.0000 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
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     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.830234    Mean dependent var 142206.3 
Adjusted R-squared 0.795722    S.D. dependent var 122062.1 
S.E. of regression 55168.50    Akaike info criterion 24.82712 
Sum squared resid 1.42E+13    Schwarz criterion 25.94921 
Log likelihood -68936.35    Hannan-Quinn criter. 25.21804 
F-statistic 24.05641    Durbin-Watson stat 1.383603 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Table 3–29. Spain:  Regression model of margin (Own Calculation) 
 
 
 
Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
MARGIN = C(1) + C(2)*GDP(-1) + C(3)*INTERESTPAID + C(4)*MCREDITORS + 
C(5)*MNONCURRENT + C(6)*MSHAREHOLDER + C(7)*D2008 + C(8)*D2009 + C(9)*D2010 + 
C(10)*D2011 + C(11)*D2012 + C(12)*D2013 + C(13)*D2014 + [CX=F,ESTSMPL="2006 2014 IF 
COUNTRYISOCODE_A=1"] 
 
The model gives good results thanks to a high R-squared figure (83,02%) and a significant 
F-statistic. In the analysis, it is possible to see how the GDP and shareholder funds variables 
produce a positive effect on margin, which as expected. Non-current liabilities are negative 
and also significant in this case, meaning that long-term external finance is directly 
associated with less margin and therefore worse performance. The dummy variable is 
significant from 2011 onwards, meaning that the companies applied a lower margin starting 
from 2011 in a significant way. 
Coming back to the regression analysis, it is possible to see that the source of finance has a 
more relevant influence on the tax paid than on the margin applied. 
To sum up, it is possible to see that the source of money directly influences the tax paid and 
the margin applied. However, some variables are more important to others in this respect. 
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3.4.3.2 France 
Test outcome (fixed effect) 
Dependent Variable: TAXATION   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/02/16   Time: 15:06   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=2  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 474   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 2771  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 3520.373 3144.499 1.119534 0.2630 
GDP(-1) 0.114083 0.087379 1.305617 0.1918 
INTERESTPAID -0.034769 0.039588 -0.878275 0.3799 
MCREDITORS 0.006418 0.001492 4.302900 0.0000 
MNONCURRENT -0.002853 0.001117 -2.555403 0.0107 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.005589 0.001832 3.050224 0.0023 
D2008 -1125.820 134.3369 -8.380568 0.0000 
D2009 -1781.916 205.3864 -8.675919 0.0000 
D2010 -389.5959 145.1899 -2.683354 0.0073 
D2011 -571.8855 204.3825 -2.798114 0.0052 
D2012 -1807.856 277.2566 -6.520514 0.0000 
D2013 -2445.596 328.7390 -7.439324 0.0000 
D2014 -3063.461 257.6650 -11.88932 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.751746    Mean dependent var 6673.449 
Adjusted R-squared 0.699053    S.D. dependent var 14162.87 
S.E. of regression 7769.558    Akaike info criterion 20.91175 
Sum squared resid 1.38E+11    Schwarz criterion 21.95127 
Log likelihood -28487.23    Hannan-Quinn criter. 21.28717 
F-statistic 14.26656    Durbin-Watson stat 1.534102 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 3–30. France:  Regression model of taxation (Own Calculation) 
 
 
Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
TAXATION = C(1) + C(2)*GDP(-1) + C(3)*INTERESTPAID + C(4)*MCREDITORS + 
C(5)*MNONCURRENT + C(6)*MSHAREHOLDER + C(7)*D2008 + C(8)*D2009 + C(9)*D2010 + 
C(10)*D2011 + C(11)*D2012 + C(12)*D2013 + C(13)*D2014 + [CX=F,ESTSMPL="2006 2014 IF 
COUNTRYISOCODE_A=2"] 
 
In France the same model used for Spanish firms offers significant results (F-
statistic=14.16993; Prob(F-statistic) =0.000000) with quite a high R-squared (75,17%). With 
taxation as a dependent variable, GDP is significant. On the other hand, in France the amount 
paid in interest does not affect the taxes. As in the case of Spain, the source of finance is also 
an important variable in order to check the level of taxes paid. In France the crisis had an 
immediate impact on taxes, even though the largest decrease was recorded in the last three 
years. This is the decrease discussed in the previous section of this chapter. 
Below is the same analysis for Margin, done previously for Spain. 
 
Test outcome (fixed effect) 
Dependent Variable: MARGIN   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/02/16   Time: 15:17   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=2  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 474   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 2762  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 318664.2 53422.73 5.964955 0.0000 
GDP(-1) -0.764294 1.452020 -0.526366 0.5987 
INTERESTPAID 0.514214 0.347028 1.481765 0.1385 
MCREDITORS 0.093560 0.058919 1.587955 0.1124 
MNONCURRENT 0.040748 0.024827 1.641259 0.1009 
3. Access to finance during the crisis and its effects on the government’s revenue: the case of 
Micro-companies 
 
 
156 
 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.115608 0.029891 3.867661 0.0001 
D2008 -1098.580 1555.398 -0.706301 0.4801 
D2009 -5247.794 2363.141 -2.220686 0.0265 
D2010 2016.474 1658.407 1.215910 0.2241 
D2011 10801.22 2244.548 4.812200 0.0000 
D2012 11041.36 2982.545 3.701993 0.0002 
D2013 4760.547 3688.010 1.290817 0.1969 
D2014 10017.06 2244.023 4.463887 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.895903    Mean dependent var 335366.1 
Adjusted R-squared 0.873721    S.D. dependent var 194912.1 
S.E. of regression 69263.50    Akaike info criterion 25.28761 
Sum squared resid 1.09E+13    Schwarz criterion 26.32994 
Log likelihood -34436.19    Hannan-Quinn criter. 25.66411 
F-statistic 40.38822    Durbin-Watson stat 1.088383 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Table 3–31. France: Regression model of margin (Own Calculation) 
 
 
 
Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
MARGIN = C(1) + C(2)*GDP(-1) + C(3)*INTERESTPAID + C(4)*MCREDITORS + 
C(5)*MNONCURRENT + C(6)*MSHAREHOLDER + C(7)*D2008 + C(8)*D2009 + C(9)*D2010 + 
C(10)*D2011 + C(11)*D2012 + C(12)*D2013 + C(13)*D2014 + [CX=F,ESTSMPL="2006 2014 IF 
COUNTRYISOCODE_A=2"] 
 
 
 
It is possible to see in the table above how the model results are good (R-squared = 89,59%) 
and significant. Unlike the model for taxation, margin does not change according to source 
of finance, meaning that companies adopt different pricing policies depending on the source 
of finance they use. The influence of economic trend that it is possible to check with the 
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dummy variables shows how the first years of the crisis eroded the margin companies 
applied while in the later years margins increased compared to 2007. 
 
3.4.3.3 Italy 
In Italy, like in Spain, the R-squared is quite good (51,90%); the independent variables, 
which influence the amount of tax paid in separate ways, are the creditors/debtors, the 
shareholder funds and the dummy. The three variables follow the patterns we expected in 
the real economy, meaning that when companies have larger debts with providers than 
credits with clients the profit of the company suffers. In Italy the effect of the crisis was 
significant and affected the amount of tax paid negatively. 
 
Test outcome (fixed effect) 
Dependent Variable: TAXATION   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/02/16   Time: 15:08   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=3  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 1000   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7636  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 6082.161 5725.426 1.062307 0.2881 
GDP(-1) 0.083402 0.186319 0.447628 0.6544 
INTERESTPAID 0.008216 0.025352 0.324072 0.7459 
MCREDITORS 0.003224 0.001348 2.392490 0.0168 
MNONCURRENT -0.001270 0.001119 -1.135211 0.2563 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.019972 0.007183 2.780543 0.0054 
D2008 -2550.545 402.7626 -6.332626 0.0000 
D2009 -3545.115 447.6828 -7.918810 0.0000 
D2010 -3427.866 200.2782 -17.11552 0.0000 
D2011 -3755.512 318.9443 -11.77482 0.0000 
D2012 -5457.892 401.9983 -13.57690 0.0000 
D2013 -4515.510 374.4538 -12.05893 0.0000 
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D2014 -4498.545 49.79135 -90.34792 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.519040    Mean dependent var 8509.600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.445632    S.D. dependent var 14748.95 
S.E. of regression 10981.46    Akaike info criterion 21.56869 
Sum squared resid 7.99E+11    Schwarz criterion 22.48853 
Log likelihood -81337.26    Hannan-Quinn criter. 21.88427 
F-statistic 7.070666    Durbin-Watson stat 1.697435 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Table 3–32. Italy: Regression model of taxation (Own Calculation) 
 
Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
TAXATION = C(1) + C(2)*GDP(-1) + C(3)*INTERESTPAID + C(4)*MCREDITORS + 
C(5)*MNONCURRENT + C(6)*MSHAREHOLDER + C(7)*D2008 + C(8)*D2009 + C(9)*D2010 + 
C(10)*D2011 + C(11)*D2012 + C(12)*D2013 + C(13)*D2014 + [CX=F,ESTSMPL="2006 2014 IF 
COUNTRYISOCODE_A=3"] 
 
In the margin model like for France and Spain, the R-squared is higher (83,66%) meaning 
that the model is quite good for the analysis. In Italy, the margin, in contrast to taxes, is 
sensitive to the source of finance. More passive interest, external financial sources and more 
creditors in need of payment required greater margins. It can be accepted that during the 
financial crisis, the cost of external finance rose and it required more margin, but that margin 
did not translate into more profit. The dummy variable shows that until 2013 the margin 
rose, and since then it has been falling. That could represent a more stable economic situation 
or a stagnation in consumption that provoked a lowering of prices.   
 
Test outcome (fixed effect) 
Dependent Variable: MARGIN   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/02/16   Time: 15:18   
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Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=3  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 1000   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7604  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 187198.2 27658.47 6.768203 0.0000 
GDP(-1) -0.529213 1.221236 -0.433342 0.6648 
INTERESTPAID 1.291587 0.339271 3.806952 0.0001 
MCREDITORS 0.094610 0.019477 4.857510 0.0000 
MNONCURRENT 0.032740 0.014854 2.204130 0.0275 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.158187 0.022017 7.184909 0.0000 
D2008 10284.98 1207.140 8.520119 0.0000 
D2009 7848.867 1493.417 5.255642 0.0000 
D2010 14624.74 1387.046 10.54380 0.0000 
D2011 9897.698 872.9595 11.33810 0.0000 
D2012 2855.797 863.1379 3.308622 0.0009 
D2013 -2091.959 1020.764 -2.049405 0.0405 
D2014 -9312.742 772.9474 -12.04835 0.0000 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.836647    Mean dependent var 233211.0 
Adjusted R-squared 0.811594    S.D. dependent var 190172.0 
S.E. of regression 82545.59    Akaike info criterion 25.60345 
Sum squared resid 4.49E+13    Schwarz criterion 26.52660 
Log likelihood -96332.31    Hannan-Quinn criter. 25.92023 
F-statistic 33.39499    Durbin-Watson stat 1.278902 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Table 3–33. Italy: Regression model of margin (Own Calculation) 
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Estimation Equation: 
========================= 
MARGIN = C(1) + C(2)*GDP(-1) + C(3)*INTERESTPAID + C(4)*MCREDITORS + 
C(5)*MNONCURRENT + C(6)*MSHAREHOLDER + C(7)*D2008 + C(8)*D2009 + C(9)*D2010 + 
C(10)*D2011 + C(11)*D2012 + C(12)*D2013 + C(13)*D2014 + [CX=F,ESTSMPL="2006 2014 IF 
COUNTRYISOCODE_A=3"] 
 
 
3.4.4 Regression model conclusion 
The regression models carried out for Spain, France and Italy allows us to draw different 
conclusions as to the main causes of stress on the system, based on the effect of the economy 
and the finance model used by companies. 
 
 Regarding taxation, the source of finance is important, especially in Spain and 
France. In Spain the interest paid also affected the amount of taxed paid. The effect 
of the economic crisis gave reduced revenue from taxation.  
 The regression model for margin showed more differences: the regional GDP 
affected the level of margin only in Spain, while the source of finance is a significant 
factor in Italy, where the economic crisis played a role throughout the selected 
period. In Spain there were only significant differences between internal and 
external sources. In contrast, the margin in France was not sensitive to the type of 
finance used. 
  
3. Access to finance during the crisis and its effects on the government’s revenue: the case of 
Micro-companies 
 
 
161 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated how access to finance, and the type of finance, could have 
consequences for the economy that during a financial crisis translate into problems and 
inefficiencies that could produce a growth in the informal economy and a reduction of 
government revenue.  
 
The first part of the chapter gives the justification for the study. As stated, from the start of 
the financial crisis, access to finance has represented a major problem for micro-enterprises. 
So reagarding the question of whether or not sources of finance are important, the data 
reported in this chapter, such as the change in lending composition, shows that the matter 
has been among the main worries for businesses. This means that obtaining funds, especially 
during a recession, if not properly monitored, could bring about a stressful financial situation 
that could produce unfair behaviour and generate growth in the informal economy, as 
defined in the first chapter. 
 
The comparison between levels of taxation and the mark-up applied in Spain, France and 
Italy brought a different conclusion. For governments it is important to know the status of 
companies in order to identify policy improvements that may help the situation. The 
regression model shows the relevance of the problem in each country and how the source of 
finance could influence the taxes paid and the margin applied. In this respect they could have 
an effect on the revenue of the government and could promote the informal economy. 
 
So for example, as shown in the chapter, if different sources of finance affect the tax paid or 
the margin applied, and at the same time the government is collecting less tax in the 
knowledge of this scenario, different actions could be taken. In this situation the quick 
application of the correct policy could make the difference. So the analysis of this chapter 
gives a part of the answer to the question of where a country is and how much margin the 
government has in its fiscal policy. 
During a recession, companies encounter a multitude of problems and, as in the case of 
access to finance, they can incur greater costs. These costs represent an inefficiency of the 
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economic system that could have different consequences: companies might go out of 
business, or record losses waiting for the situation to improve. In either case, the risk of 
growth in the informal economy increases.  
 
In summary, a reduction in revenue from taxation during a financial crisis could be generated 
in part by inefficiencies in the economic system. The solution to this problem could lie in 
the elimination of these inefficiencies. In our case, this could take the form of easier access 
to finance for businesses, rather than an increase in taxes. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The issue of the thesis was to investigate the relation between the informal economy and the 
development of a country. The focus is on how the informal economy affects the revenue of 
a country and this is partially quantified. It is observed how international standards could 
improve transparency in transfer pricing operations. Finally, it is demonstrated how the 
source of finance could affect the taxed paid or the margin applied. Below is a summary of 
the findings. 
 
1. Definition of Informal economy: what should be formal according to the law of a 
state, but it is not. The analysis is limited to activities that affect public revenue and 
expenditure and, at the same time, cause a distortion in the market. 
 
2. With respect to tax burden, a positive correlation between Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) rank 2013 (Transparency International, 2013) and Paying Taxes rank 
2013 (World Bank, 2013) among 158 jurisdictions, was detected. 
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3. Focus only on European countries and some others a negative correlation between 
informal economy 2012 (Schneider, 2012) and Corporate tax rate 2013 (KPMG, 
2014) was established. It means that high corporate tax rate is often synonymous of 
good governance. 
 
4. With respect to VAT gap it is possible to estimate its evolution over the last decade 
among European countries. The size of the VAT gap weight for the economy is 
bigger in Italy and Greece, and in eastern Europe countries. The weight of the crisis 
on VAT gap was calculated; in this regard it was found that the economies which 
were most impacted were Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, Ireland, France and Spain. 
Finally, an estimation of the VAT GAT for 2013 using a top-down approach is given. 
Here the countries recorded small variations, in particular Greece, Italy, Poland, 
Spain, Germany were some of the economies with a small increment of VAT gap. 
 
5. VAT gap could be a partial explanation for tax evasion, assuming that unreported 
VAT means, at the same time, unreported sales. On this basis, tax evasion was 
estimated. In order to have better comparisons among countries, the average 
corporate and household tax rate was applied. 
 
6. With respect to Country By Country Reporting (CBCR), the different versions 
proposed by OECD, USA, EU, EITI, Canada were compared, and recommendations 
given to better implement CBCR: 
 
7. Coordination at international level should be achieved. The European Union, United 
States and Canada will implement CBCR in a different way. Some countries from 
the African and South American continents have been following the EITI standards. 
The OECD has published a proposal of CBCR. It could be useful to find a common 
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path at international level to implement the same prevision of CBCR and put pressure 
in this regard on other countries such as Russia, China or India. The requirement of 
CBCR should be introduced into future agreements; 
 
8. With the introduction of CBCR a minimum level of transparency and accountability 
should be set and achieved for governments and public institutions at national and at 
local level; 
 
9. Companies should be divided into different groups according to size, juridical form 
and activities (large, medium and small multinational companies, domestic 
companies and autonomous, …). Each group should provide with some information 
about the activity and the companies involved in the production chain of a product 
or of a service. In other words, it could be useful to set a specific CBCR for each 
group. 
 
10. Companies should submit all information once, and in a single software designed for 
all the companies belonging to the same group and for all the countries where they 
operate. This software would reduce bureaucracy and provide the data in a workable 
format. 
 
11. Opinions from different stakeholders such as companies, labour unions, 
shareholders, and civil society, should be taken into account. It is important to specify 
which information should be given, and which should be published; 
 
12. CBCR gives information which could be used not only for taxation, but for many 
other purposes such as: governance of the multinational company, corruption, labour 
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rights, environmental impact, money laundering and terrorist financing, fair trade, 
taxation and public institutions. 
  
13. Most of this information is already required in the proposal of CBCR draft by the 
OECD and by the European Commission. It is recommended that all that information 
should be provided once and via the same software for all the countries and contain 
information about the subject, accounting, tax, bank accounts, environment, 
employment, money laundering and terrorist financing, tangible assets, intangibles 
assets, production chain, transparency/corruption, information about public 
institutions (similar to “Doing Business” by the World Bank). 
 
14. A depth analysis of the various proposals of CBCR is given and the limitations of 
the OECD proposal are summarized below: Although the proposal of the OECD 
covers all the sectors, it applies only for multinational companies having more than 
€ 750m in revenues. This could generate unfair competition among large 
multinational companies. The solution may be to use different versions of CBCR for 
different types of companies, and requiring specific information from each of them; 
 
15. The OECD proposal has another limitation the ultimate parent company of a group 
should submit the CBCR of all the companies of the group on request to the national 
tax administration where it has the fiscal residence. So, if a tax administration of 
another country has the CBCR of that multinational company, it should enquire of 
the tax administration of that country. However, in cases where: a) countries have 
not adopted the CBCR given by the OECD, or b) when countries do not have an 
agreement for the automatic exchange of information, or c) when that agreement does 
not work, the multinational company should provide the CBCR to each tax 
administration. In summary, if a tax administration wants to control a multinational 
group, in which the parent company has fiscal residence abroad, then they should 
contact the tax administration of that country. So, for example, if the government is 
likely to adopt the version of the CBCR produced by the OECD, it could be better 
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not to have any agreement of automatic exchange regarding CBCR with other 
jurisdictions, therefore the multinational companies should directly provide all the 
information required. 
 
16. With respect to access to finance during the financial crisis, it may be seen how it 
changed over time during the financial crisis. There was a negative change observed 
especially in Ireland, Spain, Greece and Italy. In this regard the impact that the crisis 
had on new companies was investigated. It was found that active population 
decreased from 2008 in Portugal, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy especially in 
enterprises with less than 10 employees. Other data was used to demonstrate this was 
the percentage of enterprises newly established in 2008/2010 having survived to 
2013. It was shown that the average of newly established companies in 2010 
throughout European countries which had survived was 60%, whilst the percentage 
dropped to 49% for those established in 2008. Microenterprises were more resilient, 
scoring on average 65% for the first two years and 53% from 2008. 
 
17. The change from 2007 and 2010 in financial composition in Germany, Spain, France, 
Italy and United Kingdom was analysed. With respect to equity it was proved that 
after the crisis banks reduced financing equity in Spain, France and United Kingdom, 
where it was widely used before. Existing shareholders continued to financing in all 
country except in Spain where the requests refused shrank by 15%. With regard to 
loans the requests refused by the bank rose in each country especially in United 
Kingdom and Spain. Owners in all the countries were still the ones financing also 
after the crisis, however in Italy the requests for loans by the employees of the 
business fall abruptly. 
 
18. To complete the view on the economic context on finance access a comparison 
between the Spanish and Italian legislation in shark loans, demonstrates different 
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approach to the problem. Spain adopts a more liberal solution like United Kingdom, 
Italy try to regulate the area but, experiments difficulties in the implementation. 
 
19. In an analysis of more than 8,000 micro-companies in Spain, France and Italy in the 
retail sector for three selected years: 2008, 2011, 2014 it is possible to see that the 
effective corporate tax rate was on average during that period, 24,41% for Spain, 
16,47% for France and 55,69% for Italy. 
 
20. The tax paid for every € 1,000 of sales were on average for this period: € 6,22 for 
Spain, € 9,26 for France and € 12,95 for Italy. By statistical weighting with the GDP, 
Spain shows an improved value in taxed paid in the most recent year (2014), whereas 
France and Italy show the reverse during this time; 
 
21. A comparison of means of mark-up between the operating revenue and the material 
cost was done: among countries the means were always different, on average the 
mark-up was 81,35% for Spain, 100,37% for France and 70,72% for Italy; and, also, 
different source of finance recorded differences among countries and in each country. 
 
22. Two regression models were built to better explain the effect of taxes paid and in the 
margin applied, by micro-companies from 2007 to 2014, separately in Spain, France 
and Italy, with respect to: the financial crisis, the sources of finance. 
 
23. The regression models for taxes paid, in Spain, France and Italy, were well explicated 
and the variables weighted in different ways among the countries as well as with 
respect to the economic trend.  
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24. The regression models for margin were even more accurate, and also in this case it 
was possible to see how the different source of finance and the economic trend, 
influenced the margin applied. 
 
Informal economy and tax evasion are the result of government policies and a litmus test of 
development of a country. As it showed in the thesis, more should be done especially at 
international level where more transparency is required. On the other hand, informal 
economy and tax evasion could be the consequence of other problems like the availability 
of finance for micro-companies. 
 
  
 
CONCLUSIONES 
 
 
Este trabajo de tesis investiga la relación entre la economía informal y el desarrollo de un 
país, centrándose en como la economía informal afecta a los ingresos públicos de un país. 
En primer lugar, se define el concepto de economía informal y se ofrece evidencia relativa 
a la relación existente entre la percepción de la corrupción y el pago de impuesto. Además, 
también se estima el alcance de la evasión fiscal para los países de la Unión Europea. En 
segundo lugar, como un aspecto de la economía informal, se analiza la transparencia en la 
normativa tributaria internacional a partir del estudio de cómo los nuevos estándares 
internacionales para la documentación relacionada con los precios de transferencia podrían 
mejorar la transparencia en la tributación de las compañías multinacionales. Por último, se 
analiza si las fuentes de financiación afectan al pago de impuestos y al margen aplicado por 
parte de las microempresas y como esto podría generar ineficiencias, que a su vez 
favorecerían la economía informal.  
 
A continuación, se exponen las principales conclusiones: 
 
1. Se define la economía informal como la parte de la economía que debería ser formal 
de acuerdo con la legislación de un país, pero no lo es. El análisis se limita a las 
actividades que afectan a los ingresos y a los gastos públicos y que, al mismo tiempo, 
provocan una distorsión en el mercado. 
 
2. Con respecto a la carga fiscal, se ha hallado una relación positiva entre el Índice de 
Percepción de la Corrupción (IPC) (Transparency International, 2013) y el Índice de 
pago de los impuestos (World Bank, 2013). A mayor percepción de corrupción 
corresponde una mayor dificultad administrativa para el pago de los impuestos. 
 
3. Se observa, también, que existe una relación negativa entre la economía informal 
(Schneider, 2012) y el tipo impositivo para las empresas (KPMG, 2014). Esto 
implicaría que un tipo de Impuestos de Sociedades alto es sinónimo de buen 
gobierno. 
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4. Con respecto a la diferencia entre los ingresos estimados y los ingresos efectivamente 
recaudados en el IVA, llamada también como déficit recaudatorio del IVA o brecha 
del IVA (VAT gap), se estudia su evolución en la última década en los países 
europeos. La brecha del IVA resulta ser más alta, con respecto al PIB, en Italia, en 
Grecia, y en los países del este de Europa. Se ha calculado también el peso de la crisis 
sobre la brecha del IVA; en este sentido se encuentra que las economías más 
afectadas son Letonia, Rumania, Eslovaquia, Irlanda, Francia y España. Por último, 
se proporciona una estimación del déficit recaudatorio del IVA para el ejercicio 2013, 
donde los países registran pequeñas variaciones. 
 
5. La brecha del IVA podría ser en parte una explicación de la evasión de impuestos. 
Considerando que una parte de este déficit se refiere a IVA no declarado y que, a su 
vez, éste es una expresión de ventas no declaradas, se aplica sobre estas últimas una 
tasa de impuesto medio. El resultado es la estimación de la evasión de impuestos en 
los países de la Unión Europea, donde se encuentra que Grecia, Eslovaquia e Italia 
son los países con una tasa de evasión más alta sobre el total de impuestos.  
 
6. Con respecto a la transparencia internacional, se comparan las diferentes propuestas 
de lo que se conoce como “Información país por país” (Country By Country 
Reporting, CBCR). Las propuestas han sido realizadas por la OCDE, EE.UU., la 
Comisión Europea, el Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) y Canadá.  
 
7. En la Información país por país se percibe cómo la cooperación en materia tributaria 
a nivel internacional será un aspecto estratégico. La Comisión Europea, EE.UU. y 
Canadá están trabajando actualmente en diferentes versiones y propuestas sobre el 
tema. Por su parte, algunos países de África y de América del Sur ya han 
implementado las normas del EITI. Para tener una base común a nivel internacional 
sobre este asunto, todos estos agentes están revisando sus propuestas a la luz de la 
versión de la OCDE. Se sugiere que la “Información País Por País” debería ser 
introducida como requisito en los acuerdos comerciales.  
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8. La introducción de la Información país por país por parte de las empresas 
multinacionales facilitaría que los gobiernos y las instituciones públicas cumplan 
unos determinados estándares de transparencia y rendición de cuentas. 
 
9. Sería necesario establecer un modelo especifico de Información país por país por tipo 
de empresas en función de su tamaño, forma jurídica, etc. Cada modelo debería 
proporcionar información acerca de la actividad, así como sobre las empresas que 
participan en la cadena de producción.  
 
10. Se propone la utilización de un software común para reducir los costes 
administrativos y la burocracia y proporcionar los datos en un formato viable y 
disponible para las administraciones tributarias en una base de datos. 
 
11. Se sugiere considerar las aportaciones de las diferentes partes interesadas, incluyendo 
así las opiniones de sindicatos, accionistas, instituciones y de la sociedad civil. Sería 
importante especificar, además del tipo de información, su grado de publicidad.  
 
12. La Información país por país podría ser utilizada no sólo para los controles sobre los 
precios de transferencia, sino para la investigación con otros propósitos, tales como: 
los controles de corrupción, el respeto de los derechos laborales, el control del 
impacto ambiental, la prevención del blanqueo de capitales y la financiación del 
terrorismo, la sostenibilidad del comercio, y el grado de transparencia de las 
instituciones públicas. 
 
13. La Información país por país, tendría que proporcionar datos sobre: contabilidad, 
impuestos, cuentas bancarias, impacto ambiental, beneficiario último, empleo, 
prevención de blanqueo de capitales y financiación del terrorismo, activos 
materiales, activos intangibles, cadena de producción, etc.. Parte de esta información 
ya es requerida en las propuestas recientemente elaboradas en la esfera internacional, 
especialmente en las propuestas de la OCDE y de la Comisión Europea.  
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14. Se analizan algunos de los aspectos críticos de la Información país por país propuesta 
por la OCDE, ya que podría ser utilizada a nivel internacional. A pesar de que cubre 
todos los sectores, se aplicaría sólo a empresas multinacionales con un volumen de 
facturación superior a 750 millones de euros, lo que podría generar una competencia 
desleal. La solución podría ser utilizar diferentes versiones de Información país por 
país según el tipo de empresas, como se ha argumentado anteriormente. 
 
15. Otra limitación de la propuesta de la OCDE es que la sociedad matriz de un grupo 
deberá presentar el informe de todas las empresas del grupo, a petición de la 
administración tributaria del país donde tiene la residencia fiscal. Por lo tanto, si una 
administración tributaria quisiese controlar un grupo multinacional en el que la 
matriz tenga la residencia fiscal en el extranjero, debería ponerse en contacto con la 
administración tributaria de ese país y, tras una petición formal, esperar el envío del 
informe. Sin embargo, en determinados casos (si el país no ha adoptado este modelo 
de informe, si no tiene el acuerdo para el intercambio automático de información, o 
dicho acuerdo no funciona) la multinacional tendría que proporcionar directamente 
el informe. Esto, junto a una utilización de una base de datos común como se ha 
propuesto anteriormente, supondría un ahorro de tiempo y de recursos. 
 
16. Se investiga la medida en que la crisis financiera afecta al acceso al crédito por parte 
de las empresas en los países europeos, registrándose un cambio negativo sobre todo 
en Irlanda, España, Grecia e Italia. Desde 2008 disminuye el número de empresas 
activas en Portugal, Reino Unido, España e Italia, sobre todo las de menos de 10 
empleados. Se observa que en 2013 se mantenían activas el 60% de las empresas 
constituidas en 2010 y el 49% de las constituidas en 2008. Las microempresas 
resultan ser más resistentes: en 2013 sobrevivían el 65% de empresas creadas en 
2010 y el 53% de las de 2008. 
 
17. Se analizan también los cambios en la composición financiera en Alemania, España, 
Francia, Italia y Reino Unido entre 2007 y 2010. Después de la crisis, la financiación 
de capital por parte de los bancos se reduce en España, Francia y Reino Unido, donde 
antes era ampliamente utilizada. Por otro lado, los accionistas continúan aportando 
Conclusion 
 
 
176 
 
financiación en todos los países excepto en España, que registra una reducción en 
torno a un 15%. Respecto a los préstamos financieros, las solicitudes rechazadas por 
los bancos suben, especialmente en el Reino Unido y España, mientras que los 
dueños de las empresas siguen concediendo préstamos.  
 
18. Para completar el contexto económico en el acceso al crédito, se describen los 
principales intermediarios financieros con especial atención a la “banca en la 
sombra” (shadow banking). Además, se proporciona una comparación entre la 
legislación española e italiana en materia de préstamos con una alta tasa de interés 
(shark loan). España adopta una legislación más liberal, en línea con el Reino Unido, 
no poniendo ningún límite y dejando al juez decidir si la tasa de interés es demasiado 
alta. Italia, por su parte,  regula el sector, poniendo, entre otras restricciones: una tasa 
tope y fondos públicos por personas que han sido estafadas por prestamistas; sin 
embargo, la normativa italiana encuentra dificultades en su aplicación. 
 
19. Se realiza un análisis de más de 8.000 microempresas en España, Francia e Italia en 
el sector minorista en tres años: 2008, 2011, 2014. Se observa que la tasa efectiva del 
Impuesto sobre Sociedades es, en promedio durante ese período, del 24,41% para 
España, 16,47% para Francia y 55,69% para Italia. 
 
20. Además, se calcula que la media de impuestos pagados por cada 1.000 euros de 
ventas para este período es: 6,22 euros para España, 9,26 euros para Francia y 12,95 
euros para Italia. Ponderando tal resultado con el PIB, España muestra un mayor 
promedio de impuestos pagados en 2014 respecto a los años precedentes, mientras 
que Francia e Italia registran una tendencia inversa durante el mismo periodo. 
 
21. La comparación de medias de los recargos entre el precio de venta y el coste de 
adquisición muestra una diferencia importante entre países, que resulta ser de 81,35% 
para España, 100,37% para Francia y 70,72% para Italia. Tal diferencia se aprecia 
también desagregando las empresas según la fuente de financiación que utilizan. 
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22. Se elaboran dos modelos de regresión para evaluar el efecto de la crisis financiera y 
de las fuentes de financiación sobre los impuestos pagados y en el margen entre 
ventas y coste de adquisición aplicado por las microempresas durante el periodo 
2007-2014, en España, Francia e Italia. 
 
23. En el modelo de regresión para los impuestos pagados las variables pesan de manera 
diferente en los países. En España, la crisis afecta a los impuestos de manera 
significativa a partir de 2010, en cambio en Francia y en Italia la contracción se 
registra ya desde el 2008. En España y Francia las diferentes fuentes de financiación 
influyen significativamente sobre el impuesto pagado.   
 
24. En el modelo de regresión para el margen las fuentes de financiación y la tendencia 
económica explican bien la variable dependiente. En España, se puede ver cómo la 
financiación con medios propios afecta positivamente al margen aplicado por las 
empresas, mientras que la financiación externa a largo plazo disminuye el mismo. 
También en este modelo, como en el de los impuestos pagados, los primeros años no 
tienen un efecto significativo sobre el margen. En Francia, a diferencia de España, 
las diferentes fuentes de financiación no afectan al margen adoptado, a excepción de 
los medios propios que tienen un efecto positivo. En Italia, las diferentes fuentes de 
financiación tienen una influencia positiva sobre el margen, así como la misma 
tendencia económica. 
 
Como se muestra en la tesis, los países con mejores instituciones tienen sistemas fiscales 
más eficientes. Los gobiernos y la comunidad internacional han propuesto estándares 
para favorecer la cooperación a nivel internacional en materia de transparencia, los 
cuales tienen un alto potencial, pero deben ser consensuados e implementados de la 
manera más eficiente para crear no sólo un sistema fiscal más equitativo, sino una 
economía sostenible. Finalmente, se ha visto cómo existen situaciones en las que la 
economía informal y la evasión de impuestos pueden relacionarse con otros problemas 
como la disponibilidad de financiación para las microempresas cuyo conocimiento puede 
permitir abordarlos. En estos casos, un aumento de recaudación podría derivar de la 
solución de estos problemas más que por una subida de impuestos. 
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Finalmente, se defiende que la economía informal y la evasión de impuestos son, en gran 
parte, un resultado de las políticas fiscales más que una elección particular, al tiempo 
que reflejan el nivel de desarrollo de un país. 
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1. VAT gap and Tax evasion 
estimation 
1.1. 2012 VAT gap 
Countries 
2012 
VAT 
gap 
2012 VAT 
gap 
without 
economic 
influence 
Difference 
Austria 12% 13,41% -1,41% 
Belgium 10% 6,98% 3,02% 
Bulgaria 20% 15,86% 4,14% 
Czech Republic 22% 15,47% 6,53% 
Denmark 8% 7,79% 0,21% 
Estonia 14% 12,62% 1,38% 
Finland 5% 4,29% 0,71% 
France 15% 8,79% 6,21% 
Germany 10% 11,36% -1,36% 
Greece 33% 29% 3,52% 
Hungary 25% 22,59% 2,41% 
Ireland 11% 4,63% 6,37% 
Italy 33% 30,72% 2,28% 
Latvia 34% 11,67% 22,33% 
Lithuania 36% 30,72% 5,28% 
Luxembourg 6% 4,40% 1,60% 
Netherlands 5% 3,02% 1,98% 
Poland 25% 23,62% 1,38% 
Portugal 8% 6% 1,76% 
Romania 44% 34,36% 9,64% 
Slovakia 39% 27,20% 11,80% 
Slovenia 9% 8% 0,56% 
Spain 18% 13% 4,68% 
Sweden 7% 10,34% -3,34% 
United Kingdom 10% 8,29% 1,71% 
Own estimation. Percent of VAT gap on 
VTTL without economic influence 
 
Countries 
2012 VAT 
gap 
2012 VAT 
gap without 
economic 
influence 
Austria 3244 3625,91 
Belgium 2991 2087,87 
Bulgaria 957 758,80 
Czech Republic 3267 2297,33 
Denmark 2141 2083,89 
Estonia 255 229,88 
Finland 905 776,26 
France 25583 14984,71 
Germany 21957 24942,53 
Greece 6651 5942,51 
Hungary 2971 2684,57 
Ireland 1262 530,81 
Italy 46034 42850,25 
Latvia 818 280,73 
Lithuania 1436 1225,51 
Luxembourg 204 149,55 
Netherlands 1966 1186,85 
Poland 9317 8802,72 
Portugal 1228 957,79 
Romania 8841 6904,30 
Slovakia 2787 1943,81 
Slovenia 270 253,29 
Spain 12412 9184,41 
Sweden 2886 4265,00 
United Kingdom 16557 13730,96 
 
Table 11. (figure 5) Own estimation. 2012 
VAT gap without economic influence. 
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Proyection  
2013 2012 
GEO/TIME SALES 
sales net 
VTTL 
VTTL VAT VAT gap 
% VAT 
gap / 
VTTL 
VTTL 
2012 
% VAT 
gap/ 
VTTL 
Inderect 
method 
% VAT 
gap / 
VTTL 
VAT gap 
Italy 1.322.133 1.182.940 139.193 93.812 45.381 32,60% 100331 32,04% 33,00% 46034 
France 1.665.939 1.493.229 172.711 144.414 28.297 16,38% 107190 15,20% 15,00% 25583 
Germany 2.095.517 1.872.156 223.361 197.005 26.356 11,80% 135841 10,17% 10,00% 21957 
United 
Kingdom 1.580.267 1.426.197 154.070 139.293 14.777 9,59% 
103683 
11,94% 10,00% 
16557 
Spain 702.272 626.532 75.741 62.179 13.562 17,91% 49751 15,98% 18,00% 12412 
Poland 350.914 312.684 38.230 27.780 10.449 27,33% 25015 25,31% 25,00% 9317 
Greece 137.811 118.868 18.943 12.593 6.350 33,52% 15450 32,67% 33,00% 6651 
Belgium 286.180 255.506 30.674 27.226 3.448 11,24% 17278 10,01% 10,00% 2991 
Austria 243.560 215.376 28.184 24.953 3.231 11,47% 18524 11,67% 12,00% 3244 
Sweden 358.299 316.153 42.146 39.048 3.098 7,35% 21778 7,15% 7,00% 2886 
Czech 
Republic 117.477 103.179 14.298 11.695 2.604 18,21% 
9037 
22,31% 22,00% 
3267 
Hungary 71.967 60.292 11.676 9.073 2.603 22,29% 8180 24,64% 25,00% 2971 
Slovakia 52.276 44.986 7.290 4.696 2.593 35,58% 5243 39,17% 39,00% 2787 
Denmark 191.557 165.051 26.506 24.360 2.146 8,10% 14961 8,54% 8,00% 2141 
Netherlands 414.914 370.548 44.365 42.424 1.941 4,38% 23719 4,50% 5,00% 1966 
Ireland 95.246 83.115 12.131 10.371 1.760 14,51% 7243 10,99% 11,00% 1262 
Portugal 123.617 108.429 15.188 13.710 1.479 9,74% 10738 8,07% 8,00% 1228 
Finland 146.027 126.391 19.636 18.848 788 4,01% 10261 3,01% 5,00% 905 
Estonia 13.367 11.512 1.855 1.558 297 16,02% 1180 14,46% 14,00% 255 
Slovenia 26.235 23.057 3.178 3.045 133 4,18% 2241 8,57% 9,00% 270 
 
2013 VAT gap ESTIMATION. Own estimation.  
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1.2  Tax evasion estimation 
GEO/TIME 
2012 
SALES 
sales net 
VTTL 
VTTL vat 2012 
VAT 
gap 
 rate 
Undeclared 
sales 
Average 
rate 
(corporate, 
income) 
Profit tax 
estimated 
evasion 
vat + 
profit 
evasion 
GDP 
2012 
Total tax 
Revenue 
TAX 
EVASION 
ON GDP 
TAX EVASION 
ON TOTAL 
TAX REVENUE 
Austria 240.299 212.492 27.807 24.563 3.244 13,09% 24790 34% 8459 11703 307.004 132.200,0 3,81% 8,85% 
Belgium 278.836 248.949 29.887 26.896 2.991 12,01% 24915 36% 8906 11897 375.852 170.700,0 3,17% 6,97% 
Czech Republic 120.319 105.675 14.644 11.377 3.267 13,86% 23577 17% 4008 7275 152.926 51.688,9 4,76% 14,08% 
Denmark 191.968 165.405 26.563 24.296 2.267 16,06% 14118 38% 5400 7667 245.252 115.758,9 3,13% 6,62% 
Estonia 12.703 10.940 1.763 1.508 255 16,12% 1582 21% 332 587 17.460 5.700,0 3,36% 10,30% 
Finland 141.885 123.340 18.545 17.987 558 15,04% 3711 32% 1171 1729 192.350 85.300,0 0,90% 2,03% 
France 1.621.292 1.453.210 168.082 142.526 25.556 11,57% 220953 28% 62508 88064 2.032.297 920.100,0 4,33% 9,57% 
Germany 2.026.431 1.810.434 215.997 194.034 21.963 11,93% 184089 30% 54352 76315 2.666.400 1.002.300,0 2,86% 7,61% 
Greece 148.150 127.786 20.364 13.712 6.652 15,94% 41742 29% 12105 18757 193.347 65.500,0 9,70% 28,64% 
Hungary 74.305 62.250 12.055 9.084 2.971 19,37% 15341 18% 2685 5656 96.968 37.332,8 5,83% 15,15% 
Ireland 90.145 78.664 11.481 10.219 1.262 14,59% 8645 22% 1859 3120 163.939 47.100,0 1,90% 6,62% 
Italy 1.344.114 1.202.607 141.507 96.170 45.337 11,77% 385300 32% 124066 169403 1.566.912 695.900,0 10,81% 24,34% 
Netherlands 408.364 364.699 43.665 41.699 1.966 11,97% 16420 35% 5675 7641 599.338 217.559,7 1,27% 3,51% 
Poland 341.445 304.247 37.198 27.783 9.415 12,23% 77003 19% 14631 24045 381.480 122.455,0 6,30% 19,64% 
Portugal 123.900 108.677 15.223 13.995 1.228 14,01% 8767 28% 2466 3694 165.107 52.900,0 2,24% 6,98% 
Slovakia 51.017 43.903 7.114 4.328 2.786 16,20% 17195 23% 3869 6655 71.096 20.300,0 9,36% 32,78% 
Slovenia 26.950 23.790 3.160 2.889 271 13,28% 2039 25% 510 780 35.319 13.200,0 2,21% 5,91% 
Spain 686.607 618.070 68.537 57.584 10.953 11,09% 98775 34% 33769 44722 1.029.002 338.200,0 4,35% 13,22% 
Sweden 346.413 305.665 40.748 37.834 2.914 13,33% 21859 35% 7596 10510 407.820 172.508,0 2,58% 6,09% 
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United Kingdom 1.635.975 1.476.474 159.501 140.457 19.045 10,80% 176292 25% 44514 63558 1.921.905 634228,617 3,31% 10,02% 
GEO/TIME 
2013 
SALES 
sales net 
VTTL 
VTTL vat 2013 
VAT 
gap 
 rate 
Undeclared 
sales 
Average 
rate 
(corporate, 
income) 
Profit tax 
estimated 
evasion 
vat + 
profit 
evasion 
GDP 
2013 
2013 Total 
tax 
Revenue 
TAX 
EVASION 
ON GDP 
TAX EVASION 
ON TOTAL TAX 
REVENUE 
Italy 1.322.133 1.182.940 139.193 93.812 45.381 11,77% 385672 32% 124186 169567 1.560.024 690.300 10,87% 24,56% 
France 1.665.939 1.493.229 172.711 144.414 28.297 11,57% 244649 28% 69211 97508 2.059.852 952.000 4,73% 10,24% 
Germany 2.095.517 1.872.156 223.361 197.005 26.356 11,93% 220908 30% 65223 91579 2.737.600 1.030.400 3,35% 8,89% 
Spain 702.272 626.532 75.741 62.179 13.562 12,09% 112183 34% 38352 51914 1.022.988 341.800 5,07% 15,19% 
United Kingdom 1.580.267 1.426.197 154.070 139.293 14.777 10,80% 136786 25% 34538 49315 1.899.098 624.803 2,60% 7,89% 
Poland 350.914 312.684 38.230 27.780 10.449 12,23% 85468 19% 16239 26688 389.695 126.261 6,85% 21,14% 
Greece 137.811 118.868 18.943 12.593 6.350 15,94% 39846 29% 11555 17905 182.054 61.100 9,84% 29,31% 
Belgium 286.180 255.506 30.674 27.226 3.448 12,01% 28723 36% 10267 13715 382.692 176.400 3,58% 7,78% 
Austria 243.560 215.376 28.184 24.953 3.231 13,09% 24694 34% 8427 11658 313.067 137.200 3,72% 8,50% 
Sweden 358.299 316.153 42.146 39.048 3.098 13,33% 23241 35% 8076 11175 420.849 180.123 2,66% 6,20% 
Netherlands 414.914 370.548 44.365 42.424 1.941 11,97% 16215 35% 5604 7546 602.658 217.560 1,25% 3,47% 
Denmark 191.557 165.051 26.506 24.360 2.146 16,06% 13362 38% 5111 7257 248.975 121.002 2,91% 6,00% 
Slovakia 52.276 44.986 7.290 4.696 2.593 16,20% 16005 23% 3601 6195 72.134 21.800 8,59% 28,42% 
Czech Republic 117.477 103.179 14.298 11.695 2.604 13,86% 18788 17% 3194 5798 149.491 50.976 3,88% 11,37% 
Hungary 71.967 60.292 11.676 9.073 2.603 19,37% 13439 18% 2352 4954 97.948 38.102 5,06% 13,00% 
Portugal 123.617 108.429 15.188 13.710 1.479 14,01% 10556 28% 2969 4447 165.690 57.300 2,68% 7,76% 
Ireland 95.246 83.115 12.131 10.371 1.760 14,59% 12056 22% 2592 4352 164.050 49.400 2,65% 8,81% 
Finland 146.027 126.391 19.636 18.848 788 15,54% 5070 32% 1600 2388 193.443 88.600 1,23% 2,70% 
Estonia 13.367 11.512 1.855 1.558 297 16,12% 1845 21% 387 685 18.613 6.000 3,68% 11,41% 
Slovenia 26.235 23.057 3.178 3.045 133 13,78% 963 25% 241 373 35.275 13.300 1,06% 2,81% 
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 2013 TAX EVASION ESTIMATION. Own estimation 
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2. Comparison between the CBCR proposed by Canada, USA, OECD, EITI and 
EU: Step-by-step comparison 
In this part, we are giving a comparison of the CBCR proposed by Canada, USA, OECD, 
EITI and EU. We try to identify main areas to better evidence differences between the 
proposals. As before, we based our analysis on the legislation provided by the countries 
or the institutions. As a result, we have resumed or reported in italics the legislation. 
 
A. WHO 
1. Subjective requirement 
2. Objective requirement 
3. Filing obligation 
4. Payee 
 
B. WHAT 
1. Payments categories: 
2. Type of payment 
3. Limit: 
4. Broke down of the payments 
5. Records: 
 
C. RELEVANT POINT 
1. Reports accessible to the public 
2. reports of another jurisdiction / with other legislation  
3. Enforce compliance and fine 
4. Audit 
5. Accrual or cash basis 
6. Formal and active participation of the civil society  
7. Formal and active participation of the Government or its representatives  
8. Finance resource 
9. Government obligation on reporting 
10. Review 
11. Declared scope  
 
  Legislation  
USA 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction 
Issuers. ACTION: Final rule. 17 CFR Parts 240 and 249 [Release No. 34-67717; File 
No. S7-42-10] RIN 3235-AK85 
CANADA Division 28 -Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act 
OECD 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 13: Country-by-Country 
Reporting Implementation Package 
EITI The EITI Standard 
EU Extractive 
Industries 
Art. 10 Directive 34 /2013 
EU Bank Art. 89 Directive 36/2013 
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A. WHO 
OECD 
MNEs: 
1. Subjective requirement  
MNEs with consolidated group revenue in the preceding fiscal year of €750 million or 
more. 
2. Objective requirement 
No sector restriction  
3. Filing obligation 
The Reporting Entity may be the Ultimate Parent Entity, the Surrogate Parent Entity, or 
the Constituent Entity. 
(a) Ultimate Parent Entity of an MNE Group 
(b) Surrogate Parent Entity. A company of a MNe group that report on behalf of the 
other companies of the group when: 
a) the jurisdiction of tax residence of the Surrogate Parent Entity requires 
filing of country-by-country reports; 
b) the jurisdiction of tax residence of the Surrogate Parent Entity has a 
Qualifying Competent Authority Agreement in effect; 
c) the jurisdiction of tax residence of the Surrogate Parent Entity has not 
notified the Systemic Failure; 
(a) Constituent Entity substitutes the Ultimate Parent Entity when one or more of the 
following conditions apply: 
a) the Ultimate Parent Entity of the MNE Group is not obligated to file a 
country-by-country report in its jurisdiction of tax residence; or, 
b) there is not an agreement of the automatic exchange of CBCR between the 
jurisdiction in which the Ultimate Parent Entity is resident and the other 
one. 
c) there is an agreement of the automatic exchange of CBCR but the 
jurisdiction in which the Ultimate Parent Entity is resident has suspended 
it or persistently failed to provided it. 
4. Payee 
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Country Tax Administration  
 
USA 
Resource extraction issuers: 
1. Subjective requirement  
All U.S. companies and foreign companies should submit the report regardless of  
 the size of the company; 
 the extent of business operations; 
 owner (government owned or ); 
 any situations in which foreign law may prohibit the required disclosure. 
(currently no foreign law prohibits the disclosure) 
 confidentiality or sensitive information (the instances when an issuer has a 
confidentiality provision in a relevant contract or commercially or competitively 
sensitive information, regardless of the existence of a confidentiality provision in 
a contract) 
 the safety and security of its employees and operations 
The issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer or an entity under the control of the issuer. 
The final rules do not extend the disclosure requirements to foreign private issuers that 
are exempt from Exchange Act registration pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b). 
2. Objective requirement 
Definition: “The commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals” include: 
a) the activities of exploration, extraction, processing, and export, or the acquisition 
of a license for any such activity.  
b) “Commercial development” the definition leaves discretionary authority to 
include other significant activities directly relating to oil, natural gas, or minerals. 
Except: 
o Marketing; 
o Transportation in the list of covered activities, unless those activities are 
directly related to the export of the oil, natural gas, or minerals; 
o Activities that are ancillary or preparatory to such commercial 
development (A manufacturer of a product used in the commercial 
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development of oil, natural gas, or minerals is not considered to be 
engaged in the commercial development of the resource). 
Other relevant aspects: 
 Prevalence of substance over form: Whether an issuer is a resource extraction 
issuer will depend on its specific facts and circumstances; 
 Activity or payment that, although not in form or characterization of one of the 
categories specified under the final rules, is part of a plan or scheme to evade the 
disclosure required under Section. 
3. Filing obligation 
The final rules require a resource extraction issuer to provide disclosure of payments 
made by the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer, or an entity under the control of the issuer 
to a foreign government or the U.S. Federal Government for the purpose of the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.  
A facts-and-circumstances determination of control consistent with the federal securities 
laws is preferable to a bright-line rule limiting disclosure to payments made only by 
consolidated entities. 
4. Payee 
(a) In the United States the requiring disclosure of payments will made to the Federal 
Government and not to state and local governments ; 
(b) A “foreign government” includes a foreign national government as well as a 
foreign subnational government, such as the government of a state, province, 
county, district, municipality, or territory under a foreign national government 
 
CANADA 
Entities: 
1. Subjective requirement  
“Entity” means a corporation or a trust, partnership or other unincorporated organization: 
(a) an entity that is listed on a stock exchange in Canada; 
(b) an entity that has a place of business in Canada, does business in Canada or has 
assets in Canada and that, based on its consolidated financial statements, meets at 
least two of the following conditions for at least one of its two most recent 
financial years: 
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i. it has at least $20 million in assets, 
ii. it has generated at least $40 million in revenue, 
iii. it employs an average of at least 250 employees; and 
(c) any other prescribed entity. 
2. Objective requirement 
An entity: 
(b) that is engaged in the commercial development of oil, gas or minerals in Canada 
or elsewhere; or 
(c) that controls a corporation or a trust, partnership or other unincorporated 
organization that is engaged in the commercial development of oil, gas or minerals 
in Canada or elsewhere. 
Commercial development of oil, gas or minerals” means  
(a) the exploration or extraction of oil, gas or minerals; 
(b) the acquisition or holding of a permit, licence, lease or any other 
authorization to carry out any of the activities referred to in paragraph (a); 
or 
(c) any other prescribed activities in relation to oil, gas or minerals. 
Control means: 
(a) companies directly or indirectly controlled in any manner; 
(b) companies deemed to be controlled and  
(c) companies controlled or deemed to be controlled by an entity deemed to 
be controlled 
3. Filing obligation 
1. Parent companies 
2. parent companies may report on behalf of the wholly-owned  subsidiary 
3. Reporting entities will also have to report on payments made by non-reporting 
entities that they control  and that are engaged in the commercial development of 
oil, gas, or minerals 
4. Payee 
(a) any government in Canada or in a foreign state; 
(b) a body that is established by two or more governments; 
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(c) any trust, board, commission, corporation or body or authority that is established 
to exercise or perform, or that exercises or performs, a power, duty or function of 
government for a government referred to in paragraph (a) or a body referred to in 
paragraph (b); or 
(d) any other prescribed payee. 
(e) Deemed payee 
 
EITI 
Companies, Government 
1. Subjective requirement 
Companies and government entities, including state-owned enterprises 
(a) All companies making material payments to the government. An entity should 
only be exempted if its payments and revenues are not material.  
(b) All government entities receiving material revenues and all the benefit stream in 
the scope of the EITI report in aggregate form. If the government could not report, 
an Independent Administrator should draw on any relevant data and estimates 
from other sources in order to provide a comprehensive account of the total 
government revenues 
2. Objective requirement 
Oil, gas and mining companies 
3. Filing obligation  
Companies and Governments 
4. Payee 
Multi-stakeholder group (The government, companies and civil society must be fully, 
actively and effectively engaged in the EITI process.) 
 
 
EU Extractive Industries 
Undertaking active in the extractive and logging industry 
1. Subjective requirement 
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That obligation shall not apply to any undertaking governed by the law of a Member State 
which is a subsidiary or parent undertaking, where both of the following conditions are 
fulfilled: 
(a) the parent undertaking is subject to the laws of a Member State; and 
(b) the payments to governments made by the undertaking are included in the 
consolidated report on payments to governments drawn up by that parent 
undertaking in accordance with Article 44. 
An undertaking, including a public-interest entity, need not be included in a consolidated 
report on payments to governments when: 
(a) severe long-term restrictions substantially hinder the parent undertaking in the 
exercise of its rights over the assets or management of that undertaking or 
(b) extremely rare cases where the information necessary for the preparation of the 
consolidated report on payments to governments in accordance with this Directive 
cannot be obtained without disproportionate expense or undue delay or 
(c) the shares of that undertaking are held exclusively with a view to their subsequent 
resale. 
 
2. Objective requirement 
Exploration, prospection, discovery, development, and extraction of minerals, oil, natural 
gas deposits or other materials, within the economic activities listed in Section B, 
Divisions 05 to 08 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1893/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 establishing the statistical 
classification of economic activities NACE Revision 2 
SECTION B — MINING AND QUARRYING 
05 Mining of coal and lignite 
05.1 Mining of hard coal 
05.10 Mining of hard coal 0510 
05.2 Mining of lignite 
05.20 Mining of lignite 0520 
06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
06.1 Extraction of crude petroleum 
06.10 Extraction of crude petroleum 0610 
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06.2 Extraction of natural gas 
06.20 Extraction of natural gas 0620 
07 Mining of metal ores 
07.1 Mining of iron ores 
07.10 Mining of iron ores 0710 
07.2 Mining of non-ferrous metal ores 
07.21 Mining of uranium and thorium ores 0721 
07.29 Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores 0729 
08 Other mining and quarrying 
08.1 Quarrying of stone, sand and clay 
08.11 Quarrying of ornamental and building stone, limestone, gypsum, 
chalk and slate 0810* 
08.12 Operation of gravel and sand pits; mining of clays and kaolin 
0810* 
08.9 Mining and quarrying n.e.c. 
08.91 Mining of chemical and fertiliser minerals 0891 
08.92 Extraction of peat 0892 
08.93 Extraction of salt 0893 
08.99 Other mining and quarrying n.e.c. 0899 
 
Exclusion 
09 Mining support service activities 
09.1 Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction 
09.10 Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction 0910 
09.9 Support activities for other mining and quarrying 
09.90 Support activities for other mining and quarrying 0990 
 
Undertaking active in the logging of primary forests. Undertaking with activities as 
referred to in Section A, Division 02, Group 02.2 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 
1893/2006, in primary forests. 
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02 Forestry and logging 
02.1 Silviculture and other forestry activities 
02.10 Silviculture and other forestry activities 0210 
02.2 Logging 
02.20 Logging 0220 
02.3 Gathering of wild growing non-wood products 
02.30 Gathering of wild growing non-wood products 
0230 
02.4 Support services to forestry 
02.40 Support services to forestry 0240 
Division / Group / Class/ ISIC Rev. 4 
 
3. Filing requirement 
Any large undertaking or any public-interest entity active in the extractive industry or the 
logging of primary forests 
4. Payee 
'Government' means  
any national, regional or local authority of a Member State or of a third country. It 
includes a department, agency or undertaking controlled by that authority as laid down in 
Article 22(1) to (6) of this Directive; 
 
EU BANK 
WHO: institution 
1. Subjective requirement 
'Institution' means: a credit institution or an investment firm. (point (3) of Article 4(1) of 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013) 
2. Objective requirement 
By the nature of the institution. 
3. Filing requirement 
There is not specification about filing requirement, so we suppose by the same institution. 
4. Payee:  
Member State and by third country in which it has an establishment.  
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B. WHAT 
OCDE 
1. Payments categories: 
Aggregate information relating to  
1. revenue,  
2. profit (loss) before income tax, 
3. income tax paid,  
4. income tax accrued,  
5. stated capital,  
6. accumulated earnings,  
7. number of employees, and  
8. tangible assets other than cash or cash equivalents with regard to each jurisdiction 
in which the MNE Group operates; 
9. An identification of each Constituent Entity of the MNE Group setting out  
a. the jurisdiction of tax residence of such Constituent Entity, and where 
different,  
b. the jurisdiction under the laws of which such Constituent Entity is 
organised, and 
c. the nature of the main business activity or activities  
2. Type of payment 
Companies must disclose all material payments in accordance with the agreed reporting 
templates and in line with the company’s audited figures. 
3. Limit: No information is provided. 
4. Brokedown and organization of the payments 
Country level (each jurisdiction in which the MNE Group operates) 
5. Records: No information is provided. 
 
USA 
1. Payments categories: 
1. taxes (taxes levied on corporate profits, corporate income, and production, but 
will not be required to disclose payments for taxes levied on consumption, such 
as value added taxes, personal income taxes, or sales taxes); 
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2. royalties; 
3. fees (rental fees, entry fees, and concession fees,); 
4. production entitlements; 
5. bonuses (signature, discovery, and production bonuses); 
6. dividends; and 
7. payments for infrastructure improvements 
8. The final rules will require disclosure with respect to activities or payments that, 
although not in form or characterization of one of the categories specified under 
the final rules, are part of a plan or scheme to evade the disclosure requirements 
under Section 13(q) 
The final rules do not require a resource extraction issuer to disclose social or community 
payments, such as payments to build a hospital or school, because it is not clear that these 
types of payments are part of the commonly recognized revenue stream this treatment of 
social or community payments is consistent with the EITI, which encourages, but does 
not require 
2. Type of payment 
Material and in kind. for each project and to each government, issuers will need to 
determine the monetary value of in-kind payments. the final rules specify that issuers may 
report in-kind payments at cost, or if cost is not determinable, fair market value, and 
provide a brief description of how the monetary value was calculated 
3. Limit 
The final rules define “not de minimis” to mean any payment, whether made as a single 
payment or series of related payments, that equals or exceeds $100,000 during the most 
recent fiscal year. 
4. Brokedown and organization of the payments 
Total amount of payments made for each project and to each government, issuers will 
need to determine the monetary value of in-kind payments. 
“Thus, if an issuer has more than one project in a host country, and that country’s 
government levies corporate income taxes on the issuer with respect to the issuer’s 
income in the country as a whole, and not with respect to a particular project or operation 
within the country, the issuer would be permitted to disclose the resulting income tax 
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payment or payments without specifying a particular project associated with the 
payment”. 
5. Records: No information is provided. 
 
CANADA 
1. Payments categories: 
Payment means a payment that is made to a payee in relation to the commercial 
development of oil, gas or minerals and that falls within any of the following categories 
of payment: 
(a) taxes, other than consumption taxes and personal income taxes; 
(b) royalties; 
(c) fees, including rental fees, entry fees and regulatory charges as well as fees or other 
consideration for licences, permits or concessions; 
(d) production entitlements; 
(e) bonuses, including signature, discovery and production bonuses; 
(f) dividends other than dividends paid as ordinary shareholders; 
(g) infrastructure improvement payments; or 
(h) any other prescribed category of payment. 
2. Type of payment 
Whether monetary or in kind 
3. Limit 
An entity must disclose any payments within a category of payment that are made to the 
same payee, if the total amount of all those payments during the financial year is at least: 
(a) the amount prescribed by regulation for the category of payment; or 
(b) if no amount is prescribed for the category, $100,000. 
4. Brokedown of the payments 
The Minister may specify, in writing, the way in which payments are to be organized or 
broken down in the report — including on a project basis — and the form and manner in 
which a report is to be provided. 
5. Records: 
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An entity must keep records of its payments made in a financial year for a prescribed 
period or, if no period is prescribed, for a seven-year period that begins on the day on 
which the entity provides the report. 
 
EITI 
1. Payments categories 
The multi-stakeholder group should agree on who prepares the contextual information 
for the EITI Report (3.1). 
 information about the extractive industries. This information should include a 
summary description of the legal framework and fiscal regime (3.2); 
 together with an overview of: the extractive industries (3.3);  
 the extractive industries’ contribution to the economy (3.4);  
 production data (3.5);  
 state participation in the extractive industries (3.6);  
 revenue allocations and the sustainability of revenues (3.7 -3.8), 
 license registers and license allocations (3.9- 3.10) and  
 any applicable provisions related to beneficial ownership (3.11) and contracts 
(3.12).  
The following revenue streams should be included: 
i. the host government’s production entitlement (such as profit oil); 
ii. national state-owned company production entitlement; 
iii. profits taxes; 
iv. royalties; 
v. dividends; 
vi. bonuses, such as signature, discovery and production bonuses; 
vii. licence fees, rental fees, entry fees and other considerations for licences and/or 
concessions; and 
viii. any other significant payments and material benefit to government. 
2. Type of payment 
Revenues, whether cash or in-kind, are recorded in the national budget.  
Where revenues are not recorded in the national budget, the allocation of these revenues 
must be explained, with links provided to relevant financial reports as applicable, e.g. 
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sovereign wealth and development funds, sub-national governments, state-owned 
companies, and other extra-budgetary entities. 
3. Limit: 
A threshold amount or percentage to determine if a company or a payment is significant 
to an outcome. EITI implementing countries often set materiality levels based on 
company or payment size. 
4. Brokedown and organization of the payments: 
The multi-stakeholder group is required to agree the level of disaggregation for the 
publication of data. It is required that EITI data is presented by individual company, 
government entity, and revenue stream. Reporting at project level is required. 
5. Records: No information is provided. 
 
EU Extractive Industries 
1. Payments categories 
 (a) production entitlements;  
(b) taxes levied on the income, production or profits of companies, excluding taxes levied 
on consumption such as value added taxes, personal income taxes or sales taxes;  
(c) royalties;  
(d) dividends; 
(e) signature, discovery and production bonuses;  
(f) licence fees, rental fees, entry fees and other considerations for licences and/or 
concessions; and  
(g) payments for infrastructure improvements. 
2. Type of payment 
Payment means an amount paid, whether in money or in kind, for activities. Where 
payments in kind are made to a government, they shall be reported in value and, where 
applicable, in volume. Supporting notes shall be provided to explain how their value has 
been determined. 
3. Limit 
Any payment, whether made as a single payment or as a series of related payments, need 
not be taken into account in the report if it is below EUR 100 000 within a financial year. 
4. Broke down and organization of the payments 
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 (a) the total amount of payments made to each government; 
(b) the total amount per type of payment as specified in points (5)(a) to (g) of Article 41 
made to each government; 
(c) where those payments have been attributed to a specific project, the total amount per 
type of payment as specified in point (5)(a) to (g) of Article 41, made for each such project 
and the total amount of payments for each such project. 
'Project' means the operational activities that are governed by a single contract, license, 
lease, concession or similar legal agreements and form the basis for payment liabilities 
with a government. None the less, if multiple such agreements are substantially 
interconnected, this shall be considered a project; 
Where those payments have been attributed to a specific project, the total amount per type 
of payment made for each such project and the total amount of payments for each such 
project has been reported. Payments made by the undertaking in respect of obligations 
imposed at entity level may be disclosed at the entity level rather than at project level. 
5. Records: No information is provided. 
 
EU BANK 
1. Payments categories: 
 (a) name(s), nature of activities and geographical location; 
(b) turnover; 
(c) number of employees on a full time equivalent basis; 
(d) profit or loss before tax; 
(e) tax on profit or loss; 
(f) public subsidies received. 
2. Type of payment: No information is provided. 
3. Limit: No information is provided. 
4. Broke down and organization of the payments: No information is provided. 
5. Records: No information is provided. 
 
 
C. RELEVANT POINT 
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1. Reports accessible to the public 
OECD: The report should be confidential. It should be available only for tax authorities 
on request. 
USA: Section 13(q), of section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, requires resource extraction 
issuers to provide the payment disclosure publicly. In addition, Section 13(q) requires a 
resource extraction issuer to provide information regarding those payments in an 
interactive data format. To the extent public disclosure of this information could result in 
costs related to competitive concerns. So, issuers could provide the information 
confidentially to the government and then the government could publish a compilation of 
the information, interested parties might still be able to obtain the information pursuant 
to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).) 
CANADA: The Division 28 of the Extractive Sector Transparency Initiative Measures 
Act says that the report should be accessible to the public for example, posting the reports 
on their corporate websites. If an entity not have a website, the Minister will specify an 
alternative approach to making the report accessible to the public. 
EITI: Widely available to the public, for example published on the national EITI website 
and/or other relevant ministry and agency websites, in print media or in places that are 
easily accessible to the public; 
EU Extractive Industries: Undertakings that prepare and make public a report 
complying with third- country reporting requirements assessed, could be exempted to do 
the report but they should publish it.  
EU BANK: The information shall be published, where possible, as an annex to the annual 
financial statements or, where applicable, to the consolidated financial statements of the 
institution concerned. 
 
2. Reports of another jurisdiction / with other legislation (e.g. provinces, 
territories or foreign countries) 
OECD: No applicable 
USA: The final rules also do not permit resource extraction issuers to satisfy the 
disclosure requirements adopted under Section 13(q) by providing disclosures required 
under other extractive transparency reporting requirements, such as under home country 
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laws, listing rules, or an EITI program. There is not an exemption for any situations in 
which foreign law may prohibit the required disclosure.  
CANADA: Reports of another jurisdiction or with other legislation (e.g. provinces, 
territories or foreign countries) can be submitted to satisfy the reporting requirements 
under the Act. It is subjected to any conditions the Minister may impose. 
EITI: No applicable 
EU Extractive Industries: "Undertakings that prepare and make public a report 
complying with third-country reporting requirements assessed as equivalent to the 
requirements of the EU are exempt from the requirements to do the report except for the 
obligation to publish that report. The criteria identified by the Commission to consider 
the requirement from third-country as equivalent to that include the following: 
i. target undertakings, 
ii. target recipients of payments, 
iii. payments captured, 
iv. attribution of payments captured, 
v. breakdown of payments captured, 
vi. triggers for reporting on a consolidated basis, 
vii. reporting medium, 
viii. frequency of reporting, and 
ix. anti-evasion measures;" 
EU Bank: No information is provided. 
 
3. Enforce compliance and fine 
OECD: Purpose to extend their existing transfer pricing documentation penalty regime. 
USA: No specific measures. 
CANADA: Authorities for the Minister to enforce compliance with the Act, including 
requesting an audit from a reporting entity or further information related to payments 
made to governments. It also provides for authorities to inspect records relating to 
payments, and other general compliance enforcement measures. 
Every person or entity that fails to comply with or that contravenes the regulations or give 
a false or misleading information is guilty of an offence punishable on summary 
conviction and liable to a fine of not more than $250,000. 
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EITI: Suspension and cancellation. 
EU Extractive Industries: General provision of administrative penalties in the Directive. 
EU Bank: General provision of administrative penalties in the Directive. 
 
4. Audit 
OECD: No specification. 
USA: The final rules do not require the resource extraction payment information to be 
audited. 
CANADA: The report is to include an attestation made by a director or officer of the 
entity, or an independent auditor or accountant, that the information in the report is true, 
accurate and complete. 
EITI: Companies and the host country’s government generally each submit payment 
information confidentially to an independent administrator selected by the country’s 
multi-stakeholder group, frequently an independent auditor, who reconciles the 
information provided by the companies and the government, and then the administrator 
produces a report. 
EU Extractive Industries: General provision of administrative penalties in the Directive. 
EU Bank: The information provided shall be audited in accordance with Directive 
2006/43/EC 
 
5. Accrual or cash basis 
OECD: No information is provided. 
USA: The final rules do not require the resource extraction payment information to be 
provided on an accrual basis, but on cash basis.  
CANADA: No information is provided. 
EITI: Since company accounts typically are prepared on an accrual basis, company 
auditors might provide a reconciliation statement to explain the difference between 
reported cash payments and financial statements. 
EU extractive industries: No information is provided. 
EU Bank: No information is provided. 
 
6. Formal and active participation of the civil society  
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OECD:  No participation at all. 
USA: No formal participation 
CANADA: No formal participation 
EITI: Multi-stakeholder oversight including a functioning multi-stakeholder group that 
involves the government, companies and the full, independent, active and effective 
participation of civil society. 
EU Extractive Industries: No formal participation. 
EU Bank: No formal participation. 
 
7. Formal and active participation of the Government or its representatives  
OECD: No formal and active participation of tax authorities. 
USA: No formal and active participation. 
CANADA: No formal and active participation. 
EITI: "multi-stakeholder oversight including a functioning multi-stakeholder group that 
involves the government, companies and the full, independent, active and effective 
participation of civil society" 
EU Extractive Industries: No formal and active participation 
EU Bank: No formal and active participation. 
 
8. Finance resource 
OECD: No information is provided. 
USA: No information is provided. 
CANADA: No information is provided. 
EITI: The international community provides support of EITI implementation both 
bilaterally and through the EITI Multi-Donor Trust Fund managed by the World Bank. 
The Secretariat is funded by supporting governments and supporting companies. 
Implementing country governments, pay for the implementation and Validation of their 
EITI process50. 
EU Extractive Industries: No information is provided. 
EU Bank: No information is provided. 
                                                 
50 For more details see “Governance Structure” on the EITI web-page. https://eiti.org/about/governance  
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9. Government obligation on reporting 
OECD: None. 
USA: None 
CANADA: None. 
EITI: The government also completes a reporting template that outlines the revenues 
received from the extractive industry. The government sends the completed reporting 
template to the Independent Administrator at the same time as the companies submit their 
information. 
EU Extractive Industries: None. 
EU Bank: None. 
 
10. Review 
OECD: The OECD will review the CBCR in 2020. 
USA: No information is provided. 
CANADA: No information is provided. 
EITI: No information is provided. 
EU Extractive Industries: The review shall take into account international 
developments, in particular with regard to enhancing transparency of payments to 
governments, assess the impacts of other international regimes and consider the effects 
on competitiveness and security of energy supply. It shall be completed by 21 July 2018.  
The report shall be submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council, together 
with a legislative proposal. That review shall consider: 
 the extension of the reporting requirements to additional industry sectors; 
 whether the report on payments to governments should be audited; 
 the disclosure of additional information on the average number of employees, the 
use of subcontractors and any pecuniary penalties administered by a country and 
 the feasibility of the introduction of an obligation for all Union issuers to carry 
out due diligence when sourcing minerals to ensure that supply chains have no 
connection to conflict parties and respect the EITI and OECD recommendations 
on responsible supply chain management. 
EU Bank: No information is provided.  
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3. Lending composition selected countries 
Success rate in obtaining equity finance 
Banks 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 8,8 0,0 0,0 35,0 91,2 65,0 
Spain 86,0 60,8 12,5 14,6 1,5 24,6 
France 74,7 43,1 0,0 3,1 25,3 53,8 
Italy 0,0 28,4 0,0 20,7 100,0 51,0 
UK 93,7 79,0 0,0 0,8 6,3 20,2 
 
  
Existing shareholders 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 65,1 93,1 25,1 0,9 9,8 6,0 
Spain 76,8 55,4 11,8 17,1 11,4 27,5 
France 96,1 89,6 2,1 5,2 1,7 5,3 
Italy 40,7 70,1 24,4 13,0 34,9 16,9 
UK 96,0 88,2 4,0 5,5 0,0 6,4 
 
 
Business angels 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 99,1 100,0 
Spain 2,3 0,5 0,0 0,0 97,7 99,5 
France 29,4 44,7 0,0 5,3 70,6 50,0 
Italy 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 100,0 
UK 35,9 17,8 7,7 4,1 56,4 78,1 
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Family, friends or other individuals, not any of the above 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 4,9 58,0 95,1 0,0 0,0 42,0 
Spain 7,4 15,8 60,8 28,7 31,8 55,5 
France 41,7 58,5 0,0 11,1 58,3 30,5 
Italy 76,1 0,0 9,4 2,2 14,5 97,8 
UK 68,6 30,0 15,7 24,0 15,7 46,0 
 
Initial public offering or other stock market offerings 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 66,7 26,5 0,0 0,0 33,3 73,5 
Spain 46,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 53,1 100,0 
France 34,8 20,2 2,2 3,0 63,0 76,8 
Italy 26,9 58,9 0,0 23,4 73,1 17,7 
UK 23,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 76,9 100,0 
 
 
Other financial institutions 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 0,0 93,6 0,0 0,0 100,0 6,4 
Spain 74,3 2,2 0,0 43,4 25,7 54,4 
France 42,9 50,6 2,4 0,6 54,8 48,7 
Italy 0,0 17,3 0,0 41,6 100,0 41,1 
UK 80,2 93,5 0,0 1,8 19,8 4,7 
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 Other businesses 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 84,6 8,9 1,9 25,0 13,5 66,1 
Spain 73,5 17,2 4,9 16,1 21,6 66,7 
France 73,5 57,5 0,0 0,8 26,5 41,7 
Italy 28,2 8,4 0,0 0,0 71,8 91,6 
UK 42,6 38,5 0,0 0,0 57,4 61,5 
 
 
 
 
Success rate in obtaining loan finance  
 
Banks 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 85.30 75.90 8.00 15.90 6.70 8.20 
Spain 87.30 59.10 9.70 27.80 3.00 13.20 
France 94.50 83.30 3.60 9.70 2.00 7.00 
Italy 86.60 78.40 12.20 16.70 1.20 4.90 
UK 88.40 64.60 6.10 14.70 5.60 20.80 
 
Owner(s)/director(s) of the business 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 93.20 82.90 5.40 14.90 1.40 2.20 
Spain 72.60 54.30 12.80 17.50 14.60 28.20 
France 85.50 72.80 4.60 11.80 9.90 15.40 
Italy 76.10 72.50 20.40 19.10 3.50 8.40 
UK 86.10 83.80 12.30 7.80 1.60 8.40 
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Other employees of the business 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 17.70 34.90 0.00 1.70 82.30 63.40 
Spain 38.80 16.70 8.90 22.30 52.20 61.00 
France 49.50 40.00 3.10 9.60 47.40 50.50 
Italy 52.40 3.30 39.50 1.20 8.10 95.50 
UK 11.40 31.00 26.00 24.10 62.60 44.90 
 
 
Family, friends or other individuals outside the business 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 40.60 59.50 12.60 8.10 46.80 32.50 
Spain 42.80 15.40 9.60 26.40 47.60 58.20 
France 57.00 44.70 10.90 18.10 32.10 37.20 
Italy 53.40 61.60 40.50 11.80 6.10 26.60 
UK 57.20 68.60 21.60 21.60 21.20 9.80 
 
 
Other businesses 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 33.00 21.70 0.50 1.60 66.50 76.70 
Spain 58.00 36.80 12.00 17.00 30.10 46.20 
France 67.30 46.20 0.00 4.00 32.70 49.80 
Italy 82.60 50.90 12.40 11.90 5.00 37.20 
UK 28.60 46.20 18.20 14.80 53.20 39.00 
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Other loan sources 
  Requests accepted 
Requests partially 
accepted 
Requests refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 42.30 33.00 15.90 5.10 41.80 62.00 
Spain 73.60 35.80 7.10 6.50 19.30 57.70 
France 77.90 55.40 6.20 18.90 15.80 25.70 
Italy 38.50 74.90 35.00 6.50 26.60 18.60 
UK 95.10 80.70 1.70 7.10 3.10 12.20 
 
Success rate in obtaining other source of finance 
 
Leasing 
  
Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 95.1 98.0 2.6 1.9 2.3 0.1 
Spain 95.1 83.8 4.5 9.7 0.4 6.5 
France 96.6 92.2 2.3 5.2 1.1 2.6 
Italy 84.4 78.4 14.4 14.9 1.2 6.7 
United 
Kingdom 
99.7 92.7 0.1 1.9 0.1 5.3 
  
Factoring 
  
Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 41.6 33.3 9.9 27.2 48.5 39.5 
Spain 80.2 62.3 13.7 19.9 6.2 17.8 
France 88.9 72.3 6.7 23.4 4.4 4.3 
Italy 83.9 69.1 12.7 19.5 3.5 11.3 
United 
Kingdom 
98.3 86.9 0.1 6.7 1.5 6.4 
  
Bank overdraft or credit line 
Annex 
 
 
219 
  
Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 89.9 85.3 5.7 12.5 4.4 2.2 
Spain 83.1 67.0 15.4 20.6 1.5 12.4 
France 86.5 71.3 7.6 15.4 6.0 13.3 
Italy 85.3 80.3 9.3 11.3 5.4 8.4 
United 
Kingdom 
94.3 83.0 4.3 9.4 1.4 7.6 
  
Subsidised loans 
  
Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 46.2 58.8 22.2 0.6 31.6 40.6 
Spain 69.6 58.5 14.8 16.8 15.6 24.7 
France 86.8 72.7 2.1 8.0 11.0 19.3 
Italy 93.5 90.3 2.1 4.9 4.4 4.8 
United 
Kingdom 
0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 
  
Subsidies by [your country's] government 
  
Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 27.4 75.8 10.7 9.1 61.8 15.1 
Spain 62.2 49.2 22.4 25.7 15.4 25.1 
France 86.0 73.1 6.3 13.8 7.7 13.1 
Italy 45.5 45.4 11.9 9.3 42.6 45.4 
United 
Kingdom 
93.8 92.1 0.0 2.1 6.2 5.8 
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Foreign government bodies or international organisations 
  
Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 0.5 12.1 17.6 15.5 81.9 72.4 
Spain 41.3 5.2 10.9 18.2 47.8 76.6 
France 57.0 45.7 0.7 22.1 42.3 32.1 
Italy 67.6 64.2 7.3 12.0 25.1 23.8 
United 
Kingdom 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
  
Trade credit (by suppliers) 
  
Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 85.1 81.4 8.9 13.2 6.0 5.4 
Spain 77.5 58.5 18.9 28.5 3.6 13.0 
France 76.3 53.8 19.3 33.8 4.4 12.5 
Italy 39.8 34.7 10.2 9.0 49.9 56.3 
United 
Kingdom 
87.9 86.5 5.5 12.4 6.6 1.1 
  
Advanced payments (by customers) 
  
Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 75.4 72.4 8.0 17.6 16.6 9.9 
Spain 69.6 48.0 20.8 28.2 9.6 23.8 
France 59.7 46.3 27.1 35.9 13.2 17.8 
Italy 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.6 98.3 99.4 
United 
Kingdom 
79.7 88.1 1.3 8.2 19.0 3.7 
       
  
International trade or export finance facilities 
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Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 13.3 38.2 0.0 0.0 86.7 61.8 
Spain 51.9 43.0 22.2 32.6 26.0 24.4 
France 76.9 71.9 7.7 18.6 15.4 9.5 
Italy 29.2 28.1 0.0 3.7 70.8 68.3 
United 
Kingdom 
100.0 99.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
  
Mezzanine or hybrid financing 
  
Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 4.6 3.5 16.9 0.0 78.5 96.5 
Spain 1.2 7.9 5.5 0.7 93.3 91.4 
France 0.0 35.1 0.0 1.8 100.0 63.2 
Italy 13.1 5.3 0.0 0.0 86.9 94.7 
United 
Kingdom 
23.9 79.4 76.1 0.0 0.0 20.6 
  
Other finance types and sources 
  
Requests 
accepted 
Requests 
partially 
accepted 
Requests 
refused 
  2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
Germany 59.0 68.8 0.0 15.7 41.0 15.5 
Spain 71.2 66.8 8.0 15.4 20.8 17.8 
France 83.6 85.2 10.0 4.5 6.4 10.3 
Italy 52.2 56.9 13.7 6.6 34.1 36.5 
United 
Kingdom 
97.9 93.3 2.1 0.5 0.0 6.3 
EUROSTAT: Success rate in obtaining other types of 
finance, by sources, type of enterprise and NACE Rev. 2 
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4. Assets of Financial Institutions 
 
26-group: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Germany, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Turkey, United States, South Africa. Note: Banks refer to the broader category of Deposit-taking Institutions. Financial assets when available, 
otherwise total assets. Converted to USD using the end of the period market exchange rates. Aggregated across jurisdictions. In case of missing data in a time series, values were not inter- or 
extrapolated. Some aggregated series have breaks and an increase in an aggregated series may be the result of improvements in reporting of a sub-sector over time rather than an increase in the 
volume of financial assets. The Banks' assets to OFIs and Banks' liabilities to OFIs figures are not adjusted for banks’ assets and liabilities to OFIs that are prudentially consolidated into banking 
groups. The size of the Hedge Fund sector is significantly underestimated primarily due to two factors. First, off-shore financial centres, where most Hedge Funds are domiciled, are not included 
in the current scope of the exercise. Second, the Flow of Funds statistics are not granular enough in many jurisdictions to allow a separation between Hedge Funds and other sectors. 
Financial stability Board Calculation (Financial Stability Board, 2015) 
 
 
Assets of Financial Institutions
USD trillion; 26 jurisdictions (26-group )
2002 116.5 4.4 51.0 1.2 1.4 13.2 12.6 11.4 23.3 3.0 2.6 2.6 0.0 6.4 3.3 0.2 0.1 1.4 3.8 0.5
2003 140.7 5.2 63.2 1.6 1.7 15.9 14.7 12.2 28.9 3.1 3.0 3.0 0.0 8.7 3.9 0.5 0.1 1.8 4.7 0.6
2004 161.1 6.1 74.0 2.1 2.1 17.8 16.4 12.4 33.8 3.1 3.2 3.7 0.0 10.4 4.7 0.7 0.1 2.1 5.8 0.7
2005 168.2 6.6 75.3 2.2 2.4 18.0 17.6 11.9 38.1 3.2 3.3 4.6 0.0 12.4 5.2 0.8 0.1 2.1 6.4 0.6
2006 193.3 7.4 87.7 2.6 3.1 20.2 19.7 11.8 45.7 3.7 3.5 5.7 0.0 15.2 5.9 0.9 0.1 2.9 7.6 0.8
2007 228.5 9.5 106.9 4.1 4.7 22.2 21.4 13.1 54.5 4.7 3.8 7.4 0.1 17.8 6.8 1.0 0.2 4.0 8.9 1.0
2008 234.9 13.1 115.4 6.7 6.8 20.6 18.8 14.2 51.9 5.4 4.3 7.4 0.1 13.2 9.2 0.9 0.1 4.6 6.6 0.8
2009 243.9 13.7 115.9 5.7 6.5 22.6 21.5 14.4 54.3 5.0 4.2 8.2 0.1 17.0 7.9 1.0 0.2 4.9 5.8 1.6
2010 258.7 15.1 121.2 5.8 6.7 24.1 23.9 14.5 58.2 4.3 4.3 6.9 0.2 19.3 8.7 1.5 0.7 5.1 7.3 1.5
2011 273.2 18.0 131.0 6.6 6.9 24.7 24.6 14.5 58.7 4.0 4.2 6.4 0.2 18.9 9.1 1.7 1.0 5.4 7.7 1.7
2012 287.9 19.8 136.5 6.4 6.7 26.2 26.7 14.2 62.8 4.1 4.0 6.0 0.2 22.0 9.4 1.9 1.5 6.0 7.9 1.7
2013 294.9 21.0 136.7 5.7 6.2 27.1 28.2 13.7 66.7 4.1 3.7 5.5 0.2 25.7 9.3 2.0 2.2 6.4 7.6 1.6
2014 295.5 21.6 135.1 5.1 5.8 27.0 29.0 13.4 68.1 4.3 3.6 4.9 0.4 27.4 9.6 2.1 2.7 6.0 7.2 1.4
Other 
Financial 
Intermedi
aries 
(OFIs)
Financial 
AuxiliariesBanks' 
assets to 
OFIs
Banks' 
liabilities 
to OFIs
Brokers 
Dealers
Others 
(identified
)
Finance 
Companie
s
Other 
Investmen
t Funds
Financial 
Institution
s
Central 
Banks Real 
Estate 
Intestment 
Trusts and 
Money 
Market 
Funds
Banks
Structured 
Finance 
Vehicles
Insurance 
Companie
s
Public 
Financial 
Institution
s
Pension 
Funds Hedge 
Funds
Trust 
Companie
s
Others 
(unidentifi
ed)
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5. Type of Financial Institutions 
Following the detailed description of the type of financial institutions is reported51. The list 
is taken from the U.S. market and represents the main actors of it. Other intermediaries could 
be find in classifications done by other authors (for example (Neave, 2009, pp. see -Part.6 - 
Chapter 17)). Moreover, the technological innovation let the intermediaries to manage the 
risk in different way and it bring the constitution of new subjects. 
  
1) Deposit-type institutions 
Depository-type institutions are the most commonly used types of financial intermediaries 
because people use their services on a daily basis. Depository institutions offer different 
types of checking or savings accounts and time deposits. Depository Institutions use the 
deposits to make loans such as mortgages, consumer loans and business loans. The deposits 
and interest paid on deposit accounts are insured by federally sponsored insurance agencies 
and therefore are considered risk-free. These deposits are also highly liquid and can usually 
be withdrawn on demand. Types of depository institutions are listed and briefly explained 
below. 
a) Commercial Banks: Commercial Banks are the largest among all financial 
intermediaries and are also the most diversified due to the large range of assets 
and liabilities they hold. Their liabilities are in the form of checking and savings 
deposits, and various types of time deposits. The assets that commercial banks 
hold are securities of various forms and denominations such as mortgage loans, 
consumer loans, business loans and loans to state and local governments. 
Commercial banks are among the most regulated forms of business due to their 
vital role in the well-being of the economy. 
b) Savings and loan association (S&L), and mutual savings banks are often called 
thrift institutions, are financial institutions that specializes in accepting savings 
deposits and making mortgage and other loans. The terms "S&L" or "thrift" are 
mainly used in the United States; similar institutions in the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and some Commonwealth countries include building societies and 
                                                 
51 (Workman, 2011) 
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trustee savings banks. Thrift institutions offer checking and savings accounts and 
other various types of time-deposits and use these funds to purchase long-term 
mortgages. Savings and loans are the largest residential mortgage lenders. Thrift 
Institutions specialize in maturity intermediation since they take liquid deposits 
and lend the out in the form of long-term collateralized loans. 
c) Credit Unions or Savings and Credit Cooperative. Credit Unions are small non-
profit depository institutions that are owned by their members who are also their 
customers. Members of credit unions all have a common bond such as military 
service, occupation etc... Credit unions primary liabilities are checking deposits 
(share drafts) and savings accounts (share accounts) and credit unions usually 
make their investments in the form of short-term instalment consumer loans. The 
most significant difference between credit unions and commercial banks are the 
restrictions that most loans are made to consumers only, the common bond 
requirement for members, the non-profit nature and the tax exemptions due to 
their cooperative nature. 
 
2) Contractual Savings Institutions: 
These are savings institutions that obtain their funds through long-term contractual 
arrangements and invest these funds on the capital markets. Insurance companies and 
pension funds are contractual savings institutions. They usually have a steady inflow of funds 
from their contractual arrangements therefore they usually do not experience difficulties 
with liquidity and can make long-term investments in securities such as bonds and sometimes 
common stock. 
a) Life Insurance Companies: Life insurance companies issues securities which are 
claims meant to protect individuals and families from events such as premature death 
or early retirement. In the event of early death or retirement the beneficiaries receive 
benefits that were promised in the contract. Many life insurance companies also offer 
some savings to their policy holders. Since their cash-flows are predictable they are 
able to invest in long-term securities that provide higher yields. Life Insurance 
companies are regulated by the states they operate in unlike depository institution 
which are regulated by they federal government. 
b) Casualty Insurance Companies: These types of insurance companies sell policies 
that protect individuals or businesses against loss of property from fire, theft, 
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accidents or other causes that can be predicted through statistical models. Casualty 
insurance companies' primary source of funds come from premiums charged to the 
policyholders. Unlike life insurance companies, the cash outflows of casualty 
insurance companies are not as predictable; therefore they invest their funds in 
short-term, highly marketable securities. Since short-term securities usually offer 
lower returns, casualty insurance companies invest in higher risk securities such as 
stocks to earn higher returns. To reduce taxes, casualty insurance companies often 
also invest in municipal bonds. 
c) Pension Funds: Pension funds generally acquire funds from employer and employee 
contributions while the employee is still working and provide the employee with 
payments during retirement. Pension funds usually invest funds in corporate bonds 
and equities. Pension funds are beneficial to individuals because they help employees 
plan and save for retirement. Because of the long-term investment nature, pension 
funds generally invest in long-term, higher yield securities. 
 
3) Investment Funds 
a) Mutual Funds: Mutual funds pool together funds from investors and then build a 
portfolio consisting of equities and bonds. The investors own shares which represent 
a portion of the mutual fund pie. The amount of shares an investor owns is dependent 
on the amount of money he or she contributed. Mutual funds are beneficial to small 
investors because they offer diversification, economies of scale for transaction costs, 
and professional portfolio management. The value of a mutual funds share is not 
fixed; it fluctuates with the change in value of the mutual fund's portfolio. Different 
mutual funds specialize in different sectors. Some mutual funds specialize in high-
risk growth stocks which are good for young and risk tolerant investors while others 
specialize in income type securities which are better for older retired individuals who 
need income to pay for their living expenses. 
b) Money Market Mutual Funds:  A money market mutual fund (MMMF) is simply a 
mutual fund that strictly invests its pool of funds in money market securities which 
are short-term securities with low default-risk. These securities are usually sold in 
denominations starting at $1-million therefore most investors do not have enough 
money to purchase them directly. MMMFs offer small investors the opportunity to 
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invest in these short-term securities without taking on huge financial risks. MMMFs 
generally allow investors to write checks and make withdraws making them 
competitive with checking and savings accounts. However, there are usually limits 
on how many withdraws can be made and the accounts are not insured. 
 
4) Other Types of Financial Intermediaries 
a) Finance Companies: Finance companies obtain most of their money by issuing 
commercial paper (short-term IOUs) to investors, and the rest is obtained from the 
sale of equity capital and long-term debt obligations. Finance companies then take 
this money and make loans to consumers and businesses. There are three basic types 
of finance companies: (1) consumer finance companies which specialize in loans 
made to households, (2) business finance companies which make loans and leases to 
businesses, and (3) sales finance companies which finance the items that are sold by 
retail stores. Finance companies are regulated by the states they operate in but are 
also subject to regulation by the federal government. 
b) Federal Agencies: The U.S. government acts as a financial intermediary through its 
agencies which take part in financial intermediary type transactions. The goal of 
federal agencies is to reduce the costs of borrowing funds in order to increase the 
flow of funds in certain sectors of the economy. Government agencies achieve this 
by selling debt securities called agency securities and then lending the funds from 
the sale to the economic sectors they serve. These agencies usually serve the housing 
sector and agriculture sector because many argue that these sectors would not be 
able to obtain credit at a reasonable cost if the government did not take direct 
intervention. 
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6. Narrowing down towards an activity-based measure of shadow banking 
 
The narrowing down methodology then involves the following steps:  
 
1. Pension funds and insurance companies that are not part of shadow banking.  
All pension fund assets, amounting to $29.0 trillion are deducted in a first step. In addition, 
$26.9 trillion of insurance company assets that are not classified into Economic Function 4 
(facilitation of credit creation) are also excluded from the shadow banking measure. 
 
2. OFIs reported as not shadow banking.  
Assets of OFIs that jurisdictions identified as not being involved in any of the shadow 
banking activities described by the five economic functions are also excluded from shadow 
banking. $23.6 trillion are subtracted in this narrowing down step. It comprises mainly 
entities that tend not to directly engage in credit intermediation or to exhibit shadow banking 
risks. Examples include equity investment funds, closed-end funds without leverage and/or 
significant liquidity/maturity transformation, and equity real estate investment trust/funds. 
 
3. Prudential consolidation into banking group.  
Entities that are consolidated into a banking group for prudential purposes are already subject 
to appropriate regulation/supervision of shadow banking risks (i.e. maturity/liquidity 
transformation, imperfect credit risk transfer, and/or leverage) and therefore excluded from 
the shadow banking estimate.36 These entities typically include broker-dealers, finance 
companies and structured finance vehicles. The amount of prudentially consolidated assets 
in this year’s report was $9.3 trillion. 
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7. Effective corporate tax rate 
  Effective tax rate 
 % 2008 2011 2014 
ES 24.7874 23.9453 24.4925 
FR 17.5924 17.0761 14.7525 
IT 54.8585 58.4408 53.7840 
 
 
Effective tax rate: 2008 
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Effective tax rate: 2011 
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Effective tax rate: 2014 
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8. Taxed paid for € 1.000,00 of sales 
 
 
 
 
Country Mean 2008 Mean 2011 Mean 2014 
ES 6.71 5.48 6.48 
FR 9.42 9.64 8.73 
IT 13.86 13.25 11.75 
 
 
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
ES FR IT
TAX PAID for €1,000.00 SALES
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Country Mean 2008 Mean 2011 Mean 2014 
ES .0290 .0253 .0305 
FR .0317 .0318 .0285 
IT .0522 .0512 .0462 
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9. ANOVA analysis  
Independent variable 1: Countries 
 Group 1: Spain 
 Group 2: France 
 Group 3: Italy 
 
Independent variable 2: Source of Finance 
 Group 1 = Commercial credit - commercial debts IF > 45 days; 
 Group 10 = Gearing = ((Non-current liabilities + Loans) / Shareholders funds) * 100 
IF < 50; 
 Group 20 = 10 + 1; 
 Group 11 = Gearing  IF> 200; 
 Group 21 = 20 + 1; 
 Group 100 = All others companies 
 
Dependent variable: Mark-up (trimmed 5% turnover over trimmed 5% material cost) = 
(tr. Turnover – tr. Material cost) / tr. Material cost 
  
Annex 
 
 
237 
 
Descriptive Statistics 2008 
Dependent Variable: 
MARKUP_trTURNOVER_trMATCOST 
Country 
ISO 
Code 
FINANCE
6 
Mean 
% 
Std. 
Deviation 
N 
ES 
1 61.10 48.56 729 
10 80.27 88.04 2781 
11 58.18 42.83 605 
20 76.78 87.47 618 
21 58.47 41.88 194 
100 71.05 62.66 2463 
Total 72.64 73.15 7390 
FR 
1 88.17 48.93 559 
10 105.03 84.68 3218 
11 92.52 52.48 530 
20 93.61 66.20 439 
21 89.80 42.18 131 
100 94.44 64.77 2066 
Total 98.56 72.95 6943 
IT 
1 58.54 40.64 1484 
10 67.32 70.16 1784 
11 55.54 40.13 913 
20 70.35 75.48 782 
21 61.07 39.09 704 
100 71.55 86.46 1916 
Total 64.98 65.77 7583 
Total 
1 65.19 46.05 2772 
10 87.54 84.26 7783 
11 65.89 47.11 2048 
20 78.06 78.21 1839 
21 64.24 41.18 1029 
100 78.70 71.99 6445 
Total 78.20 72.03 21916 
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Descriptive Statistics 2011 
Dependent Variable: 
MARKUP_trTURNOVER_trMATCOST 
Country 
ISO 
Code 
FINANCE6 
Mean 
% 
Std. 
Deviation 
N 
ES 
1 70.71 75.85 894 
10 94.29 114.64 2745 
11 70.17 62.76 679 
20 97.66 131.05 521 
21 67.80 59.29 184 
100 84.65 91.33 2451 
Total 85.70 99.90 7474 
FR 
1 95.02 72.88 445 
10 111.03 93.60 3765 
11 95.17 55.93 562 
20 111.77 81.98 216 
21 96.08 65.78 57 
100 100.98 80.01 1882 
Total 105.88 85.89 6927 
IT 
1 64.32 59.58 1660 
10 74.84 86.30 1620 
11 62.11 46.16 960 
20 76.03 70.23 759 
21 63.82 45.46 821 
100 78.57 100.85 1852 
Total 70.81 76.24 7672 
Total 
1 70.78 67.64 2999 
10 98.16 100.83 8130 
11 73.04 55.86 2201 
20 88.72 98.12 1496 
21 66.24 49.84 1062 
100 87.80 91.54 6185 
Total 86.86 88.98 22073 
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Descriptive Statistics 2014 
Dependent Variable: 
MARKUP_trTURNOVER_trMATCOST 
Country 
ISO 
Code 
Source of 
finance 
Mean 
% 
Std. 
Deviation 
N 
ES 
1 66.19 72.70 979 
10 95.69 128.30 2977 
11 70.88 67.37 743 
20 88.43 82.97 413 
21 83.03 109.76 137 
100 85.57 94.80 2489 
Total 85.71 104.94 7738 
FR 
1 92.62 59.32 407 
10 116.04 113.62 4263 
11 96.59 54.29 707 
20 120.41 92.70 58 
21 78.93 37.24 17 
100 105.68 80.59 1735 
Total 110.24 99.23 7187 
IT 
1 69.15 64.17 1355 
10 80.97 98.93 1785 
11 70.33 87.10 656 
20 84.49 134.26 977 
21 64.50 48.14 672 
100 78.82 91.09 2294 
Total 76.37 92.69 7739 
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Analysis of material score and turnover  
 
 Material cost Turnover 
  2008 2011 2014 2008 2011 2014 
ES 305170 231344 204142 461435 363221 317767 
FR 271693 272581 265274 484246 494886 485264 
IT 465006 431906 367931 701017 665931 577864 
 
Variation 
  Material cost Turnover 
  2008-2011 2011-2014 2008-2011 2011-2014 
ES -24.19% -11.76% -21.28% -12.51% 
FR 0.33% -2.68% 2.20% -1.94% 
IT -7.12% -14.81% -5.00% -13.22% 
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10. Regression analysis52 
10.1. Regression Model of taxation 
 
Following the test using in the model to see possible problem are displayed53.  
 
Serial correlation test 
The Durbin-Watson, or DW, statistic is the traditional test for serial correlation. The Durbin-
Watson statistic is under the null hypothesis no serial correlation. The Durbin-Watson could 
take values from 0 to 4 with the center in 2. So values near 0 meaning that the data are 
positive correlated; while values near 4 meaning that the data are negative correlated; so 
values near 2 are desirables. 
 
Heteroskedasticity test 
A statistical assumption for ordinary least squares (OLS) is that the error terms have a 
common variance for all observations; when it happens error terms are homoskedastic. On 
the other hand, when the variance of error vary is said to be heteroskedastic.  
 
Residual normally distributed test 
Jarque –Bara test  
 
  
                                                 
52  
53 For further explications of the tests refer to (Woolddridge, 2008), (Vogelvang, 2005), (Carrascal Arranz, et 
al., 2001)  
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SPAIN 
Taxation 
Hausman test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: TAX_1M   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 100.505845 12 0.0000 
     
     
     
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     
GDP(-1) -1.027862 -0.045325 0.776714 0.2649 
INTERESTPAID -0.424011 -0.220697 0.001230 0.0000 
MCREDITORS -0.016140 -0.023342 0.000005 0.0008 
MNONCURRENT -0.013767 -0.012204 0.000002 0.2838 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.034036 0.025334 0.000002 0.0000 
D2008 1177.003642 233.952315 
1101395.1429
44 0.3689 
D2009 -588.206259 -1769.364001 
1878030.4095
79 0.3887 
D2010 
-
3344.690279 -3139.145656 
265239.03421
2 0.6898 
D2011 
-
3301.046415 -2795.019305 
262753.19377
7 0.3236 
D2012 
-
5193.859277 -4358.896160 90799.323235 0.0056 
D2013 
-
5661.204439 -4273.406239 
243750.18377
4 0.0049 
D2014 
-
4576.741760 -3488.263409 
346326.82850
3 0.0644 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
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Dependent Variable: TAXATION   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/04/16   Time: 20:13   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=1  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 842   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 4555  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 26629.91 20043.43 1.328611 0.1841 
GDP(-1) -1.027862 0.884959 -1.161479 0.2455 
INTERESTPAID -0.424011 0.050011 -8.478354 0.0000 
MCREDITORS -0.016140 0.003476 -4.643214 0.0000 
MNONCURRENT -0.013767 0.001717 -8.019507 0.0000 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.034036 0.001815 18.74944 0.0000 
D2008 1177.004 1357.737 0.866886 0.3861 
D2009 -588.2063 1625.925 -0.361767 0.7175 
D2010 -3344.690 1015.382 -3.294022 0.0010 
D2011 -3301.046 1025.834 -3.217915 0.0013 
D2012 -5193.859 952.6377 -5.452082 0.0000 
D2013 -5661.204 1024.221 -5.527324 0.0000 
D2014 -4576.742 1068.320 -4.284054 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.531492    Mean dependent var 1446.419 
Adjusted R-squared 0.423511    S.D. dependent var 18894.22 
S.E. of regression 14345.79    Akaike info criterion 22.14765 
Sum squared resid 7.62E+11    Schwarz criterion 23.35206 
Log likelihood -49587.28    Hannan-Quinn criter. 22.57178 
F-statistic 4.922085    Durbin-Watson stat 2.063895 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Serial correlation test 
In our case the DW is 2,06 meaning that there is no serial correlation in the residual  
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Residual normally distributed 
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
-200000 -100000 0 100000 200000 300000 400000
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2014 IF
     COUNTRYISOCODE_A=1
Observations 4555
Mean      -1.28e-14
Median   124.7684
Maximum  394811.3
Minimum -222418.1
Std. Dev.   12932.65
Skewness   7.532136
Kurtosis   294.9425
Jarque-Bera  16219089
Probability  0.000000
 
 
 
France 
Taxation  
Hausman test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: TAX_2M   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 144.725193 12 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     
GDP(-1) 0.114083 -0.099973 0.021073 0.1403 
INTERESTPAID -0.034769 -0.095484 0.000134 0.0000 
MCREDITORS 0.006418 0.010349 0.000003 0.0326 
MNONCURRENT -0.002853 0.002446 0.000000 0.0000 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.005589 0.010618 0.000001 0.0000 
D2008 
-
1125.819869 -790.773963 38589.690760 0.0881 
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D2009 
-
1781.916009 -1287.442230 95547.140568 0.1097 
D2010 -389.595858 -300.931406 28115.670931 0.5970 
D2011 -571.885494 -321.234748 87762.071570 0.3975 
D2012 
-
1807.855725 -1335.200657 
162914.66256
2 0.2416 
D2013 
-
2445.596007 -1996.948120 
201812.27361
6 0.3179 
D2014 
-
3063.460832 -1981.128316 
242135.91766
7 0.0278 
     
     
     
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: TAXATION   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/04/16   Time: 20:23   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=2  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 474   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 2771  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 3520.373 4633.392 0.759783 0.4475 
GDP(-1) 0.114083 0.152815 0.746548 0.4554 
INTERESTPAID -0.034769 0.023539 -1.477088 0.1398 
MCREDITORS 0.006418 0.002979 2.154860 0.0313 
MNONCURRENT -0.002853 0.001361 -2.095893 0.0362 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.005589 0.001151 4.855738 0.0000 
D2008 -1125.820 642.8412 -1.751319 0.0800 
D2009 -1781.916 689.4427 -2.584574 0.0098 
D2010 -389.5959 633.2478 -0.615234 0.5385 
D2011 -571.8855 687.6384 -0.831666 0.4057 
D2012 -1807.856 746.0644 -2.423190 0.0155 
D2013 -2445.596 782.9094 -3.123728 0.0018 
D2014 -3063.461 809.8518 -3.782743 0.0002 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
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R-squared 0.751746    Mean dependent var 6673.449 
Adjusted R-squared 0.699053    S.D. dependent var 14162.87 
S.E. of regression 7769.558    Akaike info criterion 20.91175 
Sum squared resid 1.38E+11    Schwarz criterion 21.95127 
Log likelihood -28487.23    Hannan-Quinn criter. 21.28717 
F-statistic 14.26656    Durbin-Watson stat 1.534102 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Serial correlation test 
In our case the DW is 1,50 meaning that there is no serial correlation in the residual  
 
Residual normally distributed 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
-50000 -25000 0 25000 50000 75000 100000
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2014 IF
     COUNTRYISOCODE_A=2
Observations 2771
Mean      -1.63e-13
Median  -111.9092
Maximum  98054.01
Minimum -60545.54
Std. Dev.   7056.665
Skewness   1.827811
Kurtosis   30.61458
Jarque-Bera  89587.42
Probability  0.000000
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy 
Taxation 
 
Hausman test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: TAX_3M   
Test cross-section random effects  
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Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 111.087551 12 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     
GDP(-1) 0.083402 0.144858 0.063210 0.8069 
INTERESTPAID 0.008216 0.018440 0.000115 0.3402 
MCREDITORS 0.003224 0.000847 0.000001 0.0058 
MNONCURRENT -0.001270 -0.001183 0.000000 0.8651 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.019972 0.013082 0.000001 0.0000 
D2008 
-
2550.545107 -2470.994797 
111518.17933
2 0.8117 
D2009 
-
3545.115005 -3495.140299 
110916.70257
4 0.8807 
D2010 
-
3427.865841 -3219.093504 13980.574695 0.0775 
D2011 
-
3755.512250 -3579.447860 6105.411536 0.0242 
D2012 
-
5457.892469 -5301.356549 36631.179941 0.4134 
D2013 
-
4515.510497 -4406.384522 33486.291234 0.5509 
D2014 
-
4498.545163 -4594.298368 1253.700675 0.0068 
     
     
     
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: TAXATION   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/04/16   Time: 20:26   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=3  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 1000   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7636  
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 6082.161 6743.381 0.901945 0.3671 
GDP(-1) 0.083402 0.255442 0.326500 0.7441 
INTERESTPAID 0.008216 0.019680 0.417469 0.6763 
MCREDITORS 0.003224 0.001516 2.126830 0.0335 
MNONCURRENT -0.001270 0.000928 -1.368923 0.1711 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.019972 0.001098 18.19330 0.0000 
D2008 -2550.545 601.8127 -4.238105 0.0000 
D2009 -3545.115 602.7170 -5.881890 0.0000 
D2010 -3427.866 516.4334 -6.637576 0.0000 
D2011 -3755.512 507.4009 -7.401469 0.0000 
D2012 -5457.892 537.8491 -10.14763 0.0000 
D2013 -4515.510 536.2030 -8.421271 0.0000 
D2014 -4498.545 501.5793 -8.968762 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.519040    Mean dependent var 8509.600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.445632    S.D. dependent var 14748.95 
S.E. of regression 10981.46    Akaike info criterion 21.56869 
Sum squared resid 7.99E+11    Schwarz criterion 22.48853 
Log likelihood -81337.26    Hannan-Quinn criter. 21.88427 
F-statistic 7.070666    Durbin-Watson stat 1.697435 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Serial correlation test 
    Durbin-Watson stat  1.70 
 
Residual normally distributed 
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0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
-200000 -100000 0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2014 IF
     COUNTRYISOCODE_A=3
Observations 7636
Mean       3.35e-14
Median  -23.83300
Maximum  512310.2
Minimum -182778.0
Std. Dev.   10228.59
Skewness   15.79821
Kurtosis   848.8738
Jarque-Bera  2.28e+08
Probability  0.000000
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10.2. Regression Model of margin 
Spain 
Margin 
 
Hausman test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: MARGIN_1M   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 174.099496 12 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     GDP(-1) 4.925628 2.691040 13.740064 0.5466 
INTERESTPAID 0.714855 1.452517 0.004635 0.0000 
MCREDITORS 0.027087 0.027441 0.000026 0.9443 
MNONCURRENT -0.064336 -0.046616 0.000013 0.0000 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.073844 0.087524 0.000019 0.0016 
D2008 314.214202 1284.080292 
25336480.448
353 0.8472 
D2009 
-
6516.271993 -4016.246637 
39787286.415
466 0.6919 
D2010 
-
3542.756771 -2272.900378 
8956896.8098
22 0.6713 
D2011 
-
9451.082850 -8149.372037 
8759299.1130
68 0.6601 
D2012 
-
19111.32462
7 
-
18699.105169 
5095438.0884
98 0.8551 
D2013 
-
25184.07956
5 
-
25580.999869 
6625467.9470
32 0.8774 
Annex 
 
 
251 
D2014 
-
22324.16181
1 
-
22335.074422 
8329215.2145
43 0.9970 
     
     
     
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: MARGIN   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/04/16   Time: 20:28   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=1  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 940   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 5630  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 34179.17 86200.60 0.396507 0.6917 
GDP(-1) 4.925628 3.768222 1.307149 0.1912 
INTERESTPAID 0.714855 0.192115 3.720979 0.0002 
MCREDITORS 0.027087 0.014434 1.876647 0.0606 
MNONCURRENT -0.064336 0.006615 -9.725282 0.0000 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.073844 0.007361 10.03218 0.0000 
D2008 314.2142 12220.21 0.025713 0.9795 
D2009 -6516.272 12817.84 -0.508375 0.6112 
D2010 -3542.757 11505.49 -0.307919 0.7582 
D2011 -9451.083 11499.80 -0.821848 0.4112 
D2012 -19111.32 11336.82 -1.685775 0.0919 
D2013 -25184.08 11402.00 -2.208743 0.0272 
D2014 -22324.16 11501.00 -1.941063 0.0523 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.830234    Mean dependent var 142206.3 
Adjusted R-squared 0.795722    S.D. dependent var 122062.1 
S.E. of regression 55168.50    Akaike info criterion 24.82712 
Sum squared resid 1.42E+13    Schwarz criterion 25.94921 
Log likelihood -68936.35    Hannan-Quinn criter. 25.21804 
F-statistic 24.05641    Durbin-Watson stat 1.383603 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Serial correlation test 
    Durbin-Watson stat  1.38 
 
Residual normally distributed test 
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2,800
-799999 -399999 1 400001 800001
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2014 IF
     COUNTRYISOCODE_A=1
Observations 5630
Mean       6.20e-14
Median  -290.2156
Maximum  979168.7
Minimum -1031600.
Std. Dev.   50292.78
Skewness   0.217243
Kurtosis   89.66688
Jarque-Bera  1762034.
Probability  0.000000
 
 
 
France 
Margin 
 
Hausman test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: MARGIN_2M   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 35.769142 12 0.0004 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     GDP(-1) -0.764294 -1.823290 1.418798 0.3740 
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INTERESTPAID 0.514214 0.471529 0.005164 0.5525 
MCREDITORS 0.093560 0.133033 0.000121 0.0003 
MNONCURRENT 0.040748 0.051003 0.000011 0.0020 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.115608 0.130820 0.000021 0.0009 
D2008 
-
1098.579728 897.588404 
2339078.7540
81 0.1918 
D2009 
-
5247.794092 -2755.340117 
6052341.8483
69 0.3110 
D2010 2016.474099 3264.356797 
1575081.0843
68 0.3201 
D2011 
10801.21593
2 12438.614839 
5480022.0109
92 0.4843 
D2012 
11041.35965
3 14317.428452 
10461084.402
342 0.3111 
D2013 4760.547119 7924.746283 
12940455.598
055 0.3791 
D2014 
10017.06374
7 16098.420019 
15550592.959
516 0.1230 
     
     
     
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: MARGIN   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/04/16   Time: 20:31   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=2  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 474   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 2762  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 318664.2 41604.93 7.659289 0.0000 
GDP(-1) -0.764294 1.370843 -0.557535 0.5772 
INTERESTPAID 0.514214 0.211673 2.429283 0.0152 
MCREDITORS 0.093560 0.026613 3.515635 0.0004 
MNONCURRENT 0.040748 0.012150 3.353854 0.0008 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.115608 0.010286 11.23912 0.0000 
D2008 -1098.580 5737.020 -0.191490 0.8482 
D2009 -5247.794 6153.193 -0.852857 0.3938 
D2010 2016.474 5658.225 0.356379 0.7216 
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D2011 10801.22 6135.728 1.760381 0.0785 
D2012 11041.36 6660.272 1.657794 0.0975 
D2013 4760.547 6983.611 0.681674 0.4955 
D2014 10017.06 7223.630 1.386708 0.1657 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.895903    Mean dependent var 335366.1 
Adjusted R-squared 0.873721    S.D. dependent var 194912.1 
S.E. of regression 69263.50    Akaike info criterion 25.28761 
Sum squared resid 1.09E+13    Schwarz criterion 26.32994 
Log likelihood -34436.19    Hannan-Quinn criter. 25.66411 
F-statistic 40.38822    Durbin-Watson stat 1.088383 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
Serial correlation test 
    Durbin-Watson stat 1.09 
 
Residual normally distributed test 
0
100
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300
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900
-250000 -125000 0 125000 250000 375000 500000
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2014 IF
     COUNTRYISOCODE_A=2
Observations 2762
Mean       0.000000
Median   0.000000
Maximum  488517.7
Minimum -341148.4
Std. Dev.   62886.49
Skewness   0.626168
Kurtosis   11.62514
Jarque-Bera  8741.888
Probability  0.000000
 
 
Italy 
Margin 
 
Hausman test 
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Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: MARGIN_3M   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 44.021898 12 0.0000 
     
     
     
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     
GDP(-1) -0.529213 3.777913 3.243542 0.0168 
INTERESTPAID 1.291587 1.396263 0.002864 0.0505 
MCREDITORS 0.094610 0.088957 0.000013 0.1145 
MNONCURRENT 0.032740 0.036151 0.000005 0.1256 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.158187 0.143960 0.000016 0.0004 
D2008 
10284.97731
8 4803.403040 
5698293.0111
59 0.0217 
D2009 7848.867136 2666.753103 
5644011.4637
13 0.0292 
D2010 
14624.74198
9 17190.715316 
656123.45472
0 0.0015 
D2011 9897.698225 9440.868357 
249724.79202
8 0.3606 
D2012 2855.797495 333.529916 
1803082.2201
75 0.0603 
D2013 
-
2091.959306 -4602.553597 
1638644.0319
43 0.0498 
D2014 
-
9312.741817 -9379.099097 26951.397938 0.6861 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: MARGIN   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
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Date: 06/04/16   Time: 20:33   
Sample: 2006 2014 IF COUNTRYISOCODE_A=3  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 1000   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7604  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 187198.2 50811.58 3.684163 0.0002 
GDP(-1) -0.529213 1.925704 -0.274815 0.7835 
INTERESTPAID 1.291587 0.156027 8.277980 0.0000 
MCREDITORS 0.094610 0.011432 8.275732 0.0000 
MNONCURRENT 0.032740 0.007091 4.616937 0.0000 
MSHAREHOLDER 0.158187 0.008319 19.01531 0.0000 
D2008 10284.98 4534.480 2.268171 0.0234 
D2009 7848.867 4538.185 1.729517 0.0838 
D2010 14624.74 3892.044 3.757599 0.0002 
D2011 9897.698 3821.716 2.589857 0.0096 
D2012 2855.797 4049.104 0.705291 0.4807 
D2013 -2091.959 4038.900 -0.517953 0.6045 
D2014 -9312.742 3779.013 -2.464332 0.0138 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.836647    Mean dependent var 233211.0 
Adjusted R-squared 0.811594    S.D. dependent var 190172.0 
S.E. of regression 82545.59    Akaike info criterion 25.60345 
Sum squared resid 4.49E+13    Schwarz criterion 26.52660 
Log likelihood -96332.31    Hannan-Quinn criter. 25.92023 
F-statistic 33.39499    Durbin-Watson stat 1.278902 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Serial correlation test 
    Durbin-Watson stat 1.28 
 
Residual normally distributed test 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2014 IF
     COUNTRYISOCODE_A=3
Observations 7604
Mean       8.63e-13
Median  -25.22751
Maximum  1270673.
Minimum -1288369.
Std. Dev.   76861.70
Skewness  -0.450418
Kurtosis   43.06947
Jarque-Bera  508952.9
Probability  0.000000
 
 
 
 
